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SPMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS 
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (generic term) 
The time required t o  ready the rescue vehicle and crew 
f o r  a rescue operation following rece ip t  of t he  a ler t  
signal 
Portable Life  Support System (PLSS) carr ied on the back 
of an astronaut (generic term) 
~ u n a r  Surface Base (generic term) 
Two o r  more men working together in the  Same locat ion and 
environment 
Crew Comparlment used t o  house and t ransport  m e n  on the 
PTV and tug (generic term) 
The t h e  required f o r  the dis t ressed crew t o  communicate 
a request t o  the rescue crew 
Chemically Powered Prime Transport Vehicle (generic term) 
Change in vehicle veloci ty  in inertial space 
A general, unspecified locat ion in Earth o r b i t  or on Surface 
Environmental Control/Life Support System (generic term) 
Environmental Control System (generic term) 
Extravehicular Maneuvering Unit (generic term) 
Ut i l iza t ion  of on-hand equipment and resources, without 
outside assistance, t o  e f f e c t  immediate removal from the 
proximity of  danger 
Emplaced Sc ien t i f ic  Stat ion (generic term) 
Propellant Depot (generic term) 
Generic term for any f ly ing  vehicle designed f o r  l imited 
t r ave l  over the lunar surface (LFV) 
Guidance and Navigation 
Presence of a poten t ia l  r i s k  s i tua t ion  caused by an unsafe 
condition, environment, o r  a c t  
x i i i  
IPP Integrated Program Plan 
IVA IntraVehicular Act ivi ty  
LCG 
Lander 
Liquid Cooled Garment 
See Lunar ~tmdel; pig (UT) 
LEAP Lunar Escape Ambulance Pack 
LESS 
LFV Lunar Flying Vehicle (Flyer) 
L2 Libration Point Point of s tab le  equilibrium in o r b i t  on the  far s ide 
Lunar  Emergency Escape Sgstem (See Ref. Page 5-4) 
of the Moon 
LLT 
LM 
LIMP 
LOD 
LO I 
LRV 
LSB 
LSSM 
Maneuvering 
Work Platform 
Mev 
MOLAB 
MPL 
N-PTV 
OLS 
OPS 
PDD 
PDI 
PGA 
Lunar  Lander Tug (generic term); space tug with landing 
gear 
Lunar  Module 
Lunar Module P i l o t  
Lunar Orbit  Departure 
Lunar Orbit Inser t ion 
Lunar Roving Vehicle (Rover) 
Lunar Surface Base 
Lunar  Sc i en t i f i c  Survey Module 
Platform designed fo r  use in working on tke  ex ter ior  
of an Orbiting Lunar Stat ion 
Mill ion Electron Volts 
Mobile Laboratory 
Manned Payload 
Nuclear-Powered Prime Transport Vehizle (generic tern)  
Orbiting Lunar  Station (generic term) 
Oxygen Purge System (generic term) 
Project  Description Document (produced by NASA-MSC) 
Powered Descent I n i t i a t i o n  
Pressure Garment Assembly 
xiv 
PLSS 
a 
PTV 
RCS 
Rescue 
rem 
Response Time 
RNS 
Rover 
Safety 
SLSS 
Survival 
Survival Time 
Space Tug 
‘ILzg 
TEI 
Tumbling 
4!lv 
Pogo 
Portable Life Support System o r  Backpack (generic term) 
Prime Transport Vehicle used t o  t ransport  personnel and 
cargo between Earth o r b i t  and lunar o r b i t  (generic term) 
Reaction Control System 
Uti l iza t ion  of outside assis tance t o  e f f e c t  a return t o  
a safe haven 
Roentgens equivalent man 
The span of time between the occurrence o f  an emergency 
and the  placement of the stranded crew in to  a temporary 
o r  permanent safe haven 
Reusable Nuclear Shuttle (N-PTV) (generic term) 
Generic term f o r  any lunar surface t ransport  vehicle 
moving on tracks, wheels, e tc .  (LRV) 
Freedom from chance of injury/loss 
Secondary Life Support System (generic term) 
Refers t o  the u t i l i za t ion  of resources immediately a t  
hand t o  extend the  l i ves  of crewmen t o  permit escape 
o r  rescue 
Refers t o  the maximum length of time that a crew can l i v e  
following an emergency, using resources immediately a t  
hand 
Multipurpose vehicle used to  t ransport  men and cargo in 
lunar o r b i t  and t o  t he  lunar surface (generic term) 
Space Tug 
Transearth Injection 
Random angular motion about any axis 
Delta velocity 
A minimal weight, cabinless, rocket propelled vehicle f o r  
horizontal  f l i gh t s  i n  which the crew m u a l l y  s t ab i l i ze s  
and flys the vehicle from a standing posi t ion 
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INTRODUCTION 
L 
T h i s  repor t  presents a technical summary of the hazards and escape/rescue 
requirements ident i f ied,  and the  safety guidelines, escape/rescue guide- 
lines and concepts, and rescue plan developed, during performance of  the  
Lunar  Mission Safety and Rescue Study. 
1.1 OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of  the study was, within the l imi ta t ions  of current 
concepts and planning, t o  es tabl ish the essent ia l  guidelines for  t he  enhance- 
ment of  safety i n  advanced lunar  missions. 
ident i fging and analyzing hazardous conditions and s i tua t ions  and t h e i r  
e f f ec t s ,  and establ ishing effect ive countermeasures; (2) ident i fying con- 
d i t i o n s  and s i tua t ions  which can require a rescue mission; (3)  developing 
escape, survival, and rescue mission requirements, techniques, and concepts, 
and a rescue plan. It i s  expected that the  study r e s u l t s  w i l l  provide major 
inputs  t o  current and planned advanced lunar mission design and operations 
s tud ies  re la ted  t o  the proposed Integrated Program Plan.  
T h i s  was accomplished by (1)  
1.2 CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The study was performed under ra ther  spec i f ic  constraints  and assumptions 
imposed to  l i m i t  the e f f o r t  t o  available hformation and resmrces .  
important constraints  and assumptions are: 
The more 
Analyses a re  constrained to the lunar sphere of influence, and missions 
and operations in the 1980 time frame. 
Operations and interfaces  of major Integrated Program Plan (IPP) elements 
a r e  arialyzed. 
It i s  assumed that design and rout ine internal operations o f  major IPP 
elements a r e  optimized and no hazards analyses are required. 
1-1 
Terms and abbreviations such as Orbiting L u n a r  Stat ion (OLS) and Lunar 
Lander Tug ( U T )  a r e  general, and imply a f’unction o r  broad concept 
r a the r  than a spec i f ic  configuration, s ize ,  mass, o r  capabili ty.  
No c lass ica l  r e l i a b i l i t y  o r  probabi l i ty  analyses a r e  performed. 
hazard could occur, i t  was asmned t o  be a threak, snd malyzed 
accordingly. 
If a 
Previous and current study e f f o r t s  a r e  not  duplicated, but  these and 
the results of Apollo missions ( i n  par t icu lar ,  Missions 11, 12, and 14) 
a r e  used where appropriate. 
L 
Planned IPP elements a r e  used f o r  rescue where feasible .  
a r e  intent ional ly  kept general enough t h a t  the safety guidelines and 
rescue plan w i l l  be va l id  though IPP elements and operations change. 
Study r e s u l t s  
No s ignif icant  e f f o r t  i s  directed toward hardware design. 
Lunar surface a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  defined t o  commence with the f i n a l  f l i g h t  
phase immediately preceding spacecraft touchdown on the lunar surface, 
and t o  conclude once the crew has returned t o  a lunar ascent vehicle 
and ascent has begun. 
Lunar orb i ta l  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  defined t o  commence a t  lunar o r b i t  inser t ion,  
and t o  conclude e i the r  during spacecraft contact with the lunar surface, 
or  upon completion of the  t ransf i r th  in jec t ion  maneuver. 
The study i s  concerned with hazards t o  man, and not  with hazards t o  
equipment, program schedule, or  program objectives. 
1.3 SCOPE AND APPROACH 
The Lunar Mission Safety and Rescue Study covered the  full range of  hazards 
and escape/rescue s i tua t ions  tha t  might occur in the missions presented in 
the  high-level-budget Integrated Program Plan (IPP) o f  Ref. 1. 
The study was divided i n t o  two major tasks. These were: 
* 
Hazards analyses leading t o  safety s i d e l i n e s  and recommendations, 
rescue mission need ident i f ica t ion ,  and safety technologg develop- 
ment recommendations. 
1-2 
Escape/rescue analyses leading t o  escape/rescue requirements and 
concepts and a lunar mission rescue plan. 
A summary of the study approach i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Fig. 1. 
1.3.1 Mission Model 
The mission model and equipment elements assumed f o r  the study were defined 
from the study Statement of Work, from Appendix A t o  the Statement of Work 
t i t l e d ,  tlDescription of Lunar Program Portion of Manned Spacecraft Integrated 
Plant1, from the definitions of Integrated Program Plan elements and objectives,  
from the Project  Description Documents, and from a melding of a l l  these with 
the r e s u l t s  of pas t  and current lunar exploration studies.  
Examples of lurar exploration equipmmt elements a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Fig. 2. 
The major items and t h e i r  usage are: 
Transportation between Earth Orbit and Lunar Orbit 
Nuclear Shut t le  
Chemical Shuttle (a l te rna te)  
Lunar Lander Tug (emergency re turn)  
Operations in L u n a r  Orbit 
Orbiting Lunar Station 
Lunar Lander Tug (normal and rescue) 
Propellant Depot 
Consumables Capsules 
Unmanned S a t e l l i t e  ( sc ien t i f ic ,  communications, e tc .  ) 
Transportation between Lunar Orbit and Lunar  Surface 
Lunar Lander Tug (normal and rescue) 
Operations on the Lunar Surface 
bmar Lander Tug (normal and rescue) 
Lunar Surface h s e  
Roving Vehicles (normal and rescue) 
Flying Vehicles (normal and rescue) 
Science Equipment (emplaced s ta t ions ,  d r i l l s ,  telescopes, e tc .  ) 
Support Equipment (elec.  power, t r a i l e r s ,  suppw canis ters ,  e tc . )  
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Lunar mission operations, as well as equipment elements, were examined in  
the  study.  The primary operations considered are: 
Ear th-Moon 
Snu t ti e 
%era t ion s 
Surfsce 
Operatims 
Transport Payload Rendezvous & Docking 
Lunar  Orbit  Insertion Operations Base 
Transearth Injection Orbit  Keeping & Transfer 
Rendezvous & Docking Resupply 
Stat ion Keeping Maintenance 
Contingency Operations Tug Refieling 
Technology & m i n e e r i n g  
Science 
Ektravehicular Act ivi ty  
S a t e l l i t e  Place & Service 
E s cape/Re s cue 
Contingency Operations 
Deployment 
Exploration 
Technology & Engineering 
Science 
Resupply 
Maintenance 
Walking 
Driving (roving) 
E s  cap e/Re s cue 
Contingency Operations 
Flying 
. 
. 
Variations of the basic  mission model, containing a s e t  of equipment elements 
and mission operations, were considered during the analyses i n  the  search fo r  
the resu l t ing  e f fec ts  on safety and in recognition o f  the f l u i d  s t a t e  of fu ture  
mission planning. 
a r e  : 
Some examples of a l t e rna te  operations and elements considered 
Nuclear vs  chemical shuttle 
Space tugs, varying in s ize  and number of stages 
Non-cabin vs cabin-type roving vehicles  
Orbiting Lunar Station (OLS) vs  no OLS 
Alternate propellant depot basing schemes, and no propellant depot 
1.3.2 Hazards Analysis 
The hazards analysis approach used was t o  work from the mission model and 
defined task  objectives to: 
a. Develop a top l eve l  fbnctional flow and equipment operations diagram. 
1- 6 
LMSGA984262B 
C. 
d. 
e. 
Develop a first l e v e l  flow chart fo r  
identif’y hazard generators, hazards, 
l eve ls .  
each s e r i e s  of 
hazard groups, 
mission events t o  
and range of hazard 
Identif’y events, s i tua t ions ,  operations, and conditions requiring 
de ta i led  hazards analyses. 
Perform individual hazard studies of each item ident i f ied  in (c)  above 
t o  describe hazards, hazards effects ,  preventive and remedial measures 
and safety guidelines candidates, and t o  identif‘g situations requir ing 
rescue. 
Analyze the r e s u l t s  of individual hazard s tudies  t o  a r r ive  a t  recommended 
safety guidelines and requirements, and t o  identif’y a reas  requiring 
safety technology development. 
The hazards analysis methodology i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Fig. 3. 
1 . 3 . 3  Escape/Rescue Analysis 
The escape/rescue ana lys i s  approach was t o  first examine the deployment and 
operational cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of the  various exploration equipment elements, 
such a s  those i l l u s t r a t e d  in E g .  2. The analysis was then separated i n t o  
three p a r t s  t o  study operations during lunar a r r i v a l  and departure, in lunar 
o rb i t ,  and on the lunar surface. 
from analysis  of operations with the various hardware elements and from 
inputs from the hazards ana lys i s  task. 
Escape/rescue s i tua t ions  were developed 
An escape/rescue requirements envelope, expressed in terms of operational 
and performance limits and constraints,  was established. 
ments are:  communications, crew survival time following an emergency; escape 
or  rescue response time; and d e l t a  veloci ty  (LSV)  needs. 
rescue concepts were then defined and escape/rescue guidelines proposed, 
based on operations analyses and tradeoff evaluations. 
and guidelkies were then re-evaluated from the  standpoint of safety,  and 811 
e scape/r e scue plan f o m l a  ted . 
C r i t i c a l  require- 
Candidate escape/ 
Recommended concepts 
The escape/rescue ana lys i s  approach i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in Fig. 4. e 
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1.4 HAZARD AND RESCUE INTERRELATIONSHIP 
Report MSC-03977, Lunar Hazards Analysis and Safety Requirements, presents 
the r e s u l t s  of the  Hazards Analysis subtask and iden t i f i e s  the  poten t ia l  
nee6 fer  r e s c x  asseziated with each hazard. 
Report MSC-03978, Escape/Rescue Analysis and L u n a r  Mission Rescue Plan, 
accepts the  potent ia l  rescue need ident i f ied  in MSC-03977 and expands it t o  
describe the  escape/rescue s i tua t ion  i n  d e t a i l .  Escape/rescue concepts and 
a rescue plan are developed t o  meet the needs ident i f ied.  
the individual Hazards Studies presented in Section 2 of MSC-03977 were 
used as appropriate in developing the  escape/rescue concepts and guidelines. 
The r e s u l t s  of 
1-1 0 
LMSEA9842623 
Section 2 
ESCAPE/RESCUE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Future manned exploration of the Moon w i l l  involve more complex environmental 
and operational f ac to r s  than have been encountered on the Apollo program. 
advanced programs may involve o r b i t a l  space vehicles and a multi-manned s ta t ion ,  
extensive surface exploration, and regular l o g i s t i c s  and crew ro ta t ion  f l i g h t s  
between the Earth and the Moon. The hazards and risks associated with the use 
of f’uture f l i g h t  and crew equipment and the operational usage of t h i s  equip- 
ment i n  the lunar environment c a l l s  for  new approaches to escape/rescue plans. 
The 
One portion of the study involved the ident i f ica t ion  of escape/rescue s i tua t ions  
and associated requirements, the development of escape/rescue concepts, the 
def in i t ion  of escape/rescue guidelines, and the formulation of an escape/rescue 
plan. 
lunar a r r i v a l  and departure, i n  lunar  orb i t ,  and on the lunar surface. 
The analysis  was separated in to  three pa r t s  to study operations during 
This section summarizes the lunar  escape/rescue s i tua t ions  and concepts t h a t  , 
were analyzed, the escsFe/rescue plan developed, and the  recommended escape/rescue 
guidelines and safety requirements. 
t ions  have been indicated. 
0 In some s i tua t ions ,  possible design solu- 
2 . 1  Escape/Rescue Si tuat ions and Concepts 
This subsection describes operations i n  the lunar  area and s i tua t ions  requiring 
escape o r  rescue. 
a r e  also presented. 
operations, Lunar Orbi ta l  operations, and Lunar Surface operations. 
Alternate escape/rescue concepts t o  cope with the  s i t ua t ion  
The discussion i s  divided i n t o  three parts:  Arrival/Departure 
2.1.1 Arrival/Departure b e r a t i o n s  
Both nuclear pokered and chemically powered prime t ransport  vehicles a re  considered 
i n  arrival/departure s i tuat ions.  
difference between the  two i s  the  radiation environment associated with the nuclear 
powered vehicle. 
b m  the standpoint of escape/rescue the primary 
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The i n i t i a l  manned f l i g h t  t o  ac t iva te  the orb i t ing  lunar  s t a t ion  is  unique from 
the standpoint of escape/rescue because: 
a. The only available permanent safe haven f o r  escape purposes i s  
i n  the Earth v i c in i ty  
b. i f  rescue i s  required it must or iginate  from the &rth v i c i n i t y  
The i n i t i a l  orbi t ing s ta t ion  manning operation i s  expected to be made by e i the r  
a nuclear o r  chemical powered prime transport  vehicle (PTV) with a payload con- 
s i s t i n g  of the i n i t i a l  crew and e i t h e r  one o r  two tugs. 
loaded i n  propellants. 
not have the benefit  of personnel and equipment i n  the lunar v ic in i ty .  
quently, i f  rescue capabi l i ty  is required, rescue vehicles must be based i n  the 
Earth v i c i n i t y  and the response time w i l l  be measured i n  days. 
t i v e  a l te rna t ive  t o  rescue i s  t o  provide self-contained escape capabi l i ty ,  
through use of the tug, f o r  autonomous Earth return.  
One tug may be off- 
Rescue operations f o r  t h i s  i n i t i a l  manning f l i g h t  Will 
Conse- 
A more a t t rac-  
Routine PTV f l i g h t s  a f t e r  lunar  o r b i t a l  s ta t ion  ac t iva t ion  may be made with a 
crew compartment without a tug. The absence o f  the tug makes escape unlikely 
without augmentation of the crew compartment capabi l i t i es .  
A l l  p r ac t i ca l  lunar t r a j ec to r i e s  approach periselene a t  ve loc i t i e s  exceeding 
the lunar escape velocity. 
i n s e r t  a vehicle into the desired lunar orb i t .  
the addition of  approximately 1,000 f t / sec  of A V capabi l i ty  t o  the crew com- 
partment would enable separation from the PTV and inser t ion  in to  lunar e l l i p  
t i c a l  o r b i t  and subsequent rescue by a tug from the  s ta t ion.  
A r e t r o  velocity impulse i s  therefore required t o  
In  the event of PTV f a i lu re ,  
A guidance o r  propulsion system malf’unction during the  lunar  o r b i t  inser t ion  
maneuver could resu l t  i n  a surface impact t ra jec tory  condition. 
detected, the crew could separate t h e i r  crew compartment from the PTV and 
u t i l i z e  the 1,OCO feet/sec h V capabi l i ty  t o  en ter  an e l l i p t i c a l  o r b i t  with a 
perilune higher than 50,000 f ee t .  
Once t h i s  i s  
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The use of nuclear propulsion would primarily a f f e c t  the radiat ion danger t o  an 
escape o r  rescue e f fo r t .  Either escape o r  rescue within 24 hours a f t e r  nuclear 
engine shutdown would be radiation-limited to the PTV forward, safe-radiation 
shield cone. 
0 
Routine a r r i v a l  and departure operations m a y  have the  advantage of orb i t ing  
lunar  s t a t ion  personnel f o r  rescue. 
f l i g h t s  should be backed up by both vehicles and crews capable of rescue u n t i l  
the  inser t ion  o r  in jec t ion  i s  achieved. 
The a r r i v a l  and departure of manned PTV 
2.1.2 Lunar Orbi ta l  b e r a t i o n s  
The base f o r  lunar  o r b i t a l  operations is  the orb i t ing  lunar  s ta t ion.  
mission model c a l l s  f o r  t h i s  s t a t ion  to be placed in to  lunar  o r b i t  unmanned. 
A f l i g h t  t o  man and ac t iva te  the s ta t ion takes place a month o r  two later. 
Following act ivat ion the s t a t ion  receives regular l o g i s t i c s  f l i g h t s  from the 
Earth, and routine s t a t ion  in t e rna l  a c t i v i t i e s  and EVA s o r t i e s  f o r  routine 
The basic 
s t a t ion  inspection and maintenance and repa i r  are in i t i a t ed .  a 
A propellant depot m a y  be added to the s t a t ion  a t  some fu ture  date. This would 
introduce re la ted  a c t i v i t i e s  such as depot maintenance and repair ,  replenishment 
of depot expendables, and servicing and refuel ing vehicles. 
c 
0 
A space tug w i l l  be a key vehicle i n  the  spectrum of o r b i t a l  s t a t ion  a c t i v i t i e s  
t o  ferry crewmen and cargo between the s t a t ion  and the prime t ransport  vehicle, 
t o  perform s t a t ion  maintenance and repair missions, and as a general u t i l i t y  
vehicle. 
of s c i e n t i f i c  o r  communications s a t e l l i t e s  i n  various o r b i t a l  posit ions,  f o r  
l o g i s t i c s  f l i g h t s  t o  the lunar surface base, and t o  carry out lander tug lunar 
surface s o r t i e  missions. 
didate  f o r  use a9 a rescue vehicle. 
The tug w i l l  a l so  serve as the key vehicle f o r  the o r b i t a l  placement 
Because of these capab i l i t i e s  the tug i s  a prime can- 
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2.1.2.1 Orbiting Lunar Stat ion - I n i t i a l  Manning 
The f a i l u r e  of a c r i t i c a l  s t a t ion  subsystem, including any backup and emergency 
capabi l i ty  during the i n i t i a l  manning and act ivat ion operation results i n  two 
available options: 
t i .  Remain at the s t a t ion  arid &wit a f l i g h t  from Earth u i t h  zitkc=. 
repa i r  o r  replacement capabi l i ty  . 
b. Abandon the s ta t ion  and return t o  Earth i n  the tug 
If necessary, the docked tug could support the s t a t ion  i n  an emergency by means 
o f  a tug/station umbilical, i n  areas  such as communication, station-keeping, 
a t t i t ude  control,  and data  management. 
2ontinue s t a t ion  activation while awaiting a r epa i r  f l i g h t  from Earth. 
Such support could enable the crew .to 
A failur,? of the s ta t ion  primary l i f e  support/environmental control subsystem 
jncluding a l l  backup capabi l i ty  could be managed by having the crew r e t r e a t  +a 
the docked tug. 
a repa i r  crew and pa r t s  could arr ive.  
They could operate from the tug while repa i rs  were made o r  unti l  
. 
In a c r i t i c a l  f a i lu re  s i t ua t ion  the s t a t ion  may sus ta in  severe physical damage. 
Emergency portable oxygen masks and supply bo t t l e s ,  and pressure garments with a 
bui l t - in  oxygen supply would provide suf f ic ien t  protection from smoke o r  gases 
and the e f f ec t s  of depressurization t o  enable crewmen t o  evacuate the  affected 
area o r  t o  traverse t o  the docked tug. 
If the r a t e  of oxygen depletion o r  production of smoke o r  toxic gases was so  
rapid tha t  the crewmen could not traverse t o  the locat ion o f  stored emergency 
gear o r  could not don and ac t iva te  an emergency garment rapidly enough (perhaps 
due t o  an injury)  the crewmen could enter  an a l t e rna te  compartment which pro- 
vides a temporary safe haven. The crewmen would then have su f f i c i en t  t h e  to  
don and ac t iva te  emergency gear. 
don the emergency pressure garment, depressurize the  compartment t o  the s t a t ion  
ambient pressure leve l  and t r ans l a t e  t o  the tug. 
A crewman could e i t h e r  await rescue o r  could 
If i n j u r i e s  prevented t h i s  
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procedure, the crewmen would have to re ta in  a shir ts leeve environment i n  the 
compartment and a w a i t  rescue. The rescue crew would require  access in to  the 
a l t e rna te  compartment through an airlock. 
operative, o r  if no air lock was available, a portable a i r lock would be required. 
If the compartment a i r lock was in- 
After enter ing the pressurized compartment the  rescue crew would be able  t o  
e i the r  assist injured crewmen i n  donning pressure garments and i n  t ravers ing 
to the tug o r  could place the crewmen i n  a pressurized s t re tcher  f o r  transport- 
ing t o  the  tug. 
In order t o  ensure the ava i l ab i l i t y  of  a rescue crew and immediate access to 
pressure garments and emergency equipment, two crewmen should remain i n  the 
docked tug a t  all times during the s ta t ion  ac t iva t ion  period. 
A c r i t i c a l  f a i l u r e  could result i n  m a j o r  damage t o  both the  s t a t ion  and all 
docked tugs. 
The s t a t ion  crew would have t o  survive i n  an emergency compartment u n t i l  a 
rescue crew arrived. A minimum of 1U. hours i s  required, even under the bes t  
of t ra jec tory  conditions, f o r  a rescue crew based i n  the v i c in i ty  of Earth to 
ar r ive  a t  the s ta t ion.  A more realistic time f o r  a rescue mission from Earth 
o r b i t  i s  l.4 days, 
t ransfer  o r b i t  plane, a 60 hour t ransfer  time, a 24 hour 90' plane change a t  
lunar  o r b i t  inser t ion,  and 12 hours f o r  rendezvous, docking and rescue crew 
a c t i v i t i e s  a f t e r  a r r i v a l  a t  the  station. 
compartments must have the capabi l i ty  f o r  communicating to h t h  v i c i n i t y  and 
must have l i f e  support capabi l i ty  f o r  a minimum of l.4 days. 
No rescue crew would be available except from the  Earth vicini ty .  
This a l lows  a w a i t  o f  up t o  10 days f o r  alignment o f  the 
It follows t h a t  any s t a t ion  a l te rna te  
2.1.2.2 Orbiting L u n a r  Stat ion - Routine Operations 
c During rout ine o r b i t a l  operations the  presence of  a la rge  orbi t ing lunar  s ta t ion,  
plus two space tugs i n  lunar  o r b i t  - one operational and one on rescue standby - 
should make the  l ikelihood o f  need for  outside assis tance ra ther  remote. Out- 
side assis tance might be required i n  the following s i tuat ions:  
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a.  Critical damage t h a t  involved the s t a t ion  and both tugs 
b. Immediate need f o r  medical a id  t h a t  was not avai lable  a t  a 
damaged s ta t ion  
Ir? the  f i r s t  sitilation, 8ssist.mce coiild come from the lunar surface, from 
Earth o rb i t ,  o r  from both locations.  
capabi l i ty  f o r  performing an o r b i t a l  rescue operation w i l l  be located a t  the 
lunar surface base. Also, a lunar lander tug used f o r  a solo surface sor t ie  
mission could, by aborting i t s  mission, be used as an o r b i t a l  rescue vehicle, 
again with l imited capabili ty.  
tugs i s  t h a t  they w i l l  generally not have the capabi l i ty  t o  perform a plane change 
on the return t o  o r b i t ,  and thus must wait f o r  up t o  14 days t o  proceed t o  the 
orb i t ing  lunar station. 
s i tua t ion  ( a ) .  
p rac t ica l  rescue capabi l i ty  with a prime t ransport  vehicle from Earth o rb i t .  
Thus it i s  concluded tha t  an acceptable rescue mode f o r  s i tua t ion  (a)  i s  not 
available u n t i l  refueling capabi l i t i es  are avai lable  on the lunar  surface. 
A f u l l y  fueled lunar lander tug with the 
The l imi t ing  feature  f o r  solo surface s o r t i e  t 
This is  not  a sa t i s fac tory  rescue response time f o r  
The same response time limit of  14 days i s  present f o r  a 
In the second s i tuat ion,  the standby rescue tug i n  lunar o r b i t  has the capa- 
b i l i t y  t o  perform up t o  a 90' plane change, descend t o  the lunar  surface base, 
and land, if provided with a A V capabi l i ty  of 15,000 ft /sec.  
the descent would require refueling before it could return t o  o rb i t .  
The tug used fo r  
2.1.2.3 Extra Vehicular Act iv i t ies  i n  Orbit 
Orbi ta l  extra  vehicular a c t i v i t y  (EVA) escape/rescue s i tua t ions  i n  o r b i t  can be 
divided in to  two general categories: (1) the crewman on EVA i s  attached t o  the 
orb i t ing  lunar  s ta t ion ( o r  some other spacecraft)  by means of a t e the r ,  o r  
umbilical, o r  both, o r  (2)  the crewman i s  i n  an astronaut maneuvering u n i t  (m). . 
Escape from ar! WA s i tua t ion  implies t h a t  the crewman has the capabi l i ty  t o  
re turn and enter the s t a t ion  without outside assis tance.  
the crewman on EVA cannot reach a safe haven unless  outside assis tance i s  
Rescue implies t h a t  
0 
supplied. Typically, a crewman on EVA performing a planned s t a t ion  maintenance 
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function could be on a l i f e  support back pack o r  a short  umbilical connection 
in to  the  s t a t ion  l i f e  support, communications, environment control,  and power. 
If the crewman could not, wear a backpack because of  operational considerations, 
he should have a minimum 90 minute duration emergency l i f e  support system. This 
required duration i s  a function of the probable rescue response time plus  a 
contingency factor. 
The EVA crewman needs a separate, self-contained voice communications l i nk  
operating on a c a r r i e r  frequency t h a t  is reserved f o r  escape/rescue emergency 
use. 
t a ted  and unable t o  ta lk ,  a self-contained RF loca tor  beacon and f lashing l i g h t  
should be designed in to  the crewman's helmet. This emergency equipment should 
be capable of being act ivated manually by the  crewman and should also be auto- 
matically act ivated i n  the  event o f  such conditions as: 
In addition, since the crewman may be injured, ill, o r  otherwise incapaci- 
a. Su i t  power loss 
b. Umbilical f a i l u r e  
c. 
d. 
e. Communications failure 
Activation of emergency oxygen system 
Suit  s t a t i c  pressure decaying below a minimum leve l  
It i s  recommended t h a t  an EVA crewman be assigned as a poten t ia l  rescue crew- 
man t o  back up the  EVA crewman on work status. 
suited,  with a backpack, 
t i on  with a quick disconnect. 
rescue crewman with maximum maneuverability i n  the  event of an emergency. 
remaining on umbilical u n t i l  an emergency occurs the ful l  backpack metabolic 
capabi l i ty  i s  available.  
The rescue crewman should be 
but  attached to the s t a t ion  by an umbilical connec- 
The quick disconnect i s  needed t o  provide the 
By 
c It i s  a l so  possible, though not recommended, f o r  an EVA crewman t o  use an AMU 
to t r a n s l a t e  around the  s t a t ion  while not attached by e i t h e r  t e the r  o r  umbilical. 
The AMU would require redundancy and fa i l / sa fe  design philosophy similar t o  
t h a t  of the s ta t ion.  
O2 system and emergency communications capabili ty.  
a l s o  require  an AMU with a t  l e a s t  the propulsion, A V, and other  capabi l i ty  of 
the  AMU assigned t o  the EVA crewman. The rescue-assigned crewman would require 
The crewman would need the 90 minute capabi l i ty  emergency 
The rescue crewman would 
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line-of-sight, d i r ec t  observation of the EVA crewman and therefore might have 
t o  maneuver h i s  AMU t o  successive posi t ions around the  s ta t ion .  
A c r i t i c a l  rescue s i tua t ion  could occur i f  the  EVA crewman were d r i f t i n g  un- 
controlled away from the s ta t ion.  
f loat ing.  If h i s  velocity r e l a t i v e  t o  the  s t a t ion  i s  low, the rescue crewman 
and AMiU should be able t o  reacn tne d r i f t i ng  crewman and re turn  him t o  the 
s ta t ion .  
range beyond the safe operating limit of the rescue AMU. 
He could be i n  an AMU o r  could be free- 
If the relative ve loc i ty  i s  high the d r i f t i n g  crewman might reach a 
. 
The recommended approach is  t o  provide the rescue AMU with the  capabi l i ty  t o  
achieve a t  least a veloci ty  of 150 ft/sec with respect to the s t a t ion  t o  catch 
the runaway AMlJ and then s t i l l  be able  to return t o  the s ta t ion .  
normal EVA mode a c t i v i t i e s  should be velocity-limited to a value of approximately 
100 f t /sec.  
be able  t o  chase, catch and re turn  the  EVA AMU even i f  i t s  t o t a l  ve loc i ty  capabiliQSr 
were expended i n  a runaway propulsion fa i lure .  
* 
The AMlJ used f o r  
Thus, the rescue AMU with a t o t a l  A V capabi l i ty  of 400 f t / sec  woulrl 
A guidance system fa i lure ,  l o s s  of  a t t i t ude  control,  o r  a runaway react ion con- 
t r o l  th rus te r  could r e s u l t  i n  a tumbling s i tua t ion  with the AMU. 
would have available the  lunar surface,tfie s ta t ion ,  and the stars and the Earth 
f o r  use as a visual reference i n  determining h i s  r e l a t i v e  or ien ta t ion  and tumb- 
l i n g  direct ion.  
reaction thrus te r  could be used to stop o r  a t  l e a s t  t o  reduce the tumbling r a t e  t o  
a manageable level.  This emergency thrus te r  could consis t  of  c lus t e r s  of manually 
activated so l id  motors oriented along the AMU 3 principle  axes. 
corrective thruster  a t  a t h e  the magnitude and duration of the corrective velocity 
vector could be controlled. 
th rus te r  (perhaps using cold gas) could be used t o  arrest any tumbling motion. 
The crewman 
Once the tumbling direct ion was determined, an emergency corrective 
By f i r i n g  one 
If the crewman were separated from the M, a hand-hela 
* 
The tumbling-arrest th rus te rs  could a l s o  be used (by se lec t ive  f i r i n g )  t o  Pre- 
vent a co l l i s ion  with the s t a t ion  and t o  roughly control  the  veloci ty  vector 
unt i l  the rescce crewman arrived. 
b 
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A pressure suit tear during EVA poses a difficult survival problem. 
EVA crewman were attached to the station by an umbilical, a suit tear could 
cause a critical or even fatal suit static pressure drop. 
located quickly and repaired or sealed off, survival could probably be extended. 
A self-sealing capability seems an attractive possibility. A pressure garment 
that could be unfolded and quickly deployed around the crewman and sealed a l s o  
appears promising. 
factory static pressure level. 
sufficient cooling flow and still maintain proper static pressure. 
Even if an 
If the tear could be 
The escaping gas would fill the garment and provide a satis- 
An exhaust pressure relief valve could provide 
2.1.2.4 Orbiting Lunar Station Deactivation 
"he same options available during station activation are also available during 
deactivation. 
2.1.2.5 Space Tug Orbital Operations 
"he failure of tug equipment such as the docking mechanism, docking sensors, 
attitude control system, etc., could result in a rescue situation in which 
survival would not be a problem since the tug life support system would not be 
affected. 
to the near vicinity of the stranded tug to tow it back to the station. If the 
docking mechanism had failed, external attach points would be needed to provide 
a positive and rigid attachment between the stranded and rescue tug. 
0 
The docked rescue tug could separate from the station and transfer 
"he l o s s  of electrical power, including emergency power, will result in the loss 
of all tug functions including communication, life support and attitude control. 
Refer to Fig. -5 
a shirtsleeve environment existed in the crew compartment, the crew could use 
oxygen masks and await rescue. 
cabin temperatwe went out of limits, or if the ambient pressure decayed, the 
crew would be forced to don pressure suits or emergency pressure garments. 
tug environmental control system would stop functioning and the compartment 
would immediately start to cool down. 
not available, the crew would need thermally insulated garments. 
for a typical sequence of events related to life support. If 
If the rescue could not be accomplished before 
The 
If pressure suits and back packs were 
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In a critical failure situation the tug would probably sustain severe physical 
damage and a sudden loss  or deterioration of a critical capability. 
nation of the ambient atmosphere could be counteracted by donning oxygen masks 
or emergency pressure garments. 
the immediate donning of pressure suits or emergency pressure garments. 
umbilical connection into the tug life support system could provide indefinite 
life support and environmental control capability. 
0 Contami- 
Crew compartment depressurization would require 
A n  
A critical failure in the tug during cargo transfer operations could result in 
the tug's operational capability being compromised by the on-board presence of 
cargo. Tug and cargo container design must be amenable to rapid and selective 
jettisoning or separation from the tug. 
be installed in the cargo attachment mechanisms to provide a separation 
5 to 10 ft/sec. 
peaters for laser or iRF radar detection to aid in eventual recovery of jetti- 
soned modules. 
If necessary, separation springs could 
AV of 
Cargo module design should include corner reflectors or re- 
Because of the possibility of collision with the station, or structural damage 
to the tug while performing close proximity station maneuvers during maintenance 
and repair operations, it is recommended that the crewmen wear pressure suits 
at all times during such operations. 
@' 
The failure of a critical tug subsystem while operating near the station could 
result in a collision or in tumbling. It is strongly recommended that the tug 
design provide for manual control, through mechanical linkages or cables, of 
emergency attitude control and emergency propulsion subsystems. 
c 
The emergency propulsion subsystem could be either liquid or solid propellant 
and would be used to prevent collision or undesired contact with the station or 
other spacecraft. 
translational thrust, velocity vector control, and tumble-arrest, as well as 
attitude control. 
The attitude control subsystem should be capable of low 
2-1 1 
The possible necessity to effect forced entry into a disabled tug or other 
spacecraft must be taken into account in the design phase. 
or attachment mechanisms with attachment points designatdd on the vehicle 
exterior are needed. Manipulator arms with hooks or heavy duty pincer claws 
could be used to tie into these emergency attachment points or even to break 
through the skin to grasp a primary struct-wdi member. 
crewmen should be familiar with the general structural characteristics of all 
manned spacecraft. 
Ehergency linkage 
In addition, rescue 
The tug vehicle may be used to transfer scientific statellites from the PTV or 
station to various orbital positions. 
mately 5310 ft/sec of 
requirements leave ample margins for crew survival regardless of when an emer- 
gency occurs during such a mission, assuming the life support subsystem remains 
functional. 
For this type mission, up to approxi- 
AV and 35 hours mission time are required. These 
A failure in the life support system (or a power failure) does not necessarily 
require immediate switchover to pressure suits or emergency garments. A breath- 
able crew compartment atmosphere would exist at the time of failure and for 
perhaps as long as an hour or more. If cabin pressure remained above 2.5 psi 
the crew could don olrygen masks and a thermally insulated garment and survive 
for at least 36 hours and perhaps 48 hours even without food or water. 
cabin pressure decays below a safe minimum, a pressure garment andbackpack 
would be required. 
a minimum of 20 hours of survival time to make rescue feasible. 
If 
The available pressure garments and backpacks must permit 
2.1.2.6 Lunar Lander Tug Surface Sortie Operations 
Lunar lander tug (UT) surface sortie flights w i l l  probably be planned for 
descent and ascent in the orbit plane of the lunar station. Landing sites on 
the Earthside cf the Moon will always have potential communication capability 
with the Earth. A critical LLT subsystem failure prior to powered descent 
initiation (PDI) would permit a mission abort and would leave the LLT in a 
slightly elliptical orbit with apolune at the station orbit altitude and peri- 
lune at PDI altitude. Rescue from the station would require o n l y  330 minutes 
to accomplish versus a potential survival time of 12 hours for the worst case 
situation of either a total power or life support subsystem failure. 
required for rescue is well under the recommended tug capability of 15,000 ft/Sec. 
The A V  
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@ The possibility of rescue after PDI depends on the nature of the failure and 
its side effects. 
second stage or adequate auxiliary propulsion subsystem was available. 
To increase the chances and duration of survival following a crash landing, the 
crew should be in pressurized suits with freshly charged backpacks during powered 
descent. 
injured which is more than enough 
lunar station. 
descent phase of the lunar lander, it could get down to the site in 2 hours 
(one orbital period) because the orbiting lunar station would be in line-of- 
sight and coincident with the lunar lander. 
would be involved, the rescue tug (with a total 15,000 ft/sec AV capability) 
could immediately return the distressed crewmen to the orbiting lunar station 
for medical treatment. 
A propulsion failure would result in impact unless a 
This would provide 12 hours of life support even though unconscious or 
time for a rescue tug to oome from the orbiting 
If the rescue tug were manned and activated during the powered 
Because essentially no plane change 
Loss of the guidance system, or even electrical power, could be counteracted by 
resorting to full manual control of vehicle propulsion and attitude control. 
The recommended procedure, however, for non-propulsive failures would be to 
switch to an ascent mode and return to an altitude above 8 nm and inject with an 
orbital velocity sufficient to provide a perilune minimum of 8 nm. 
rescue operation from the orbiting lunar station could then be accomplished, if 
required. 
An orbital 
2.1.2.7 Orbiting Propellant Depot Operations 
V 
An orbiting propellant depot may be used to supply cryogenic propellants and 
other expendable liquids and gases for the tug propulsion, intelligence, and 
crew modules. Vehicle servicing requires that the manned vehicle rendezvous 
and dock with the depot, followed by the connection of liquid and gas transfer 
lines, the transfer of consummables into the tug, and then disconnecting and 
separating the tug from the depot. Depending on depot design and operations 
requirements, it could be required that one or more tug crewmen go on EVA in 
order to service the vehicle. 
ation be avoided. 
It is recommended that use of EVA for this oper- 
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Crew survival., following a c r i t i c a l  fue l  depot f a i l u r e  while the  tug i s  docked 
t o  t h e  depot and being serviced, will primarily depend on the  capabi l i ty  t o  
disconnect fueling and servicing connections and t o  undock under emergency con- 
di t ions.  
cut bo l t s  might be appropriate and necessary even if open-and-still-flowing 
l i n e s  r e m i n e d  cn the d e p t  side cf' t h e  irzterfsce. 
come from the tug s i d e  of the interface.  
The use of pyrotechnic devices t o  cut  l i nes ,  p u l l  la tching pins,  o r  
Contrnl  and ynwer shmild 
One w o r s t  case survival s i tua t ion  occurs if the  crew were so l e ly  dependent on 
pressure s u i t s  and back pack un i t s  o r  emergency pressure garments f o r  survival  
and were unable t o  undock the tug fron: t he  propellant depot. 
f o r  rescue by a t u g  docked a t  the  s t a t ion  i s  of primary concern. 
sen ts  a tabulation of the rescue tug sequence of events and time spans. 
The response t i m e  
Table 2 pre- 
A c r i t i c a l  s i tua t ion  with one o r  more crewmen on EVA on the  depot could r e s u l t  
i n  a s i tua t ion  in  which the  docked tug would be forced t o  undock and leave the  
EVA crewmen behind. 
unless some means of escape were provided. 
located on the  depot could provide a means of escape from the  depot and possible 
re turn t o  the  orbit ing s ta t ion .  
could provide the approximate 100 f t /sec of A V needed t o  re turn t o  the  s t a t ion  
o r  provide one t o  two hours of  survival t i m e  away from the s ta t ion .  
gency f lash ing  l igh t ,  homing beacon, corner re f lec tors ,  and a short  range voice 
communications system would be required. 
These crewmen would be stranded and i n  extreme jeopardy 
An astronaut maneuvering u n i t  (AMU) 
A cold gas propelled, manuallly operated u n i t  
An emer- 
2.1.3 Lunar Surface Operations 
Surface operations can be divided in to  two phases: 
s o r t i e  operations and lunar surface base operations. 
t h a t  surface sortie f l i g h t s  may be i n i t i a t e d  about six months a f t e r  act ivat ion 
of t he  orbi t ing lunar  s ta t ion ,  with the  lunar  surface base act ivated about 2* 
years l a t e r .  
lunar  lander tug (LLT) 
Present planning indicates  
Y 
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m e  lun r lander tug s o r t i e  operation w i l l  includ surface exploration and 
s c i e n t i f i c  experiments. 
and lunar  pole locations,  
Potent ia l  landing s i t e s  include Earthside, fa rs ide ,  
Each mission duration w i l l  probably be no longer than 
28 days. 
a. 
b. 
C. 
2.1.3.1 
A typical  mission sequence consis ts  of: 
touchdown of a lander tug a t  a predetermined s i t e  
deployment of  support equipment and any loca l  s i t e  experiments 
t he  carrying out o f  traverse operations using equipment such as 
EXA rover, f l ye r ,  and ground-effect-machines. Short distance 
t raverses  could be made on foot,  par t icu lar ly  i f  higher mobility 
s u i t s  a r e  developed, though Apollo 14 t raverse  experience tends 
t o  cas t  doubt on the  p rac t i ca l i t y  of on-foot t raverse  operations 
with current equipment. 
Lunar Lander Tug Surface Operations 
A typ ica l  lunar  lander tug s o r t i e  w i l l  probably be characterized by the  touch- 
down of a s ingle  tug having a t o t a l  crew of 4 men. 
duration w i l l  be 14 t o  28 days. 
t h a t  of the lunar surface bsse (LSB) , and landing a ids  will be minimal. 
The nominal mission 
The s i t e  lu ra in  may be somewhat rougher than 
Q 
I n  general, there  are two emergency operations of in te res t :  
a. Escape, i n  which the  crew returns t o  the  orb i t ing  s t a t ion  i n  the  tug 
Y 
b. Rescue, i n  which a tug comes down from the orb i t ing  s ta t ion ,  lands 
a t  the  s o r t i e  s i t e ,  and returns t o  the orb i t ing  s ta t ion .  
One of the  f irst  tasks  a f t e r  the  tug has touched down on the  surface i s  t o  
deploy landing and loca t ion  a ids  so  tha t  a rescue tug could land regardless of 
sun elevation angle and i n  e i the r  sunlight o r  darkness. 
tug payload capabili ty,  it i s  preferred t h a t  descent and ascent maneuvers be 
made i n  ( o r  close to )  the o r b i t  plane of the  orb i t ing  s ta t ion .  
emergency occurring during a r r i v a l  o r  departure of the  tug would not require a 
I n  order t o  maximize 
Therefore, an 
rescue tug t o  make a la rge  plane change. e 
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A rescue operation a t  some point i n  time midway through the  LLT so r t i e  mission 
could require the rescue tug t o  make a 90-degree plane change during the descent 
phase. 
i f  immediate return t o  the  orb i t ing  s t a t ion  were required. 
plane changes, plus the  ascent and descent AV needs, would far  exceed the  
W I  nn+:cipated "A. ~ E F U ~ S P  capabi l i ty  of  the  t.iug= A rescue tug with a A V  capabi l i ty  
o f  15,000 ft /sec could descend and provide a temporary safe haven, b u t  wu-dd 
have t o  remain on the  surface f o r  up t o  I4  days while awaiting fu r the r  ass is tance 
from a second rescue tug. 
A second 90-degree plane change would then be required during ascent, 
Two 90-degree 
. 
A worst-case s i tua t ion  would occur if  the LLT crew compartment pressure in t eg r i ty  
was destroyed. 
crew survival t i m e  using pressure s u i t s  and back packs. 
have t o  make a 90-degree plane change f o r  descent without delay. 
I n  t h i s  case, the  rescue response t i m e  must be l e s s  than the  
The rescue tug could 
2.1.3.2 Traverse Operations 
Traverse operations take place i n  the  v i c i n i t y  o f ,  o r  between, the  permanent and 
temporary lunar surface bases. 
with o r  without an Apollo 14 type handcart, i n  an EVA mode mobility vehicle, o r  
i n  a pressurized-cabin mobility vehicle. 
The t raverse  may be made by the  crews on foo t  
EVA mode vehicles operate r e l a t ive ly  close t o  a parked tug and/or lunar  base. 
The pressurized cabin vehicle may t r a v e l  between two widely separated points  
on the  surface, The LLT from which it originates  may return t o  o r b i t  a f t e r  
the rover vehicle reaches a point of no return,  and the  pick-up LLT may not 
land unt i l  the  rover vehicle nears i t s  destination. 
A c r i t i c a l  fac tor  i n  t raverse  operations i s  the  condition o f  the  pressure s u i t s  
and backpacks. I n  the event of  damage t o  the suit o r  backpack, the capabi l i ty  
t o  walk back o r  drive back would be nu l l i f i ed  o r  severely impaired. 
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EVA Mode Traverses 
Walkback 
injured, 
from the  scene of an emergency i s  p rac t i ca l  i f  the  personnel a re  not 
i f  the  remaining backpack metabolic capabi l i ty  is  adequate, and i f  
the  physiological suit  l i m i t  i s  not exceeded. 
I n  the  case of a foo t  traverse,  a handcart (similar t o  the  one used on Apollo 14) 
could be used t o  carry an extra  backpack o r  secondary l i f e  support uni t .  
survival  bag (similar t o  an emergency pressure garment k i t  without the  mobility 
fea ture)  may be carr ied t o  encase a crewman with a subs tan t ia l  suit  leak. 
A 
A rover vehicle can be used t o  make a surface rescue of  men on foot ,  i n  another 
rover vehicle, o r  with a f l y e r  whose location is  accessible. 
of  the  EVA mode rover vehicle would probably be l e s s  than t h a t  o f  an uprated 
f l y e r  o r  a ground ef fec ts  machine. 
However, the  range 
The fol!.owing conclusions were made re la t ive  t o  rescue of crewmen on EVA mode 
traverses:  
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f .  
The pressurized cabin rover vehicle i s  an acceptable rescue vehicle 
except i n  the  case of an uprated flyer. 
For two-man crews, the buddy system, plus an emergency oxygen supply 
of 5 l b  t o t a l  - o r  be t t e r  - is required t o  enable rescue by a rover 
vehicle. 
I n  the  case of a damaged su i t ,  some type of pressure garment must be 
provided which can u t i l i z e  the residual  backpack capabili ty.  
The rover vehicles should be capabie of carrying a minimum of two men 
plus the  rescue crew. 
The rover vehicle must be capable of  carrying and furnishing l i f e  support 
t o  a 
The ext ivat ion of a rescue mission should not require more than two hours. 
i n  a pressure garment. 
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The LLT i n  lunar o rb i t  offers a possible approach t o  the  rescue of crewmen 
on EVA traverse. There a re  two general d i f f i cu l t i e s :  
a. The LLT cannot land i n  rough lu ra in  which might be acceptable f o r  a 
f l y e r  . 
b. The LLT would have d i f f i c u l t y  i n  searching f o r  a disabled vehicle 
if the  latter 5;; .-+ wLLI1vuc, L--..t 1 Lvc;~t im - -  devices. 
I n  e i t h e r  of these cases it would be necessary t o  per fom the  rescue i n  two 
steps. 
would involve a search f o r  the disabled vehicle. Use of t he  LLT from o r b i t  
appears t o  have no advantages over rescue by rover o r  f l y e r  dispatched 
from the  nearby surface base, and has disadvantages of increased response 
time and unnecessary commitment of the  primary rescue vehicle. 
The f i r s t  s tep  would be t o  land t h e  tug from orb i t .  The second 
2.1.3.4 Cabin Rover Mode Traverses 
The rescue of personnel i n  a cabin rover on a long t raverse  would be accomp- 
l ished by a rescue tug from orb i t .  The problems discussed above f o r  EVA 
t raverse  rescue apply, but no reasonable a l t e rna t ive  i s  avai lable  except 
f o r  t he  poss ib i l i ty  of  dispatch of a second cabin rover from the  or ig ina l  
surface s i t e .  I n  e i the r  case the  response time could range from hours t o  
days. It appears advisable t o  carry out long t raverses  using buddy cabin 
rovers. 
4 
2.1.3.5 Lunar Surface Base Operations 
The lunar  surface base w i l l  probably consis t  of the  following elements: 
a. Base s t ructure  including l i v ing  quarters,  laboratory, working 
areas, and supporting equipment. 
b. Mobility vehicles f o r  lunar traverses.  
c. Propellant depot. 
d. Landing s i t e  and lunar  lander tug. 
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The separation between the  lunar surface base and the  normal tug landing 
s i t e  could be about 1-1/4 nm. 
damage t o  t h e  surface base because of tug explosion and lunar  s o i l  ejata 
s t i r r e d  up by the  tug engines. 
escape and rescue response times. 
This distance limits the  poss ib i l i t y  of  
This separation distance influences the  
Lunar surface base a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  probably be similar t o  those of the 
lander tug s o r t i e  missions except that  more complex and heavier equipment 
with increased capaci t ies  w i l l  probably be used. 
probably be v i r t u a l l y  unlimited i n  range and may a l so  take place during the  
lunar night. 
used. 
individual t o  incapacitation o r  i so la t ion  of the e n t i r e  crew. 
s i tua t ions  f o r  individuals on traverses have been presented i n  preceding 
sections.  
Traverse operations w i l l  
On the  longer traverses cabin-type rovers w i l l  probably be 
Ehergency s i tua t ions  may vary from in jury  o r  i so l a t ion  of a s ingle  
Escape/rescue 
Cases involving the l m a r  surfece base crew i n  t o t a l  are  now considered. 
hergencg  Shel ter  Concepts 
In  t h e  event of  a c r i t i c a l  accident rendering t h e  lunar  surface base un- 
inhabitable,  immediate survival i s  the  first consideration. Temporary 
she l t e r s  are concepts which extend the  survival t i m e  of t h e  surface base 
crew. 
t h a t  rescue from lunar  o r b i t  i s  possible. The idea of providing a she l t e r  
f o r  14 days t o  a l l o w  f o r  a zero plane change rescue seems t o  be an unreal- 
i s t i c  requirement. This i s  because the injured men, if any, should be 
evacuated as soon as possible. 
A minimum survival time of a t  least 12 hours should be provided so 
A second pressure compartment within the  base with provisions f o r  access 
by a rescue crew could provide the necessary support providing i ts  in t eg r i ty  
survived the  accident. 
An external  l i f e  support compartment f o r  the lunar surface base has been pro- 
posed as a preventive measure against the  l o s s  of cabin habi tab i l i ty .  This 
compartment could be set apar t  f rom the  main base, but connected by a pres- 
surized tunnel. This concept may have an advantage if  the  base sustains  
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an explosion. 
could a l so  serve a s  a por t  through which the  EVA crews could come and go 
during routine operations. The external  she l t e r  could be separated from 
the  base, o r  it might be erectable only i n  case of an emergency. 
problem with the detached she l t e r  i s  t h a t  the  base crew must resort  t o  
EZA t o  gair: access. 
not require a denitrogenization period i f  the  she l t e r  is  easily accessible.  
The she l t e r  pressurization should be grea te r  than 6.8 ps i a  so  t h a t  the  
men can pre-oxygenate readi ly  a f t e r  they gain sanctuary i n  the  she l t e r  i n  
case EVA ac t iv i ty  i s  required. 
The external  shel ter ,  which should be a t  surface l eve l ,  
The 
Tk;is r e q ~ i r e s  s m e  klcd of pressure ;;uit, bit does 
Escape t o  a Standby Tug 
The use of a standby lunar  lander tug f o r  escape from the  lunar  surface 
base i s  best  sui ted f o r  the  case where no crewmen a re  injured o r  incapaci- 
tated.  The standby rug should be f u l l y  fueled; that is, contain enough pro- 
pe l lan t  t o  be capable of a t o t a l  AVof 15,000 ft /sec.  
ascent t o  the orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  including a 90 degree plan change if  
necessary. I f  the  tug i s  no t r e fue leda f t e r  landing, a waiting time of  up 
t o  14 days may be required f o r  alignment with the  orb i t ing  lunar s ta t ion.  
This w i l l  allow immediate 
The use of a standby tug f o r  escape depends on the  capabi l i ty  o f  a t  l e a s t  
two members o f  the crew t o  e f f ec t  the  t ransfer  of personnel from the  base 
to theescape  tug, and t o  p i l o t  it t o  rendezvous with the  orb i t ing  lunar  
s ta t ion.  
( e i the r  walking o r  riding) o r  by using a pressurized cabin rover compatible 
with air locks on the base and the  standby tug. 
The t ransfer  of personnel may be accomplished i n  an EVA mode 
For the  EVA mode, the  rover vehicle should be capable of carrying a t  least 
two men i n  pressure suits and one pressurized s t re tcher .  
rover vehicle, a hand c a r t  similar t o  the  Apollo 14 type could be used f o r  
transporting a pressurized s t re tcher ,  but t he  minimum separation distance 
Instead of a 
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of l-l/L+ nm between the  base and the standby tug makes the traverse t i m e  about 
an hour versus 20 minutes using an EVA rover. 
rover, the evacuation of four incapacitated crewmen by two able  crewmen 
using a hand c a r t  would require the capacity of two 6000 BTU backpacks f o r  
each of  t he  two crewmen. Use of an EVA rover would a l l o w  the t ransfer  within 
the  capacity of  one backpack each. 
Without the use of  an EVA 
The use of  a pressurized cabin rover and compatible docking por t s  eases the 
problem of handling incapacitated men in the EVA mode and avoids dependency 
of  the  escape upon portable l i f e  support systems. These docking por t s  could 
be surface-mounted. If elevated, t he  cabin rover could climb a ramp t o  mate 
with the  docking ports ,  o r  may dock with a pressurized elevator compartment. 
If the  docking po r t s  on the  base and tug do not include air locks,  t he  rover 
vehicle a i r lock must be capable of pressurizing i t s e l f  t G  the base and tug 
pressures. Response time i s  not c r i t i c a l ,  as the  men are  f u l l y  protected. 
Lunar Escape System (LESS) 
The use of  a two-man EVA f lye r  vehicle was examined i n  the study. 
b i l i t y  of  t he  concept depends on a t  l e a s t  one crewman per vehicle being 
capable of p i lo t ing  the  escape flyer.  
vousing with the  lunar orbi t ing station within the  time provided by a back- 
pack do not make t h i s  approach a t t r ac t ive  compared t o  escaping i n  a standby 
t u g  o r  awaiting rescue on the surface. 
The feas i -  
The problems of ascending and rendez- 
Rescue from Lunar Orbit 
In the  category o f  rescue, the most general approach i s  t h a t  of  surface 
rescue from lunar orbi t .  This concept requires  t h a t  a lander tug always 
be on-orbit a t  t he  s ta t ion  and on standby a l e r t .  
be readi ly  available. 
during those periods of time tha t  t h e  base i s  manned. 
needed t o  perform routine o rb i t a l  missions and as a backup f o r  surface 
rescue. 
the  operational use of  the  base and s ta t ion ,  and f o r  other manned missions 
i n  orb i t .  
k rescue crew must a l s o  
A second tug, a s  a minimum, must a l s o  be a t  the LSB 
A t h i rd  tug i s  then 
Thus, a minimum of three tugs a re  required i n  the  lunar area during 
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The nominal response time f o r  removing the  d is t ressed  crew t o  the  rescue 
tug i s  10.75 hours including 2 hours f o r  phasing and 2.6 hours f o r  descent 
and landing including any plane changes. 
crew could await rescue i n  pressure garments and 6000 Btu backpacks which 
As a m i n i m u m  the  dis t ressed 
pr=T,ride 12 hcurs s 1 1 m ~ i ~ m 1  UI  V I V C L L  + i m n  V U ” fe r  crewen 8% rest. 
A fast-response rescue i s  possible i n  the  case of t h e  rescue of t he  crew 
of a tug which fa i l s  a t  a routine l i f t - o f f  o r  landing. 
space s t a t ion  o r b i t  plane i s  approximately coincident with the  base; the  
orb i t ing  tug is i n  a dedicated, standby s ta tus ;  the space s t a t ion  o r b i t a l  
plane includes the  base s i t e  a t  t he  t i m e  of surface lift-off o r  touchdown fran 
orb i t ;  and an invest igat ion of  conditions a t  the  emergency s i t e  i s  not 
required. 
I n  t h i s  case, the  
The penalty, i n  terms of 
severe. 
change requirements. 
requirement i s  r e l a t ive ly  fixed, and w i l l  probably be similar t o  the  13,900 
f t /sec experienced on the  Apollo program.) 
change velocity can be expressed as a function of two operating modes. 
veloci ty  imposed by a rescue mission can be 
( I t  should be recognized t h a t  the  ascent/descent 
The primary contribution t o  this penalty i s  derived from plane 
I n  general, rescue vehicle plane 
a. 
b. 
Plane change accomplished a t  o r b i t a l  a l t i t u d e  
Plane change accomplished a t  apogee a l t i t u d e  of an e l l i p t i c a l  o rb i t .  
The rescue tug w i l l ,  f o r  a given configuration, have a spec i f ic  ve loc i ty  
potent ia l .  
r e l a t ive ly  fixed. 
accomplishing an o r b i t  plane change during e i t h e r  descent o r  ascent, o r  
both. 
s i t e ,  it is  probable t h a t  the  tug will have a l imited&\/ capabi l i ty  avail-  
able  f o r  a plane change. 
The descent and ascent-to-orbit ve loc i ty  requirements a re  
The remaining tug capabi l i ty ,  if any, i s  available f o r  
After a n  o r b i t a l  rescue tug has accomplished a landing a t  an emergency 
The m i n i m u m  remaining capabi l i ty  must be equal to ,  o r  grea te r  than, t h a t  
required f o r  an in-plane ascent and rendezvous with the  s ta t ion .  If the  
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required ascent plane change and ascent Avrequirements exceed the  tug  
capabi l i ty ,  it must remain on the  surface until the  Moon's o r b i t a l  ro ta t ion  
reduces the required plane change t o  a l e v e l  within the  rescue tug ' s  capa- 
b i l i t y .  
Table 2-1 presents typ ica lA\ /  rescue vehicle requirements f o r  the  two plane 
change modes. The choice between the two depends on the tradeoff advantage 
betweend\/ needs and response time, 
change, the tablc shows totalAVsavings of approxhate ly  5500 f t / sec ,  i f  
the  plane changeiamade a t  apolune of a 24-hour-period e l l i p t i c a l  o rb i t .  
On the  other hand the e l l i p t i c a l  o rb i t  period represents the  consequent 
cost  i n  terms of increased response time. 
For a descent and ascent 90 degree plam 
Table 2-1 
VELOCITY REQUIREMENTS FOR RESCUE 
ORBITAL MANEWEE, 60 NM POLAR ORBIT 
Event 
90 deg Plane Change 
Descent & Landing 
___I-- 
Ascent and 
Rendezvous 
._ - . - -- 
90 deg Plane Change 
Plane Change a t  
Orbi ta l  Alti tude 
(f t /sec)  
Plane Change a t  
E l l i p t i c a l  Orbit Apogee 
AV Cum. A V  
( ft/s e c ) (ft /sec) 
I I 
4,800 4,800 
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Another a l te rna t ive  t o  minimize ascent rescue vehicle AJ requirements 
would c a l l  f o r  the  rescue vehicle, after recovering and loading the  stranded 
crew, t o  ascend and i n j e c t  i n to  a c i rcu lar  o r b i t  o n  a t r a j ec to ry  t h a t  mini- 
mizes the orb i t  plane angle with respect t o  the s t a t ion  orb i t .  A n  o r b i t a l  
vehicle, such as the  prime t ransport  vehicle, another o r b i t a l  tug, o r  even 
the  o r b i t a l  s ta t ion  i t s e l f ,  would then make the  required p lane chmge mAd 
recover the  crew and perhaps t h e  rescue tug. 
tug could be recovered on a l a t e r  f l i g h t .  
If necessary, t i e  rescue 
. I  
Conclusions f o r  Lunar Surface Base Escape/Rescue 
1. It i s  concluded t h a t  rescue capabi l i ty  from o r b i t  i s  required a t  all 
times. 
During tug landing and takeoff from the  surface, the  tug i n  o r b i t  &ould 
be placed i n  a standby condition. 
a t  all time i s  also required. 
Therefore, one rescue tug should always be s ta t ioned i n  o rb i t .  
A standby tug stationed a t  the  base 
2. A second stage on the  lunar lander tug i s  not required f o r  evacuating 
personnel i n  the event of landing o r  takeoff f a i l u r e s  on the surface. 
3. !The penal t ies  of providing f o r  t he  IVA t r ans fe r  of personnel between 
base and lander tug are  suf f ic ien t  t o  r e j e c t  t h i s  p h n  f o r  escape 
purposes . 
4. An EVA rover vehicle must be carr ied by the  rescue tug. 
vehicle must be able  t o  carry a t  l e a s t  two men i n  su i t s ,  p lus  a pressur- 
ized stretcher.  
The EVA rover 
The rover must be operable night  and day. 
5. The rescue tug must be capable of  landing within 1/2 nm of t he  base 
under a l l  day and night  conditions. 
0 '  
6.  A AVcapabili ty o f  U,490 f t / sec  i n  addi t ion t o  the  14,850 f t / sec  f o r  
90 degree plane change, descent, and landing would give the  rescue tug 
an immediate turnaround capabi l i ty  f o r  ascent and rendezvous with the  
orb i t ing  lunar s t a t i o n  including a 90 degree 24-hour e l l i p t i c a l  o r b i t  
plane change. 
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7. A Avcapab i l i t y  of 7550 f t /sec i n  addition t o  the  basic descent and 
ascent budget should be provided the  l o g i s t i c s  tug and the  standby tug 
t o  permit escape without waiting on the  lunar  surface. 
8. Rescue andevacuation a ids  should include the following: 
Portable a i r lock  
Hand c a r t  which can car ry  ap res su r i zed  s t re tcher ,  o r  serve as a 
wheel cha i r  
Floodlights on the  rover vehicle f o r  l i gh t ing  night  operations 
during t r a v e l  and ingress t o  t he  base 
Tools t o  gain ingress t o  the base 
Elnergency power supply on rover vehicle t o  operate too ls  and 
elevators  
Einergency communications equipment 
In t e rna l  she l t e r  i n  the base with 12-hour survival  resources 
A 6000 Btu backpack with a ba t te ry  l i f e  i n  excess of 1 2  hours f o r  
escape/rescue and survival  
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2.2 ESCAPE/RESCUE PLAN 
The escape/rescue plan i s  presented i n  two major parts;  f i r s t ,  a descr ipt ion of 
the vehicles  and equipment recommended, followed by a descr ipt ion of the  escape/ 
rescue operations using t h a t  equipment. The equipment recommendations include 
a descr ipt ion of use of proposed Integrated Program Plan elements a s  rescue 
=.chicles szd the modif icat ims s ~ c ?  additions required tc! ads$ t & ~ o   element.^ 
t o  use on escape/rescue missions. 
es cape/ surviva l/r es cue use i s  a Is o des cr ibe d . 
The escape/rescue operations a re  divided i n t o  three general  operat ional  areas 
including l u n a r  o r b i t  a r r i v a l  and departure, lunar o rb i t ,  and the  lunar surface. 
Special  support equipment recommended fo r  
2.2.1 Escape/Rescue Vehicle and Equipment Requirements 
2.2.1.1 Prime Transport Vehicle Escape/Rescue Requirements 
The Prime Transport Vehicle, which may be nuclear o r  chemically powered, i s  the  
basic  c a r r i e r  for normal Earth-Moon personnel and cargo f l i gh t s .  
candidate vehicle f o r  a rescue mission from the  Ear th  v ic in i ty .  
It i s  a l s o  the  
Rescue Mission with a Prime Transport Vehicle 
For the  rescue mission the  prime t ransport  vehicle should be equipped with a 
fueled tug and addi t ional  crew compartments t o  accommodate a l l  t he  lunar per- 
sonnel being rescued. The maximum response t i m e  f o r  rescue of orb i t ing  lunar 
s t a t i o n  personnel from Earth o rb i t  i s  14 days based on t h e  following conditions: 
. 
. 2-1/2 days t ranslunar  f l i g h t  time (60 hours) 
10 days waiting i n  Earth o r b i t  f o r  Earth/Moon alignment 
. 1 day f o r  lunar o r b i t  in jec t ion ,  including t i m e  f o r  24-hour 
e l l i p t i c a l  plane change maneuver t o  provide a 90" plane change, 
i f  necessary, f o r  alignment with the  plane of the  orb i t ing  
lunm s t a t i o n  
. 1 2  hours f o r  phasing, rendezvous, and docking of t he  tug with 
the  orbi t ing lunar s ta t ion .  
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The maximum 10 days waiting i n  Earth o rb i t  could be reduced t o  24 hours by 
launching from t h e  Ear th  surface in to  a su i tab le  Earth o r b i t  f o r  t ranslunar  
in jec t ion .  
The crew compartment should contain provisions f o r  the rescued crew return 
t i m e  of 14 days t o  allow waiting i n  lunar o rb i t  f o r  Earth o r b i t  alignment. 
The AV requirements f o r  a rescue of personnel from an orb i t ing  lunar s t a -  
t i o n  by a rescue vehicle coming from Earth o r b i t  are: 
Translunar In jec t ion  (60-hr f l i g h t ) :  10,250 f t / s e c  
Lunar Orbit Inser t ion  (3-burn 90" plane change) 4,500 f t / s e c  
Transearth In j ec t ion  (3-burn 90" plane change): 4,500 f t / s e c  
Earth Orbit Inser t ion  (60-hr f l i g h t )  : 10,250 f t / s e c  
29,500 f t / s e c  
C r e w  Rotation F l ight  with a Prime Transport Vehicle 
The crew compartment of t he  prime transport vehicle used f o r  normal crew ro- 
t a t i o n  f l i g h t  must be equipped w i t h  an autonomous escape capabi l i ty  t o  be used 
i n  t h e  event t he  prime t ranspor t  vehicle ends up on an escape or lunar impact 
t r a j ec to ry  as  a r e s u l t  of malfunction during lunar a r r i v a l  or departure maneu- 
vers.  This escape capabi l i ty  must include the  a b i l i t y  t o  detect  t h e  existence 
of a dangerous t r a j ec to ry ,  separate from the  prime t ranspor t  vehicle, and in-  
j e c t  i n t o  a lunar o rb i t  t o  await rescue. I n  addition t o  autonomous guidance, 
a t t i t u d e  control, communications, and power, a propulsion system with a mini- 
mum AV capabi l i ty  of 1,000 f t / s e c  i s  required. 
a 
Specia l  Requirements f o r  a Nuclear Prime Transport Vehicle 
If the  prime t ranspor t  vehicle i s  nuclear-powered, t he  escape/rescue plan r e -  
quires  an auxi l ia ry  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  system t o  a r r e s t  any tumbling and hold the  
FTV s t ab le  long enough f o r  an escape or  rescue operation t o  be completed within 
the  forward safe-radiat ion sh ie ld  cone angle, and the  crew t o  be moved away t o  
a sa fe  distance. 
2.2.1.2 Orbiting Lunar S ta t ion  Escape/Rescue Requirements 
The Orbiting Lunar S ta t ion  as  a Rescue Base and Safe Haven 
The orb i t ing  lunar s t a t i o n  i s  the  primary rescue base and safe  haven following 
escape from other lunar areas.  Consequently it must be able t o  support a l l  a 
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personnel i n  the lunar area f o r  a period long enough t o  allow rescue from the  
Ear th  v ic in i ty ,  nominally 14 days. 
Survival Provisions a t  t h e  Orbiting Lunar S ta t ion  
I n  order t o  insure survival  of a crew following a c r i t i c a l  accident,  t he  orb i t -  
ing  liunar s t s a t a i m  should have t.wo presslure compartment$ - separa te  
but interconnected. 
normal maximum number of crewmen i n  an emergency for a period of t i m e  commen- 
surate  with rescue -- nominally 14 days from Earth v i c in i ty .  
Eacn compartment s n a i l  be capable or" supporting the  e n t i r e  
Escape Provisions a t  t he  Orbiting Lunar S ta t ion  
A f u l l y  fueled tug t o  be used only f o r  escape/rescue missions s h a l l  be attached 
t o  t h e  orbit ing lunar s ta t ion .  
and preceding establishment of a permanent Lunar Surface Base, t h i s  tug w i l l  be 
t h e  primary means of escape from the  lunar area. The requirement f o r  a dedica- 
t e d  tug means t h a t  the  i n i t i a l  ac t iva t ion  and o r b i t a l  operations requires  the 
presence of a t  l e a s t  two tugs - the  second f o r  normal o r b i t a l  operations; and 
a minimum of three tugs are required before lunar surface operations can s t a r t .  
During i n i t i a l  ac t iva t ion  of the  lunar s t a t i o n  
2.2.1.3 Space Tug Escape/Rescue Requirements 
The tug has been designated as  t h e  primary escape/rescue vehicle f o r  a l l  lunar 
areas with the exception of some lunar t raverse  operations where it i s  consid- 
ered a backup rescue vehicle. 
Escape Provisions with a Space Tug 
The tug must be capable of accommodating the  orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  crew and 
returning it t o  the Earth v i c in i ty .  
and provisions f o r  four days (nominal f l i g h t  t i m e  of 60 hours). 
S,urface Base the lunar landing tug i s  the primary means of escape. It must ac- 
commodate the  lunar surface base crew f o r  a maximum waiting t i m e  of 14 days f o r  
alignment w i t h  t he  plane of the  orbi t ing lunar s t a t ion ,  ascent,  and rendezvous 
with the s ta t ion  (nominal AV of 6,900 f t / sec) .  The waiting time could be de- 
creased by increasing A V  capabi l i ty .  
This mission requires  a AV of 15,000 f t / s ec  
For the  Lunar 
Lunar Surface Rescue Provisions with a Space Tug 
A f u l l y  fueled tug f o r  rescue must have a nominal AV capabi l i ty  of 15,000 ft/SeC 
with a l l  rescue equipment and crew on board. For surface rescue t h i s  includes 
a 3-man EVA rover. TIE 15,000 f t / s e c  A V  capabi l i ty  i s  su f f i c i en t  t o  rescue a 
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crew from any lunar surface s i tua t ion  and re turn  them t o  a t  l e a s t  a temporary 
safe  haven. 
Because the  15,000 f t / s e c  AV capabili ty i s  not su f f i c i en t  t o  immediately re -  
t u rn  the  rescued crew t o  a permanent safe  haven for  a l l  s i tua t ions ,  provisions 
must be made t o  accommodate them for a period of up t o  14 days before a perma- 
nent safe  haven can be attained. 
. 
Rescue tugs must be able t o  land on the lunar surface under a l l  conditions of 
l igh t ing  and sun elevation. 
boundary markers, and area l ight ing should be avai lable  a t  the  emergency s i t e .  
To f a c i l i t a t e  these landings, tracking beacons, 
Lunar Orbit Rescue Provisions with a SDace Tug 
The basic  A V capabi l i ty  of 15,000 f t / sec  provides the  tug with the a b i l i t y  t o  
complete a l l  rescue missions f o r  any lunar o r b i t a l  s i tuat ion.  The most s t r i n -  
gent AV requirement i s  rescue of a crew on a hyperbolic escape t r a j ec to ry ,  
which can be accomplished provided the delay i n  i n i t i a t i n g  the rescue i s  no 
more than two hours from the  t i m e  the dis t ressed c r a f t  passed periselene. 
For rescue of the crew of another vehicle i n  lunar o rb i t ,  an AMU i s  recommended 
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  the t r ans fe r  of injured crewmen from a damaged o r  dangerous vehi- 
c l e  such a s  a tug/propellant depot accident. 
ment common t o  a l l  rescue missions i s  described i n  a succeeding section. 
Additional spec ia l  rescue equip- 
e 
Survival Provisions with a SDace Tw 
The space tug w i l l  be used f o r  both o r b i t a l  and surface operations. Certain 
equipment and procedures are  necessary t o  insure surv iva l  and provide escape 
capabili ty.  . 
The survival  requirements vary w i t h  the tug missions. For operations i n  the 
l o c a l  area of the orb i t ing  lunar s ta t ion,  prime t ranspar t  vehicle,  and propel- 
l a n t  depot, a survival  time of 3 hours i s  su f f i c i en t  f o r  rescue. For longer 
duration o r b i t a l  missions such a s  s c i en t i f i c  s a t e l l i t e  placement, a minimum 
surv iva l  t i m e  of 20 hours i s  required. For lunar surface s o r t i e s  a survival  
time of 12 h.aurs i s  required, and 48 hours i s  recommended. 
vis ions are  f o r  cabin pressure, oxygen, and thermal protection only. Food and 
water a r e  not considered necessary f o r  these time spans. 
The surv iva l  pro- 
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The tug should have t w o  pressure compartments - separate but interconnected. 
Each compartment should have a dedicated and separate emergency l i f e  support 
system t h a t  w i l l  provide a survivable atmosphere and ambient condition f o r  a 
m i n i m a  of  12 horns. 
Each tug should be supplied with pressure suits, backpacks, and emergency 
pressure s u i t s  t o  support t he  en t i r e  crew f o r  a minimum of 12 hours. 
2.2.1.4 
An escape device such a s  an Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMIT) i s  needed f o r  
emergency use by an EVA crewman under c r i t i c a l  emergency conditions a t  an 
o r b i t a l  propellant depot. 
system with mechanical linkage control  would permit v i r t u a l l y  instantaneous 
actuation of the AMU followed by separation from the  depot and t rans la t ion  t o  
a safe  range. 
In  order t o  eliminate EVA during refuel ing of the  tug ,  it i s  recommended t h a t  
interchangeable propellant modules, t h a t  would not  require  EVA f o r  coupling 
and connecting o f  supply l i nes ,  be considered. 
2.2.1.5 
The lunar surface base i s  a semi-permanent i n s t a l l a t ion  with a nominal crew of 
six men. 
tug, EVA rover vehicle, cabin rover vehicle, and propellant depot. 
A t  l e a s t  one lunar lander tug w i l l  be parked about 1-1/4. nm from the  I S B  a t  
a l l  times. 
f o r  escape a n d  rescue missions a t  a l l  times. 
propellant resupply on t h e  lunar surface. 
immediate v ic in i ty  line-of-sight, a rover vehicle sha l l  be avai lable  f o r  
rescue missions.  
2.2.1.6 
Traverses ox the lunar surface w i l l  be conducted i n  e i the r  t he  EVA mode o r  by 
using cabin rovers. In the  l a t t e r  case, provision f o r  survival  i n  the  EVA 
mode must be provided i n  case cabin i n t e g r i t y  i s  l o s t .  
Backpack Life  Support System Requirements fo r  Survival 
I n  order t o  provide survival time, a backpack l i f e  support system of 6,000 BTU 
capacity and a 12-hour pack i s  necessary. 
Orbital Propellant Depot Escape/Rescue Requirements 
A cold gas propulsion and a t t i t u d e  control  react ion 
Lunar Surface Base (LSB) Escape/Rescue Requirements 
Supporting equipment located a t  the base may include a lunar lander 
T h i s  LLT sha l l  be f u l l y  fueled ( AV = 15,000 f t /sec)  and avai lable  
This imposes a requirement f o r  
During any EVA t raverses  beyond the  
b 
Lunm Surface Traverse Escape/Rescue Equipment Requirements 
This unit ,  when used with a pressure 
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suit or emergency pressure garment, can provide 12 hours l i f e  support f o r  a 
man a t  r e s t  awaiting rescue. 
a second EVA crewman could plug into a un i t  worn by a "buddy" crewman. 
t i m e  span required f o r  plug-in and switchaver should be i n  the  order of seconds. 
The backpack systems should be designed so that 
The 
Ekneraencv Pressure Garment Reauirements f o r  Survival 
A simple lightweight emergency pressure garment that can be donned i n  f i v e  
seconds or less should be available t o  a l l  crewmen on surface traverses a t  a l l  
times. The crewman must be able t o  don the pressure garment whether i n  pres- 
sure s u i t  or not, and the  garment should be convertible t o  a s t re tcher  by the  
addi t ion of rods or  poles. . 
EYA Walking Traverse Equipment Requirements f o r  Survival 
All EVA walking t raverses  beyond the immediate l ine-of-sight v i c i n i t y  of the 
base or tug should be done i n  pairs. 
A hand c a r t  should be taken along carrying a spare backpack uni t  and two emer- 
gency pressure garments. 
The maximum distance should be 4 nm. 
This w i l l  provide an addi t ional  6 hours survival  
time f o r  both crewmen using the  same backpack while awaiting rescue. 
EVA Rover Reauirements f o r  Survival 
A l l  rover vehicles should be capable of carrying a minimum of two passengers 
plus the  driver. 
pressurized s t re tchers .  All EVA rovers should include an ex t ra  backpack u n i t  
and emergency pressure garment f o r  each crewman, thus providing an addi t ional  
12-hour survival  t i m e  at rest. 
i s  3 knots and 12 nm, respectively. 
The capabi l i ty  m u s t  include the  case of incapacitated men i n  
The nominal speed and range of an EVA rover 
Pressurized Cabin Rover Requirements f o r  Escape/Rescue 
The nominal speed of a cabin rover i s  5.4 knots, and the  range i s  270 t o  400 nm 
with l i f e  support f o r  14 t o  24 days, respectively. The pressurized cabin rover 
i s  t h e  preferred rescue vehicle f o r  surface traverses.  
a m i n i m u m  capacity of 3 crewmen, whether they are i n  pressure s u i t s ,  emergency 
garments , @r pressurized stretchers.  
f o r  rescue should have dual controls - one s e t  inside t h e  cabin, and the other 
outside the cabin, and so arranged t h a t  a crewman i n  a pressurized s u i t  can 
cont ro l  the  vehicle. 
The cabin should have 
A pressurized cabin rover vehicle used 
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2.2.2 Escape/Rescue Operations Plan 
The primary emphasis of t he  escape/rescue plan i s  on providing the  endangered 
crew with the  capabili ty t o  escape t o  a permanent safe haven. 
i s  always the  poss ib i l i ty  of the e n t i r e  crew being incapacitated and not cap- 
able of s e w  heip, provisions are a l so  made f o r  survival  an6 fo r  rescue 'uy 
outside help t o  remove the  crew t o  8 permanent safe haven. 
Because there 
The escape/rescue plan i s  divided i n t o  three general operational areas includ- 
ing lunar orb i t  a r r i v a l  and departure, lunar orb i t ,  and the  lunar surface. 
plan i s  summarized i n  Table 2-2 
The 
2.2.2.1 Lunar Orbit Arrival/Departure Escape/Rescue Operations 
The lunar arrival/departure has two phases: t h e  i n i t i a l  manning and act ivat ion,  
and the routine log i s t i c s  f l i g h t s  involving crew rotat ion.  
I n i t i a l  Manning Operations 
The i n i t i a l  orbiting lunar s t a t i o n  manning f l i g h t  should have the  crew trans-  
ported i n  a f u l l y  fueled tug capable of e i t h e r  autonomous re turn  t o  Earth o rb i t  
or  autonomous lunar o rb i t  inser t ion  and rendezvous with the  orbi t ing lunar s ta -  
t ion ,  i n  the  event of a Prime Transport Vehicle malfunction during lunar o rb i t  
inser t ion.  
If the tug i s  used t o  escape t o  the  orbi t ing lunar s ta t ion ,  it i s  then kept on 
standby f o r  possible escape t o  Earth u n t i l  a second Prime Transport Vehicle a r -  
r ives  from Earth o rb i t  t o  provide any required support. 
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Routine Arrival/Departure Operations 
For rout ine crew r o t a t i o n  f l i g h t s ,  personnel should be transported t o  and from 
lunar o rb i t  i n  a crew compartment with an autonomous escape capability.- 
event of lunar orbi t  i n se r t ion  f a i l u r e ,  t he  crew compartment can be detached 
fmix t h e  p r i m  transpzrt  vehicle and m m e d  t o  a sa fe  lumr orbf t  tz, await  res- 
cue by a tug from the  orb i t ing  lunar s ta t ion .  
I n  the  
2.2.2.2 Escape/Rescue Operations i n  Lunar Orbit 
For lunar o rb i t  operations from the  orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion ,  two tugs a re  neces- 
sary; one as  a dedicated escape/rescue vehicle, and t h e  other t o  be used f o r  
normal o r b i t a l  operations including o r b i t a l  so r t i e s .  
Orbiting Lunar S ta t ion  Escape/Rescue Operations 
If t h e  orb i t ing  lunar s t a t i o n  has t o  be abandoned, the  standby tug  i s  used f o r  
escape t o  E a r t h  o r b i t  or t o  lunar orb i t .  Pr ior  t o  t h e  establishment of a per- 
manent lunar surface base, the  Earth v i c i n i t y  i s  the  only source of outside help 
fo r  t he  orbi t ing lunar s t a t i o n  crew. 
must be i n i t i a t e d  from the Earth v i c in i ty .  
t o  survive f o r  14 days i n  the  orb i t ing  lunar s ta t ion / tug  combination while await- 
ing rescue from Ear th  orb i t .  
Consequently, i f  rescue i s  required, it 
Provisions must therefore  be made 
Following establishment of the  permanent lunar surface base, rescue of t he  orb- 
i t i n g  lunar s t a t ion  crew by the  lunar lander tug  from the surface base i s  pre- 
f e r r ed  f o r  c r i t i c a l  emergencies requiring a fas t  response time. 
lander tug  can ascend, make up t o  a 90" plane change, and rendezvous with the  
orb i t ing  s t a t i o n  i n  5 hours, including 2 hours f o r  phasing. 
requirement i s  l e s s  than the  recommended 15,000 f t / s e c  tug  capabi l i ty .  After 
rendezvous and rescue of the crew, the  tug should rcmain i n  lunar o r b i t  f o r  a 
€TV rescue mission from Earth o r b i t  (up t o  14 days). 
the  crew t o  the FTV, r e fue l ,  and r e tu rn  t o  t h e  lunar surface base t o  support 
crewmen l e f t  on the  surface. If propellant i s  avai lable  t o  t h e  tu(?: from a depot 
i n  o r b i t ,  the tug has t h e  option of refueling and returning the  d is t ressed  crew- 
men t o  Earth orbit  without waiting f o r  a r r i v a l  of a rescue F"V. 
A f u l l y  fueled 
The maximum A V  
The tug  can then t ransfer  
Tug Escape/Rescue Operations i n  Lunar Orbit 
Two classes  of operations will be conducted i n  lunar o r b i t  by the tug;  close-in 
operations consisting of t he  movement of suppl ies  and propel lant  involving the 
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prime transport  vehicle and the propellant depot, and extended-duration so r t i e s  
such as the  placement of s c i e n t i f i c  s a t e l l i t e s .  
ing lunar s t a t ion  i s  the  primary rescue vehicle during these operations. 
gency survival  provisions must be available i n  the  operating tug t o  allow time 
f o r  the  rescue tug t o  arr ive.  
cue t o  20 hours f o r  extended o rb i t a l  sor t ies .  
A dedicated tug a t  t he  orb i t -  e 
Emer- 
This t i m e  var ies  from three hours f o r  l oca l  res- 
2,2,2- 3 Lunar Surface Escape/Rescue Operations 
I n  order t o  provide escape/rescue capabili ty f o r  lunar surface operations, a 
minimum of three tugs capable of landing on the lunar surface are required: 
1. 
2. 
3. A tug f o r  routine log is t ics  and operations i n  lunar o rb i t  
A dedicated escape/rescue tug a t  t h e  orbi t ing lunar s t a t ion  
A tug f o r  surface so r t i e s  
The lunar surface missions w i l l  involve three types of operations: lunar lander 
tug so r t i e s ,  lunar surface base operations, end lunar surface traverses.  
h n d e r  Tug Sor t ie  Escape/Rescue Operations 
The lunar lander tug may conduct surface so r t i e s  up t o  28 days duration- 
escape/rescue plan must handle two types of emergency: accident during descent 
or ascent, and c r i t i c a l  accident during routine operations. 
The 
. 
Descent and Ascent - The most dangerous time of the  lunar surface s o r t i e  i s  
during descent and ascent. A c r i t i c a l  accident may require immediate rescue. 
An act ivated and manned tug on a l e r t  a t  the  orbi t ing lunar s t a t ion  during these 
operations can descend i n  one o rb i t a l  period ( 2  hours) because the  s t a t ion  i s  
e s sen t i a l ly  overhead and i n  plane a t  t he  t i m e  of planned descent or ascent. If 
the crew i n  the  lunar lander i s  suited and on backpacks during the c r i t i c a l  
takeoff and landing phases, then survival time i s  suf f ic ien t ,  even i f  the  cabin 
i s  ruptured. 
. Routine Operations - 
b i t i n g  lunar s'iation could take as long as 10 hours including communications, 
rescue tug act ivat ion,  phasing, descent, landing, and traverse t o  the  surface 
tug. 
therefore  be assured. 
b i l i t y  t o  r e tu rn  t o  lunar o rb i t  i f  it made a subs tan t ia l  plane change during de- 
scent. Therefore, it must contain suf f ic ien t  provisions t o  remain on the  lunar 
surface u n t i l  the  t h i r d  tug can arrive (up t o  14 days) and remove the  crew and/ 
or  r e fue l  t he  rescue tug. 
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During the normal 28 days operation, rescue from the or- 
Survival provisions f o r  a minimum of 12 hours duration on the  surface must 
The rescue tug from orb i t  w i l l  have insuf f ic ien t  AV capa- 
Lunar Surface Base Escape/Rescue Operations 
The permanent lunar surface base should have enough f u l l y  fueled tugs standing 
by t o  remove the en t i r e  lunar surface base crew t o  the  orbi t ing lunar s ta t ion.  
As a ' oazhp  rescue male ir, c8se the  lunar surface bnse crew cannot. help t.hem- 
selves,  a rescue tug from the orbi t ing lunar s t a t ion  could e f f ec t  a rescue i n  
no more than 11 hours. 
should be taken as were described f o r  the lunar lander tug sor t ies .  
During landing and takeoff of tugs, t he  same precautions . 
Lunar Surface Traverse Escape/Rescue Operations 
Lunar surface traverses are assumed t o  be conducted by t h e  following means of 
locomotion and t h e i r  corresponding distance from surface base together wi th  
t r a v e l  speeds. 
. Walking - 4 nm/2 knots 
. EVA Rovers - 8 nm/3 - 4 knots 
. Pressurized Cabin Rovers - 270 - 400 nm/ 5 knots 
Flyers (1- and 2-man) - 5 and 15 nm/180 knots 
. Ground Effects Machine (1-man) - 11 nm/14 knots 
All t raverses  are under EVA conditions except f o r  those i n  the  pressurized cabin 
rovers. The basic l i f e  support f o r  EVA t raverses  i s  provided by ~,OOO-BTU back- 
packs The recornended escape/survival/rescue plan i s  based on the a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of a f r e sh  backpack a t  the  time of the emergency. 
This emergency backpack w i l l  provide a 12-hour survival  time while awaiting res -  
cue (500 BTU/hr while r e s t ing )  or  the  capabi l i ty  t o  walk back i f  there  a re  no 
other impediments such as in jur ies ,  damaged s u i t ,  o r  lack of direction. 
Walk Back 
an average speed of 2 knots (1,400 BTU/hr while walking). 
allow the distressed crew on a walking or EVA rairer t raverse  t o  r e tu rn  t o  base 
by walking i f  they are not injured o r  incapacitated and t h e i r  s u i t s  are  i n  good 
condition. 
distance frorr, base be l imited t o  the  8-nm walk-back capabili ty.  
f l ye r s  will probably be used only f o r  t raverses  involving rough or mountainous 
t e r r a i n ,  and the crew may not be able  t o  negotiate the  re turn  t r i p  on foot. 
- A s ingle  ~ , O O O - B T U  packpack b r i l l  allow a man t o  walk back 8 nm a t  
This capabi l i ty  will 
For the one-man ground e f f ec t  machine, it i s  recornended t h a t  the 
The 1- and 2-man 
. 
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I n  general, a dis t ressed crew should not i n i t i a t e  a walk-back escape u n t i l  they 
have contacted the  base and informed them of t h e i r  s t a t u s  and plans. If commu- 
nications cannot be established, they should btay with t h e i r  equipment and 
await rescue which will be in i t i a t ed  automatically by t h e i r  failure t o  report. 
For a walking t raverse ,  t he  emergency backpacks and pressure garment should be 
car r ied  on a hand car t .  
are l imited t o  a 4-nm radius,  t he  emergency backpack need only be of 3,000 BTU 
capacity. 
I n  order t o  reduce weight f o r  walking traverses,  which 
EVA Traverse Rescue 
verse i s  a rover - e i the r  pressurized or EVA. The pressurized cabin rover i s  
recommended because the  distreslsed crew can be placed i n  a safe haven and ad- 
ministered medical treatment a t  the scene of the  emergency. 
the dis t ressed crewmen are on EVA during the  re turn  t r i p .  
t i m e  i s  adequate f o r  rescue and return within the 8-nm radius of the base. 
mentioned e a r l i e r  f o r  flyer traverses,  a rover vehicle may not be able t o  nego- 
t i a t e  the lura in  t o  reach a distressed flyer. 
be avai lable  f o r  a l l  flyer traverses over lu ra in  t h a t  cannot be traversed by a 
rover vehicle within the  l2-hour survival time. 
- The primaryvehicle f o r  rescuing a crew on an EVA tra- 
For the  EVA rover 
The 12-hour survival  
A s  
Consequently a rescue f lye r  should 
Pressurized Cabin Rover Traverse Rescue - The cabin rover t raverse  may range 
up t o  400 nm from the  point of departure. 
ate with "buddy" rovers and avoid need f o r  rescue. 
a long t raverse  and a rescue need wises, the  crew should normally remain w i t h  
t he  rover and await rescue from orbit. A s ingle  backpack per crewman w i l l  pro- 
vide 12 hours of survival  t i m e ,  which exceeds the  time f o r  a tug from lunar or- 
b i t  t o  complete a rescue operation. To avoid excessive plane change requirements 
f o r  t he  rescue tug, the  t raverse  should be careful ly  coordinated with the  orb i t -  
ing lunar stat ion.  
The recammended procedure i s  t o  oper- 
If a cabin rover i s  sent on 
2.2.3 Escape/Rescue Plan Summary 
Three areas are of primary in t e re s t  i n  t he  proposed escape/rescue plan. 
1. 
These are: 
The c r i t i c a l  time spans for escape/survival/rescue, which were found t o  
bel:! hours and 14 days 
The equipment required for escape/survival/rescue; and 2. 
3- The deployment of equipment required f o r  escape/survival/rescue. a 
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These three areas are s m r i z e d  as  follows: 
2.2, 3, 1 C r i t i c a l  Time Spans f o r  Escape/Rescue 
The c r i t i c a l  times f o r  rescue were found t o  f a l l  i n t o  two d i s t i n c t  spans: 12  
hours, and 14 days. 
12-Hour Escape/Survival/Rescue Time Span - 
crew ( tha t  i s ,  t ransfer  t o  a t  least a temporary safe haven) can be accomplished 
i n  12 hours or less f o r  a l l  lunar s i tua t ions  with the possible exception of a 
high-alt i tude lunar o r b i t  tug s o r t i e  such as the  placement of a s c i e n t i f i c  s a t -  
e l l i t e .  I n  the case of extreme a l t i tudes ,  rescue may take up t o  20 hours. 
I n i t i a l  survival i s  predicated on a t  l e a s t  the  ava i l ab i l i t y  of a pressure gar- 
ment with a 6 ,000-m 12-hour ba t te ry ,  backpack which w i l l  provide 12 hours 
survival  t i m e .  An addi t ional  switchable backpack w i l l  provide su f f i c i en t  sur- 
vival t i m e  f o r  the  tug sorties requiring up t o  20 hours rescue time. 
These time spans a re  discussed below. 
Escape or rescue of a dis t ressed 
14-day Escape/Survival/Rescue Time Span - I n  some s i tua t ions ,  performance 
Umitations may require the  escape/rescue tug t o  wait f o r  addi t ional  help a f t e r  
the  dis t ressed crew has a t ta ined  a temporary safe  haven. 
could be as long as 12 days, 
t o  support i t s  own crew and any rescued crew members f o r  up t o  14 days. 
This waiting period 
Consequently, each escape/rescue tug must be able 
2.2.3.2 Escape/Rescue Equipment Requirements 
Equipment required f o r  escape, survival,  and rescue includes the  following: 
1. Space tugs with: 
a. 15,000 f t / s ec  P V  capabi l i ty  
b. 14-day l i f e  support capabi l i ty  
c. landing legs and equipment 
d. two (2)  pressurized compartments 
e. manual control  capabi l i ty  
f .  operabili ty by space-suited astronaut 
2. An orbit ing lunar s t a t i o n  with: 
a. 
b. 
tvo  ( 2 )  or  more pressurized compartments 
capabili ty t o  support a l l  crewmen i n  t h e  lunar area f o r  14  days 
i n  an emergency 
. 
40 
6.  
7. 
. 
. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12 0 a 
Prime transport  vehicles with: 
a. 30,000 f t / s ec  A V  capabili ty 
b. 
c o  
Prime transport  vehicle crew compartments with: 
a. 1,000 f t / s ec  A V  capabili ty 
b. autonomous navigation, guidance, c m u n i c a t i o n s ,  and l i f e  support 
14-day react ion time from Earth o rb i t  t o  lunar o rb i t  
redundant s tab i l iza t ion  for a nuclear powered vehicle 
A propellant depot i n  lunar o rb i t  
EVA rovers with: 
a. 3-man capacity, minimum 
b. 16-IIDI range 
C. surface speed of 3 t o  4 knots 
Cabin rovers with: 
a. 4-man capacity 
bo surface speed of 5 knots 
Rescue astronaut maneuvering un i t s  (AMU's) with: 
a. 2-man capacity 
b. 90-minute l i f e  support 
ce 400 f t / s ec  A V  capabili ty 
(rescue AMU required only i f  M I S  are used f o r  normal operations) 
Pressure s u i t s  with: 
a. 
b. RF and visual  locator  beacons 
backpack switching capabili ty during EVA 
L i f e  support backpacks with: 
a. 6,000 EfCU capabi l i ty  
b. 12-hour l i f e  support capabili ty 
C. 
d. swi.tching capabi l i ty  during EVA 
"buddy" sharing provisions f o r  a l l  functions 
Emergency pressure garments with: 
a. j-second don time 
b. emergency oxygen supply attached 
Oxygen masks with emergency oxygen supply 
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13 
l-4. 
15  
16. 
17. 
18. 
19 
20. 
21. 
Portable a i r locks 
Pressurized s t re tchers  
F i r s t  aid k i t s  
herqency communications equi-pent, including: 
a. rocket-propelled radio beacons 
b. tracking beacons 
c .  
Handcarts with capabi l i ty  t o  car ry  a pressurized s t re tcher  and crewman, 
o r  an incapacitated crewman i n  a pressure s u i t  
Rescue location aids  
Lunar backside communications s a t e l l i t e  pr ior  t o  landings on the  back s ide 
Propellant depot o r  tug propellant resupply capabi l i ty  a t  each lunar 
surface base  
Rescue lunar f lye r  t o  back up any operational f l y e r  sent  i n to  an a rea  
inaccessible by other means of  t ransportat ion 
landing and touchdown locat ion aids  
. 
2.2.3.3 Escapefiescue Equipment Deployment Requirements 
The equipment required by the  rescue plan i s  deployed a s  follows: 
1. An orbit ing lunar s t a t ion  i n  lunar o r b i t  (assumed 60 nm c i rcu lar ,  polar) 
2. A dedicated rescue tug a t  the orbi t ing lunar s ta t ion ,  carrying an EVA 
rover, portable airlock, pressurized s t re tcher ,  f i r s t  aid equipment, 
cabin breaching tools ,  and handcart 
3 .  An operational tug i n  lunar o rb i t ,  which i s  capable of  surface rescue. 
4. A f u l l y  r’ueled tug a t  each lunar surface base 
. 
5. A 3-man FXA rover with each surface s o r t i e  tug, a t  each lunar surface 
base, and on each rescue tug. 
and supporting 4 
The rover should be capable of carrying 
men i n  an emergency. 
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7. 
8. 
9.  
10. 
. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14 
AI. a 16. 
. 
17. 
18. 
19 
20. 
21. . 
Two (2)  prime t ransport  vehicles i n  Earth orbit / lunar o r b i t  area, with 
crew compartments attached when carrying personnel, or  when used f o r  
rescue 
A propellant depot i n  lunar orb i t  
A propellant depot, o r  resupply capabi l i ty ,  f o r  tugs a t  a lunar surface 
base 
A cabi.n rover a t  each lunar surface base 
Pressure s u i t s  and l i f e  support backpacks where always accessible t o  
each crewman 
An emergency pressure garment always accessible t o  each crewman 
Oxygen masks for  each crewman in  each pressurized compartment 
A portable a i r lock with each rescue tug 
.4 rescue AMU located wherever a basic AMU i s  used 
A pressurized s t re tcher  with each vehicle, s ta t ion ,  and bame 
F i r s t  a id  k i t s  accessible t o  each crewman a t  a l l  times 
Handcarts with each surface vehicle and base 
Rescue locat ion aids  with each surface vehicle 
Lunar backside communication s a t e l l i t e s  located t o  provide continuous 
communications between lunar surface backside, lunar orbi t ing s ta t ion ,  
and Earth 
Elnergency communications equipment on each lander tug and each surface 
sor t ie  vehicle. 
A rescue flyer a t  point of origin of any operational f l ye r  sen t  i n to  an 
area inaccessible by other means of transportation. 
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2.3 ESCAPE/RESCUE GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS 
The following paragraphs present the escape/rescue guidelines and require- 
ments recommended f o r  advanced lunar  exploration. 
spec i f ic  hazards generating the requirement f o r  escape/rescue are cross- 
referenced with the hazards presented i n  Section 3 of this docaen t .  
escape/rescue guidelines a re  separated by area of operation and include : 
arrival/departure,  o r b i t a l  operations, and surface operations. 
t i o n  f o r  the guidelines m a y  be found i n  MSC-03978. 
The Hazard Study and 
The 
Jus t i f i ca -  
2.3.1 Safety Requirements f o r  Rescue 
A safe rescue operation i s  an inherent requirement. The s t r e s s ,  shor t  time 
span, and short  response time are  all cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of  a rescue operation 
t h a t  tend t o  decrease the  mission sa fe ty  leve ls .  
quirements are intended t o  enhance the  rescue operation safety.  
The following spec i f ic  r e -  
All lunar  mission personnel must receive spec i f ic  sa fe ty  t r a in ing  in-  
cluding rescue procedures and techniques, hazard iden t i f i ca t ion  and 
equipment operation. 
Emergency equipment t o  maximize crew survival following the occurrence 
of an emergency must be avai lable  during every manned mission or opera- 
t ion .  
emergency equipment, such as oxygen masks, emergency pressure garments, 
pressure s u i t s ,  and backpack units, i n  more than one location. 
will be dependent on vehicle s ize ,  number of compartments, arrangement, 
crew s ize  and dispersion, e t c .  
Pressure suits, backpack units and emergency pressure garments must be 
avai lable  f o r  each crewman at  each manned s i t e .  I n  addition, surface 
or o r b i t  vehicles assigned f o r  rescue duty must have Pressure garments 
on-board for the  assigned crew and fo r  the  &mum number of men t h a t  
could be involved i n  a rescue operation. 
Tugs, orbi t ing lunar s ta t ions ,  and surface bases may require 
T h i s  
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5. 
6. 
Pr ior  t o  i n  t i a t i o n  of a rescue operation a go-ahead must be received 
from a designated rescue operations coordinator. 
f o r  the  coordination are at the  LSB and at the o r b i t a l  s ta t ion .  
Suggested s t a t ions  
RF frequencies and monitoring equipment s h a l l  be assigned and dedicated 
f o r  rescue support. 
No backside surface landings or traverses s h a l l  be made unless a back- 
s ide  communications s a t e l l i t e  has  been act ivated and has achieved 
f 'u l l  operational s ta tus .  
2.3.2 Lunm Orbit Arrivd/Rw&ure Escapehescue Guidelines 
The arrangement of personnel and equipment f o r  the Initial Manning Fl ight  
i s  qu i t e  d i f f e ren t  from the subsequent routine crew ro ta t ion  f l i g h t s .  Con- 
sequently, t w o  d i s t i n c t  sets of guidelines a r i s e  as given i u  the following. 
The Initial Manning Fl ight  guidelines pertaining t o  the  tug a r e  f o r  the  
i n i t i a l  tug only. 
Reference 
Esc  a p e b e  scue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline study No. Hazard No. 
INITIAL m N G  F'LIGHT 
1 The in i t i a l  manning f l i g h t  
should t ransport  the crew 
t o  lunar o r b i t  i n  a tug which 
i s  fueled and provisioned t o  
make an autonomous escape 
from the Prime Transport Ve- 
hicle (PTV) and e i ther  rend- 
ezvous with the Orbiting Lunar 
Stat ion or return t o  Earth 
orb i t .  
1 
2 Prior t o  lunar orbi t  inser t ion ,  1 
the  tug carrging the i n i t i a l  
manning crew must be manned and 
act ivated f o r  immediate escape. 
HA-1 
HA-1 
HA-2 
2-43 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline study No. H a z a r d  No. 
3 The guidance system of the 
i n l t i a l  manning tug m~t .  be 
activated and capable of 
warning the crew of any man- 
euvers t ha t  place them on a 
t ra jectory requiring escape. 
4 The i n i t i a l  manning tug 
guidance and navigation system 
must be capable of generating 
the commands for  escape man- 
euvers from a disabled prime 
transport vehicle. 
5 The ini t ia l  manning tug 
should be able t o  return to ,  
and rendezvous with, the or- 
bit ing lunar s ta t ion follow- 
ing an escape from the prime 
transport  vehicle. 
6 The prime transport  vehicle 
must contain a redundant at- 
t i tude control system capable 
of overcoming any tumbling 
suff ic ient ly  fo r  the crew t o  
escape i n  e i the r  the tug or 
crew compartment . 
7 The prime transport vehicle 
redundant a t t i tude  control 
system sha l l  be activated and 
operated f r o m  the tug or crew 
compartment. 
8 A nuclear prime transport 
vehicle should have an auto- 
pi lot /a t t i tude control sys- 
tem capable of holding the 
PTV i n  a stationary a t t i tude  
long enough for the  crew t o  
escape t o  a distance safe 
from radiation. 
1 
1 
3 
36 
HA-1 
HA-3 
HA-1 
HA-2 
HA-3 
HA-2 
HA-3 
HA-4 
Reference 
Escapebe scue Haz;ard 
Guideline No. Guideline study No. H a z a r d  No. 
ROUTINE CREW R O T U I O N  FLIGHTS 
9 
10 
11 
. 
12 
13 
The C r e w  Compartment (CC) 
of the Prime Transport Ve- 
h ic le  should have its own 
propulsion system, including 
a t t i tude  control, which w i l l  
allow the crew t o  escape t o  
an e l l i p t i c a l  lunar orb i t  i n  
the event of a disabled FTV. 
T h i s  propulsion system should 
have quick activation t i m e  
coupled with long dormant 
storage life, &nd must be able 
t o  provide a m i n i m A V  of  
1000 ft /sec t o  the CC. 
The crew compartment of the 
prime transport vehicle 
should contain an autonomous 
Guidance and Navigation (G&N) 
System capable of monitoring 
the effect  of any maneuver i n  
the lunar area. 
The G&N system i n  the C r e w  
Compartment carried by a prime 
transport vehicle should be 
able t o  generate commands for  
escape maneuvers including 
placing the CC on a safe tra- 
jectory. 
The crew compartment on a 
prime transport vehicle should 
have a communications system cap- 
able of signaling the orbit- 
ing lunar stat ion of the need 
f o r  rescue. 
The crew compartment on a 1 
prime transport vehicle should 3 
have aids, both electronic and 
v i s u a l ,  t o  allow a rescue ve- 
hic le  t o  locate, track, and 
rendezvous. 
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HA-1 
HA-1 
HA-3 
HA-1 
HA-3 
HA-1 
HA-3 
HA-1 
HA-3 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline StUdY No. Hazard No. 
14 During routine lunar  o r b i t  1 HA-1 
a r r i v a l  and departure man- 3 HA-3 
euvers, t he  ?q at t h e  crbit ina 0 
lunar s t a t i o n  s h d i  be manned 
and activated i n  the  event t h a t  
rescue i s  needed. c 
2.3.3 Lunar Orbital  Operations Escape/Rescue Guidelines 
RESCUE FROM EARTH VICINITY 
15 A dedicated rescue vehicle  
should be maintained i n  the  
Earth v i c i n i t y  during o r b i t a l  
lunar s t a t ion  ac t iva t ion  and 
deactivation, The vehicle  and 
crew must be on a ready-alert 
status with a t o t a l  response 
time less than the  probable 
survival  time of the stranded 
crew. 
1 HA-1 
HA-3 
16 During routine orb i t ing  lunar 4 
s t a t ion  operation, a c r i t i c a l  
s t a t ion  emergency t h a t  makes 
it impossible f o r  the  crew t o  
use docked tugs f o r  escape 
w i l l  result i n  a need f o r  res- 
cue e i t h e r  from the  lunar sur- 
face or from the Earth v i c in i ty .  
I n  addition t o  picking up the 
stranded s t a t ion  crew, the  
rescue vehicle from the  Earth 
v i c i n i t y  must r e fue l  the  tug  
for  i t s  return t o  support crew- 
men l e f t  on the  surface.  Note 
t h a t  a surface-based tug t h a t  
i s  used for  a rescue mission t o  
lunar o r b i t  w i l l  probably not  
have sufficient remaining 
veloci ty  capabi l i ty  t o  e i t h e r  
re turn t o  a lunar  surface s i t e  
o r  t o  reach Earth o r b i t  without 
re fue l ing .  
HB-1 
HB-2 
HB-3 
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Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Gcideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
17 A t  l e a s t  two crewmen shuuld 4 HB-1 HB-3 
remain i n  the  docked tug as m-2 HB-4 
a dedicated rescue team dur- 
ing  orb i t ing  lunar s t a t i o n  
act ivat ion and deactivation. 
ORBIT1 NG LUNAR STATION 
. 18 A t  least two crew compartments 4 must be avai lable  i n  the  orb i t -  38 
ing  lunar s ta t ion .  Each 
compartment must be self- 
contained with respect t o  the  
s t a t ion  subsystems and must, 
as a minimum, include the  
following capabi l i t i es :  
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f .  
g* 
h. 
i. 
Life Support 
Environmental control 
E lec t r i ca l  power 
Commmications with Earth 
v i c in i ty ,  tugs - whether 
docked or o r b i t a l  - Prime 
Transport Vehicle - whether 
i n  lunar area or between Earth 
and &on - lunar surface s i t e s ,  
and t o  rescue crews ins ide  
the s t a t ion  
Lighting 
Airlock i n t o  s ta t ion  i n t e r i o r  
Emergency equipment (See Items 19, 22, & 23) 
Operable by one crewman, 
whether injured or i n  good 
heal th  
Atmospheric f i l t e r s  and atmos- 
pheric recirculat ing capabi l i ty  
to c lea r  any contaminants t h a t  
might en te r  w i t h  a crewman 
HR-1 HB-3 
HB-1 HB-4 
Hl3-2 
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Reference 
Esc a p e b e  scue H a ! Z d  
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. H a z a r d  No. 
j. 
k. 
Instrumentation di splays , 
both i n  the compartment 
and s i t s ide ,  to tiid the  
rescue crewmen i n  deter- 
mining conditions i n  the 
compartment. 
The l i f e  support system 
must include capabili ty 
t o  reduce the compartment 
ambient pressure, and t o  
control the mixture r a t i o  
of O2 t o  any i n e r t  d i lu ten t  
g= 
19 
20 
21 
Emergency portable oxygen 4 
masks and sup?ly bot t les  and 
pressure garments with a 
built- in portable oxygen 
supply should be strategic- 
a l ly  located throughout the 
orbiting lunar station. 
The orbit ing lunar s ta t ion 4 
design must provide a means 
for the crewmen t o  find 
t h e i r  way t o  emergency gear, 
a l ternate  compartments, o r  
docked vehicles under ex- 
treme conditions of smoke, 
lighting, motion, o r  toxic gas. 
The alternate compartment 4 
communication system of an 
orbiting lunar s ta t ion must 
include the capabili ty for  
the rescue crew and stranded 
crew t o  converse regardless 
of the ambient atmospheric 
conditions i n  the compartment 
and i n  the station. 
HB-1 
HB-3 
HB-4 
HB-3 
HB-4 
HB-5 
HB-1 
HB-3 
2-48 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue HWiaXd 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. H a z a r d  No. 
. 
22 The orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  4 HB-1 HB-3 
a l t e rna te  compartment equip- HB-2 Hl3-4 
ment must include f i r s t  aid 
supplies, portable oqgen  
masks and pressure garments 
with bui l t - in  portable oxygen 
supplies, and pressurized 
s t r e t che r s  f o r  moving injured 
men who cannot don protect ive 
garments or  pressure suits. 
23 The following types of emer- 4 
gency equipment must be avail-  8 
able f o r  use by orbi t ing lunar  20 
crewmen f o r  rescue purposes: 
a. Oxygen masks and portable 
b. Pressure garments with 
c. Lighting equipment 
d. Pressurized s t re tchers  
e. Radiation monitoring equip- 
ment 
f .  Portable a i r lock (including 
equipment f o r  attaching the  
a i r lock  and cutt ing through 
a  all o r  bulkhead) 
O2 supplies 
bu i l t - i n  O2 supplies 
g. First a id  supplies 
24 The a l t e rna te  compartments i n  4 
an orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  must 
provide survival capabi l i ty  
f o r  a span of t ime greater  than 
the  Earth-vicinity-based res- 
cue vehicle response t i m e .  It 
i s  estimated that this survival 
t i m e  should be greater  than U, 
days. 
HB-1 HB-4 
HB-2 HJ-1 
HB-3 HJ-3 
HB-1 HB-3 
HB-2 HB-4 
2-L9 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
25 The p o s s i b i l i t y  of radia- 4 HB-3 
t i o n  contamination mst be HB-L 
taken i n t o  account i n  the  
design and performance re- 
quirements f o r  d l  emergency 
gear, including pressure suits 
and backpack units. 
26 Crew safety t ra in ing  must 
include operation of all 
emergency equipment and 
compartments, as well as 
the in t e rp re t a t ion  of radia- 
t i o n  monitoring instrumenta- 
t ion.  
4 31 
9 36 
20 
27 Ehergency first aid kits 4 31 
must include the capabi l i ty  9 36 
f o r  the treatment of radia- 20 
t i o n  sickness, and crewmen 
must be t ra ined t o  recognize 
and treat exposed crewmen. 
28 An emergency, backup, manu- 4 
a l l y  controlled a t t i t u d e  con- 
t r o l  system i s  needed t o  
a r r e s t  o rb i t ing  lunar s t a t i o n  
tumbling motion, or  at l e a s t  
t o  reduce it t o  a l e v e l  t h a t  
permits tug docking and un- 
docking operations. 
29 The orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  i s  - 
the  leading candidate f o r  act-  
i ng  as the  primary lunar area 
escape/rescue base and safe  
haven. It follows t h a t  the sta- 
t ion  must be able t o  accommodate 
the assigned s t a t ion  crew, crews 
being rotated- including surface 
crews - plus any crewmen using 
the s t a t i o n  as a safe  haven fol-  
lowing an escape/rescue operation. 
HB-1 HB-4 
HB-2 HQ-1 
HB-3 
HB-4 
HQ-1 
. 
HB-5 
2-50 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue H a z a r d  
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. H a z a r d  No. 
. 
The orbiting lunar s ta t ion  - 30 
orbi t  a l t i tude must be high 
enough t o  provide a suitably 
large area of station-to- 
surface line-of-sight cover- 
age for  communications and 
tracking purposes. A mini- 
rrmm a l t i tude  of 60 nm i s  
recommended. 
31 
32 
The orbiting lunar s ta t ion  - 
orb i t  inclination must be equal 
to,  or greater than, t he  lati- 
tude of any surface s i te  or 
exploration party trmerse 
t rack i n  order that  escape/ 
rescue operations could be 
carried out with no plane change 
required. Rescue without plane 
change wi l l  s t i l l  require a 
fore  s tar t ing the tug descent 
or ascent. 
w a i t  of from 0 t o  lL+ days be- 
15 I n  order f o r  the orbit ing 
lunar station-based tugs 
t o  conduct escape/rescue 
operations, the s ta t ion 
ephemeris must be known at 
all times. T h i s  knowledge w i l l  
provide a precisely known point 
i n  space from which the tug 
ephemeris i n  turn can be computed. 
33 The rescue tug i n  lunar orb i t  l 5  
must be provided with n d g a -  
t iona l  updates after making 
plane changes o r  other o rb i t a l  
maneuvers t ha t  intwifuce sig- 
nif ioant  e r r o r s  into the tug 
&dance system 
HC-4 
HC -5 
HC-4 
HC-5 
2-51 
Reference 
Escapehescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No, H a z a r d  No. 
ORBITAL EVA 
35 An EVA crewman i n  o r b i t  
should be te thered t o  the 
s t a t ion  at all times. 
36 The primary source of l i f e  
support, power, environ- 
mental control,  and commun- 
i ca t ion  capabi l i ty  f o r  an 
EVA crewman i n  o r b i t  should 
be by means of an umbilical 
connection t o  the s ta t ion .  
A backpack should be worn 
by the crewman or  a backup 
l i f e  support system. 
- 34 I n  order f o r  the rescue tug to 
operate mtononmsly i n  the 
lunar area, a correct  lunar 
gravi ta t iona l  d e l  must be 
determined, and the  exact 
locat ion of a l l  manned sur- 
face s i t e s  must be known i n  
terms of a coordinate gr id  
system t h a t  i s  compatible 
with the t u g  n d g a t i o n d  
computer algorithm. 
7 
35 
7 
37 External umbilical connec- 7 
t i o n s  should be s t ra teg ic-  
a l l y  located on an orbi t ing 
lunar s t a t ion  both i n  equip- 
ment areas needing planned 
periodic maintenance at ten-  
t i o n  and also close t o  
equipment needing a t ten t ion  
i n  the event of a malfunc- 
t i on  o r  fa i lure .  
HK-1 HK-5 
HK-4 
HK-1 
HK-4 
HK-1 
HK-4 
2-52 
Reference 
Escapehescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Studs No. Hazard No. 
. 
38 If orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  7 HK-1 
ex te r io r  equipment clearances HK-4 
preclude the wearing of a 
n o d  backpack by the EVA 
crewman performing routine 
maintenance, he should at 
l e a s t  have a minimum 90-minute 
duration emergency l i f e  sup- 
port  capabi l i ty .  
39 
40 
41 
42 
A backup, standby rescue crew- 7 
man must be suited and be i n  39 
a posi t ion outside the orbi t -  
ing  lunar  s t a t i o n  so t h a t  he 
has a d i r e c t  line-of-sight t o  
a working EVA crewman at a l l  
times. 
The backup, standby rescue 7 
39 crewman f o r  an EVA crewman 
at an orbi t ing lunar s t a t ion  
must have a normal backpack, 
a 90-minute duration emergency 
l i f e  support system, be 
te thered t o  the  s ta t ion,  and 
have an umbilical connection 
i n t o  the s t a t ion  so t h a t  he 
has the  f u l l  potent ia l  l i f e  
support capabi l i ty  i f  a rescue 
operation i s  required. 
The umbilical connection of the 7 
standby rescue crewman f o r  an 39 
EVA crewman at an orbi t ing 
lunar  s t a t i o n  must be capable 
of quick disconnection by the  
crewman at the point of connec- 
t i on  i n t o  his suit. 
A l l  pressure s u i t s  must have 7 
a separate, self-contained 
voice c o d c a t i o n s  l i n k  
operating on a ca r r i e r  fre- 
quency t h a t  is reserved f o r  
emergency use. 
HK-1 
HK-4 
HK-6 
HK-1 
HK-4 
HK-6 
HK-1 
m-4 
HK-6 
HK-4 
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43 All pressure suits must 7 HK-2 
have a self-contained and 35 HK-5 
powered RF beacon and flash- 
ing l i g h t  possibly located 
on the crewmanls helmet. 
. 
44 Emergency equipment should 
be capable of being activated 
e i tber  manually by the EVA 
crewmam or automatically act i -  
vated i n  the event of such 
conditions as suit power loss, 
umbilical f a i lu re  , activation of 
the crewmanls emergency l i f e  
support system, or decrease i n  
suit s t a t i c  pressure below some 
m i n i m a l  level.  
7 
45 
4.6 
47 
The emergency EVA l i f e  support 
system must have an operational 
capabili ty at l e a s t  as long as 
the rescue response t i m e  plus 
a contingency allowance. 90 
minutes i s  the recommended min- 
im operational capability. 
7 
If the EVA crewman U S ~ S  an 
(AMU) t o  t ranslate  around 
the s ta t ion  to perform 
maintenance, the backup 
standby rescue crewman mst 
a lso  be i n  an AMU with 
suf f i c i  ent additional 
velocity and l i f e  support 
capabili ty t o  perform a 
rescue operation. 
7 
Astronaut Maneuvering U n i t  39 
The rescue A,MU must have a 
velocity capabili ty of approx- 
imately 3 t o  4 times the capa- 
b i l i t y  of the EVA crewmanfs AMU 
t o  be able t o  perform a rescue 
operation for the s i tuat ion i n  
which the EVA CreWmanfs AMU sus- 
t a ins  an unplanned full duration, 
propulsion burn and the AMU i s  i n  
an uncontrolled t ra jectory a- from 
the station. 
7 
2-54 
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HK-1 
HK-4 
HK-1 
HK-4 
HK-6 
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e 
c 
48 The AMU must have a self- 7 
controlled capability to 
prevent o r  stop tumbling 
motion. T h i s  capability 
should be i n  the form of 
3 &s reaction control 
je t s .  
ClFtBITAL TUG 
(Has capability t o  land) 
49 A dedicated Escape/Rescue 4 
Lander Tug stationed at  the 
OLS i s  required i n  addition t o  
an operational Lander fig. 
T h i s  dedicated E/R Tug must be 
equipped with appropriate emer- 
gency equipment, l i fe  support 
supplies and other necessary 
expendables, and must be docked 
t o  or standing by near the OLS, 
rully serviced and f ie led  at 
all times. Lunar surface oper- 
ations require a third Lander Tug, 
which can be used as an escape 
vehicle from the lunar surface. 
The operational Tug should also 
be a Lander Tug as it can be 
called upon to evacuate 
"rescued and rescue crewstt under 
certain emergency situatioiis . 
50 Properly positioned omni 30 
antennas should be used fo r  
short-range space tug voice 
and data  communications t o  
ensure no loss of signal due 
t o  the aspect angle o r  atti- 
tude relat ive t o  the orbit ing 
lunar station, prime transport 
vehicle, propellant depot, 
surface site, o r  Earth vicinity.  
This capabili ty i s  par t icular ly  
important t o  mainta.in continuous 
c o d c a t i o n s  with a tumbling 
vehi c le  . 
HK-3 
HB-1 HB-4 
HB-2 HB-5 
HB-3 
HC -1 
2-55 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
51 Any spacecraft  i n  the lunar 6 HC -1 
v i c i n i t y  should have external 10 HC -3 
at tach points by which a res- 
cue ve'hicie such as a tug 
could a t tach  r i g i d  couplings 
and maneuver or provide t h r u s t  
vector control  as required. 
Rescue tug crewmen will prob- 
ably require visual, d i r e c t  
line-of-sight capabi l i ty  o r  
remote opt ica l  sensors and 
v isua l  displays t o  maneuver 
r e l a t i v e  t o  the stranded ve- 
h i c l e  and complete the hookup. 
52 Passive thermal control gar- 10 
ments a re  needed f o r  use by 
the crew following e i t h e r  an 
e l e c t r i c a l  power o r  environ- 
mental control subsystem (ECS) 
f a i lu re .  There would be ample 
time t o  don such a garment be- 
cause cabin cool-down would be 
relatively slow. A less de- 
s i r a b l e  a l te rna t ive  i s  t o  in- 
sulate  the crew compartment 
w a l l s  t o  maintain a l ivable  
temperature f o r  a min imum of 
3 h a w s  a f t e r  an ECS o r  power 
failure. 
53 Sudden depressurization of a 8 
crew compartment requires  10 
rapid response emergency 27 
techniques and/or equipment 33 
t o  prevent subjecting the 38 
crew t o  dangerously low am- 
b ien t  pressure. 
a. The crew should be i n  
pressure suits during those 
operations i n  which the  tug 
or  spacecraft i s  maneuvering 
close t o  other spacecraft, 
the orbi t ing lunar s ta t ion ,  
or propellant depot . 
HC -2 
HC -1 
HR-1 
HO-3 
HJ-2 
2-56 
Reference 0 Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
a 
54 
. 
55 
b. 
C. 
d. 
If helmets cannot be worn 
because of v i s i b i l i t y  re- 
quirements, the helmets 
should be s o  designed and 
so located relative t o  the 
crewmen tha t  they could be 
donned at l ea s t  t o  the extent 
t ha t  suit ambient pressure 
in tegr i ty  i s  assured within 5 
seconds a f t e r  occurrence of 
the emergency. 
Visual and aural  warning sig- 
nals  are needed to  inform the 
crew of a c r i t i c a l  broaching 
of cabin ambient pressure 
integrity.  
Ehergency pressure garments 
should be available tha t  could 
be donned even over a pressure 
suit,  and that would attain 
pressure in tegr i ty  within about 
5 secmds. 
An emergency thruster subsystem, 8 
manually controlled, i s  needed 11 
12 
system fa i lure  occurred leming  25 
the tug on a coll ision course 
with another spacecraft. "he 
thruster  subsystem might need a 
thro t t l ing  capability, depending 
on thrust-to-weight variations 
(a consequent acceleration var- 
ia t ions)  due t o  payload and/or 
propellant weight variations. 
i n  the event a space tug sub- 
A routine space tug crew re- 10 
22 
a backup alarm system. A rec- 30 
ommended report-in sequence i s  
a minimum of one contact every 
30 minutes with an automatic 
rescue alarm i f  communications 
contact is not made within 5 
minutes a f t e r  the scheduled 
contact time. 
port-in sequence is needed as 
HC -4 
HN-1 
w-2 
HC -2 
HP-1 
HL-2 
2-57 
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Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No, Hazard No. 
56 The space tug ambient atmos- 
pheric rec i rcu la t ion  and pur- 
i f i c a t i o n  loop should include 
the  capsbi l i ty  t o  remove nox- 
ious or toxic  contaminants t h a t  
may be present due t o  f a i l u r e ,  
f i r e ,  or a c r i t i c a l  s i tua t ion .  
57 
58 
The space tug and other  manned 
spacecraf't should be designed 
with two or more separate and 
independent pressure compart- 
ments. Each compartment 
should have a dedicated and 
separate emergency l i f e  sup- 
port  and ECS subsystem t h a t  
will provide a survivable at- 
mosphere and ambient condition 
f o r  a minimum of 3 hours 
T h i s  approach would increase 
the  poss ib i l i t y  f o r  the func- 
t i o n a l  survival of at  least 
one compartment. 
Cargo modules t o  be car r ied  by 
the  space tug should be s o  
designed t h a t  they can be 
se lec t ive ly  je t t isoned - i t h  a A v, 
with rsspest t o  the tug 
of a t  l e a s t  10 ft/second. 
Ibdules tha t  could be j e t t i -  
soned should be equipped 
with corner r e f l e c t o r s  or 
transponders t o  a id  i n  t h e i r  
search and recovery follow- 
ing  the end of the emergency 
period. 
10 HC -1 
8 
33 
38 
HB-1 
H I 4  
HR-1 
HJ-2 
14 
20 
HM-1 
. 
2-58 
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Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
59 The crew compartment ambient 
atmosphere shuuld be maintained 
at 3.5 ps i  and of a pure oxygen 
composition t o  prevent possible 
crew disablement i n  the event 
of cabin depressurization and 
the need t o  switch rapidly t o  
pressure suits and backpack 
units. 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Space tug design should include 
provisions for manual control,  
through mechanical linkages or 
cables, o f  an emergency atti- 
tude control  and propulsion 
subsystem. 
Some means i s  needed t o  r ig-  
i d l y  l i n k  a rescue vehicle 
to a d is t ressed  vehicle t o  
pruvide a s tab le  platform from 
which a forced entry c d d  be 
made i n t o  a dis t ressed vehicle,  
Attachment points  should be 
c l ea r ly  marked, and poten t ia l  
rescue crews instructed i n  
t h e i r  locat ion d the methods 
f o r  attaching linkup devices. 
A portable a i r lock  i s  needed 
t h a t  can be handled by two 
EVA crewmen, and that i s  la rge  
enough t o  accommodate an in-  
jured crewman and at l e a s t  
one other crewman. 
Portable instrumentation i s  
needed, together with some tech- 
nique f o r  determining the  pres- 
sure and composition of the 
stranded vehic le ' s  crew campart- 
ment ambient atmosphere. If 
there  was no compartment pressure, 
access could be made by d i r e c t  
cu t t ing  through the  spacecraft  
wall. 
8 HC -2 
38 HR-1 
39 HJ-2 
I2 
11 
15 
25 
38 
3 
6 
3 
6 
3 
6 
HC-6 
HN-1 
HR-1 
HB-6 
HB-7 
HB-8 
HB-6 
HB-7 
Hl3-8 
m-6 
HB-7 
HB-8 
2-59 
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64 On all spacecr&, areas accept- 5 
6 able for ent ry  by e i t h e r  d i r e c t  
means o r  by means of a portBble 
d r l o c k  should be c l ea r ly  ident i -  
f i e d  and marked. S t ruc tura l  de- 
sign must provide f o r  su f f i c i en t  
space between primary load-carry- 
i ng  s t ruc tu ra l  members so t h a t  
en t ry  could be made using simple 
skin-cutting tools r a the r  than 
torches or  heavy-duty cu t te rs .  
It is assumed t h a t  insu la t ion  and 
micrometeoroid ba r r i e r s  can be 
removed quickly by simple hand 
tools .  One p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t o  
provide pyrotechnic i n s t a l l a t i o n s  
t h a t  would cut  the skin between 
structural members by means of an 
applied e l e c t r i c  current. The cut- 
through area  should be s ized t o  be 
consistent with the requirements 
f o r  handling injured crewmen i n  em- 
ergency pressure garments. 
65 
65 
The space tug crewmen should be 10 
able t o  moni tor  and evaluate I 2  
t h e i r  ephemeris i n  order t o  de- 
t e c t  a poten t ia l  or actual  un- 
de si rable  t r a j ec to ry  cordi ti on. 
Pressure suits, backpacks, o r  4 
emergency pressure garments must 8 
provide a minimum of 20 hours of 33 
survival  t i m e .  Under emergency 
conditions, a crewman could be 
provided with a po ten t i a l  sur- 
v i v a l  capabi l i ty  of up t o  48 hours 
by a combination of a passive 
thermal garment, emergency pres- 
sure garment, and oxygen suffi- 
c i en t  t o  maintain 3.5 ps i  am- 
bient  pressure and a breathable 
atmosphere within the pressure 
garment. 
15 
16 
HB-7 
HB-8 
m-9 
? 
HC-1 “2-5 
HC-3 HC-6 
HC-4 
HB-1 
HB-3 
HI-1 
HJ-2 
Reference 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No, Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
67 Techniques and materials a r e  8 H I - 1  
needed t o  quickly find and s e a l  33 HJ-2 
holes, r i p s ,  o r  jagged t e a r s  
i n  the crew compartment pressure 
c e l l  walls. 
68 
69 
70 
Rnergency manual control of t h e  15 
tug propulsion and a t t i t ude  16 
control subsystem would permit 
a manually controlled emergency 
landing i n  the event of a guid- 
ance system f a i l u r e  after 
powered descent i n i t i a t i o n .  
ORBITAL PROPELLAM' DEPOT 
The propellant depot must in-  
clude emergency loca tor  devices 
such as flashing l i gh t s ,  running 
l i g h t s ,  RF o r  opt ical  beacons, 
corner re f lec tors ,  and act ive 
transponder. 
13 
An escape device such as an 
AMU i s  needed f o r  emergency use 
by an EVA crewman under c r i t i c a l  
emergency conditions a t  an or- 
b i t i n g  propellant depot. A cold 
gas propulsion and a t t i t ude  con- 
t r o l  react ion system with mechani- 
c a l  l inkage control  would permit 
v i  r t u d l y  instantaneous actuation 
of the AMU followed by separation 
from the depot and t rans la t ion  to 
a safe  range. After a safe posi- 
t i o n  was reached, the escaping 
crewman could act ivate  more 
complex and slower reacting elec- 
t ron ic  guidance, navigation, pomr, 
and communications hardware. The 
escape device would also need lo-  
ca tor  devices such as f lashing 
l i g h t s ,  RF o r  opt ical  beacons, 
and act ive transponder. 
13 
HC -5 
HC-6 
HE-1 
HE-3 
HE-2 
2-61 
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Es capebescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
71 
72 
73 
An emergency despin system 13 HE-2 
(3-&s) i s  needed t o  counter- 
a c t  tumbling torques o r  rates 
and reduce a n e a r  r a t e s  of 
a propellant depot t o  safe  
l eve l s  conducive t o  comple- 
t i on  of docking and undocking 
maneuvers. 
An emergency k i t  should be 
avai lable  on the propellant 
depot, with equipment items 
avai lable  such as: 
a. F i r s t  a id  supplies 
b. Emergency pressure garments 
c. Oxygen masks ( f o r  use i n  
the emergency compartment 
or with pressure garmentsj 
d. Portable l i g h t s  
e.  Flares  - perhaps similar 
t o  photographic flashcubes, 
only l a rge r  i n  s i ze  and 
power 
f .  Passive thermal garments 
Propellant depot docking mech- 13 
anisms should be designed s o  
t h a t  a docked vehicle  could be 
uncoupled by actuating mechani- 
c a l  re leases  or  pin pullers. It 
would be acceptable i f  the jammed 
docking mechanical emergency un- 
coupling system could be disen- 
gaged with p a r t  of the depot 
docking mechanism remaining 
locked t o  the tug mechanism, 
13 HE-2 
2-62 
HE-1 
HE-2 
Reference 
Studs No. Hazard No. 
Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline 
74 An emergency decaupling system 13 
i s  needed on the propellant 
depot t o  sever serrricinn l i nes  
connected t o  the tug' 
HE-1 
HE-2 
A 
75 
This system should be powered 
and controlled from e i ther  the 
tug or depot side of the in-  
terface. 
2.3.4 Lunar Surface be ra t ions  
The following guidelines summarize the equipment and operational requirements 
f o r  the escape and rescue of crews on the surface of the &on. 
are keyed t o  major operational phases of the surface mission. 
this summary i s  the selection of the most acceptable concepts as derived i n  
The guidelines 
Implicit  i n  
the preceding analysis. 
LAM>ER TUG LOCAL SURFACE OPEWQIONS 
76 
77 
17 A minimum of  one dedicated and 
serviced lunar l ande r  rescue tug 
must be docked at the orbit ing 
lunar s ta t ion a t  all times during 
a lander tug sor t ie  operation. 
A lander tug assigned t o  res- 
cue i n  support of a lander tug 
sor t ie  mission must have the 
capabili ty to  land at a planned 
s i t e  a t  any t i m e  during the 
lunar day o r  night. 
The lander tug used on so r t i e  
missions should contain pres- 
sure suits, backpack units, 
pressurized s t re tcher ,  and 
pressure bags o r  garments 
adequate t o  support the crew. 
18 
18 
HD-1 
HD-1 
HD-2 HD-4 
HD-3 HD-5 
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Reference 
EscapefRescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. H a d  NO 0 
78 The lander tug should have a 18 HD-4 
handcart capable of carrying HD-5 
a pressurized s t re tcher  and 
crewman, or  an incapacitated 
crewman i n  a pressure s u i t .  
79 
80 
A rescue a l e r t  s ignal  system 
i s  needed i n  the lander tugs 
t h a t  w i l l  automatically in-  
i t ia te  a llrescue needed" sig- 
n a l  based on sensed c r i t i c a l  
items such as a ham3 landing, 
unplanned loss  of crew com- 
partment pressure, fire, 
explosion, o r  other  s i t ua t ions  
with a high probabi l i ty  of crew 
incapacitation. 
The lunar lander tug design 
should include at l e a s t  one 
emergency access door t h a t  i s  
compatible with the  portable 
a i r lock  design, o r  could be 
used for  egress/ingress when 
the  tug i s  depressurized. 
81 I f  the lunar lander tug de- 
sign i s  such t h a t  the crew 
compartment i s  s igni f icant ly  
above the lunar surface, an 
elevator  and emergency power 
supply are  needed t o  enable 
a rescue crew t o  eas i ly  and 
quickly en ter  a disabled tug 
and remove incapacitated 
crewmen. 
82 An uprated backpack i s  needed 
with a minimum metabolic cap- 
a c i t y  of  6,000 BTU1s and a 
ba t t e ry  l i fe t ime of at l e a s t  
12  hours. 
18 
17 
18 
18 
17 
HD-1 
HD-1 HD-4 
0 
HD-2 HD-5 
w-4 
HD-1 
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Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline study No. Hazard No. 
83 It  i s  highly desirable tha t  the - 
lunar lander tug have the vel- 
oci ty  capabili ty t o  ascend t o  
o rb i t a l  velocity, make up t o  a 
90-degree plane change, and 
complete rendezvous and docking 
with the orb i ta l  station. 
85 
86 
87 
A s  an alternative o r  backup to  
Guideline 83 above, the tug 
must have the l i f e  support capa- 
b i l i t y  t o  remain on the lunar 
surface u n t i l  the ascent 
velocity (and plane change) re- 
quirements are within i t s  per- 
formance limttations. 
18 
One of the first crew tasks, after 
a landing has been coapleted, i s  
t o  deploy the rescue location aids. 
A s  a min imum these should include: 
18 
a. 
b. 
A tracking beacon f o r  use by 
a rescue tug 
Marker l i gh t s  t o  designate the 
emergency landing s i t e  and 
desired touchdown point 
rescue beacons 
c. A kit of rocket-propelled 
d. hergency communication system 
A lunar backside comunmications 17 
s a t e l l i t e  i s  needed pr ior  t o  
in i t i a t ion  of surface landings 
on the backside. 
The lander tug should have a cap- 17 
a b i l i t y  fo r  maintaining ambient 18 
atmospheric pressure above 3.5 
psi .  This capability could be 
i n  the form of a separate com- 
partment, or even emwgency 
pressure garments. 
HD-1 HD-5 
HD-3 HD-7 
HD-4 
HD-1 HD-5 
HD-3 HD-7 
HD-4 
HD-1 
HD-1 
HD-3 
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Escape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Studv No. d NQ. 
TRAVERSE OPERATIONS 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Pressure suits must have the cap- 
a b i l i t y  for autmatically sealing 
suit r i p s  or t ears ,  
22 
Each crewman needs an emergency 
pressure g m e n t  available at  al l  
times (including when i n  pressure 
suits and on EVA). These garments 
should be capable of being con- 
verted t o  a s t re tcher  by the addi- 
t ion  o f  rods or poles. 
18 
22 
23 
Backpack units must be so designed 22 
t h a t  a second EVA crewman could 23 
plug in to  a uni t  worn by a %uddyll 
crewman t o  permit t ransfer  of a l l  
c r i t i c a l  hnc t ions  such as l i f e  
support, pomr, and communications. 
The time span required fo r  plug-in 
and switch-over should be on the 
order of a few seconds. 
A n  emergency secondary l i f e  sup- 17 22 
port  system or oxygen supply 18 23 
survival time of a traverse crew. 
The choice and design of  each 
w i l l  be a function o f  the re- 
quired survival time needed t o  
sat isf’gthe requiremsnts of a 
par t icular  traverse mission. 
system i s  required t o  extend the 21 
92 Rover vehicles t ha t  are t o  be 21 
22 
23 
used as potent ia l  rescue vehicles 
must have the payload capabi l i ty  
f o r  carrying the stranded crew- 
men whether they are i n  pressure 
suits, emergency garments, or 
on a pressurized stretcher.  
HL-1 
HD-2 HL-3 
HD-4 HL-5 
HD-4 
HL-3 
HD-1 HG3 
HD-3 HL-3 
. 
H G 1  
HG2 
HG-4 
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Es cape/Re s cue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hward No. 
94 
93 A pressurized cabin rover vehicle 21 
used for rescue should have dual 
controls: one set inside the 
pressurized cabin; the other out- 
side the cabin and so arranged 
that a crewman in a pressure suit 
could control the vehicle. 
95 
96 
97 
The pressurized cabin should have 
a minimum capacity for three crew- 
men. The vehicle should have a 
minimum payload capability of four 
crewmen, including the driver. 
21 
All rescue mobile vehicles should 21 
have the capability for hoisting 22 
and carrying an incapacitated 23 
man in a pressurized stretcher. 
Implied here is the capability 
of interconnection between the 
vehicle life support system and 
the stretcher. 
A handcart, similar to that used 
on Apollo 14, should be carried 
21 
24 
by each lander tug. 
should be capable of carrying an 
incapacitated man either in a 
pressure suit or a pressurized 
stretcher. 
The handcart 
Mobile vehicles used for traverse 
missions should carry the follow- 
ing types of emergency comunica- 
tions equipment: 
21 
a. Rocket-propelled radio beacons 
b. Tracking beacon to aid a res- 
cue tug in locating an emer- 
gency site 
tion aids 
c. Landing and touchdown loca- 
HG1 
HG2 
HG-1 
HG2 
HG1 
HG2 
m-5 
HG2 
"-1 
HG1 
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Reference 
Hazard Es cap e/Re s cue 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
98 Lunar f l y e r s  used on missions 24 "-1 
in to  rough ILurain areas  t h a t  "-2 
are  inazzessible f o r  surface 
vehicles shcll ld he sent  i n  
pa i r s ,  with each capable of 
returning the  crews of both 
vehicles. 
99 
100 
101 
The time required f o r  activa- 
t i o n  of the  rescue mission 
(time span from receipt  of res- 
cue alert  communication t o  
departure o f  t he  rescue ve- 
h i c l e  and crew) must be no 
more than two hours. 
A f l y e r  t h a t  i s  used a s  a res- 
cue vehicle must have a minimum 
range radius grea te r  than the  
t raverse  radius of the surface 
vehicles t h a t  it i s  supporting. 
The f l y e r  must be capable of  
acquiring and tracking the  
locat ion beacons t o  be carr ied 
by a l l  t raverse  and flyer 
vehicles. 
102 A l l  rover vehicles should be 
capable of  carrying a minimum 
of two crewmen plus the  driver.  
The addi t ional  capabi l i ty  must 
include the  care  of incapaci- 
t a t ed  men i n  pressurized 
s t re tchers .  
103 A l l  rover and f l y e r  vehicles 
must be capable of act ivat ion 
i n  no more than two hours. 
24 
24 
2L 
21 
"-2 
"-2 
"-2 
HG-2 
. 
e 
"-2 
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ES cape /Res cue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
104 Any vehicle t h a t  is designed 
f o r  automatic (hands-off) 
operation must be capable of 
full manual operations and 
control by a crewman i n  a 
pressure suit. 
105 
106 
107 
108 
A lunar  f l y e r  used f o r  rescue 
should have a payload capabi l i ty  
of a minimum of three men - one 
p i l o t ,  plus two incapacitated 
men i n  e i t h e r  pressurized s t r e t -  
chers o r  normal pressure suits. 
A wheeled ffstretcherff  c a r t  should 
be carr ied by a rescue f l y e r  as 
standard equipment 
The cargo capacity o f  a f l y e r  
on the  outbound leg  of a rescue 
mission should be used t o  carry 
special  gear such as too ls ,  
s t r e t che r  ca r t ,  etc. This equip- 
ment can be abandoned f o r  the  re- 
turn  t r i p ,  thereby providing addi- 
t i o n a l  cargo capabili ty.  
A lunar  lander tug used a s  an 
o r b i t a l  rescue vehicle f o r  
surface rescue missions must 
carry an EVA type rover vehicle 
with a three-man capacity, in- 
cluding the driver.  
LUNAR SURFACE BASE 
18 HD-7 
24 
24 
24. 
18 21 
19 24 
20 
Planned l o g i s t i c s  f l i g h t s  toand from16 
the lunar  surface base (LSB) should 19 
be made when the LSB surface s i t e  
i s  in-plane with the s t a t i o n  or- 
b i t a l  plane. 
"-2 
"-1 
"-1 
"-2 
HD-5 H E 2  
HF-4 "-2 
HC-6 
HF-1 
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Es cape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No, Guideline Studs No. Hazard No. 
110 An automatic (with manual 
override) rescue signal alert 
system is needed to transmit 
alarm signals to the Eart'n 
vicinity, orbital station, 
PTV, or other orbital elements 
(including foreign spacecraft). 
This system should be triggered 
by such items as: 
Unplanned depressurization 
Base atmospheric contamina- 
tion by toxic gases 
Fire 
Explosion 
Bacteria 
Temperature extremes 
Radiation 
111 
112 
113 
Provision must be made for a re- 
dundant, independently powered 
emergency communication system 
with the capability of direct 
communication with the Earth 
from a lunar surface base. 
The lunar surface base should be 
located on the Earth side of the 
Moon to ensure continuous communi- 
cation with the Earth vicinity. 
Rescue oprations in the near 
vicinity of the lunar surface 
base would be materially aided 
by the capability of direct unit- 
to-unit communications linked 
through the LSB as a repeater 
station. 
HF-3 HF-5 19 -4 8
20 
19 
20 
19 
19 
20 
HI?-2 
HF-4 
HF-8 
HF-1 HF-4 
HF-3 HF-5 
HF-3 HF-7 
HF-4 HF-8 
HF-5 
a 
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Eb cape/Rescue Hazard 
Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
114 One o r  more lander tugs with 
crew-carrying capacity equal t o  
the number of men i n  the lunar 
surface base area must be i n  a 
standby condi t ionat  the  base a t  
all times. 
115 
l i 6  
117 
118 
c 
119 
The normal log is t ics  vehicle 
landing s i t e  and a backup s i t e  
1/2 n.m. (approximately) from 
the lunar surface base must be 
marked with landing aids  and 
equipped with location and track- 
ing beacons t o  enable a landing 
a t  e i the r  s i t e  during both day 
and night conditions. 
Any lander tug parked a t  the  
lunar surface base must have the  
l i f e  support capability to  remain 
on the  surface with a capacity 
load of escaped crewmen f o r  a mini- 
m of 14 days to  ensure takeoff 
conditions with no plane-change 
required. 
Emergency power and external con- 
t r o l  must be provided f o r  any 
elevator or other means a t  the 
lunar surface base f o r  ingress/ 
egress in to  the  LSB crew compart- 
ment. 
"he lunar  surface base airlocks 
should accommodate a m i n i m  of  
two men i n  pressure su i t s ,  o r  one 
man i n  a pressure suit  and one man 
i n  a pressurized stretcher. 
An emergency internal communica- 
t i on  system must be provided so 
tha t  a rescue crewman can t a lk  
t o  stranded crewmen inside the  
lunar surface base regardless of 
the in te rna l  ambient atmospheric 
conditions. 
19 HF-3 HF-8 
20 E-4 
20 
28 
19 
20 
19 
20 
19 
20 
19 
20 
HF-6 
HO-L 
HF-3 
HF-4 
HF-8 
HF-2 HF-5 
HF-3 HF-8 
HF-4 
HF-3 HF-8 
HF-L 
HF-3 HF-5 
HF-4 "-8 
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Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
120 At least one emergency sealed 
door is needed in the external 
shell of  the Pimr surface base. 
either side, and should be compat- 
ible with the portable airlock, 
and sized to handle a pressurized 
stretcher and suited crewmen. 
This dos r  Shc’dd be cper2ble frcm 
121 
122 
123 
All airlocks should be equipped 
with power, controls, instrumenta- 
tion, and life support capability 
that is independent of the primary 
systems and operable regardless of 
the primary systems functional 
status. 
Alternate support compartments 
are needed in the lunar surface 
base to provide crew temporary 
safe havens. These compartments 
must be self-contained with re- 
spect to base subsystems. The 
minimum compartment life support 
capability span is 48 hours to 
enable an orbit rescue tug to 
complete a 90-degree plane change 
utilizing a 24-hour period ellip- 
tical orbit to minimize descent 
A velocity requirements. 
The emergency gear carried by a 
rescue crew must include in- 
strumentation for determining 
the base atmospheric composition, 
including the level and type of 
any radiation that might be 
present. An external connector 
should be provided that ties into 
the base instrumentatioc system. 
An emergency backup system should 
be available at the vicinity of 
each airlock and emergency access 
19 HI?- 5 
19 
19 
20 
38 
19 
20 
HF-5 . 
HF-1 HF-4 
HF-2 HF-8 
e HF-3 HR-1 
HF-3 
HF-4 
HF-8 
. 
hatch in case the primary instrumenta- 
tion system has failed. 
struments should be carried by the 
rescue crew for use after access 
into the base has been obtained. 
Portable in- 
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Guideline No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 0 
124 Ehergency gear of the following 19 HF-1 HF-5 
types i s  required on board the  20 "-3 "-8 
HF-4 rescue tug f o r  use by the  res- 
cue crew f o r  rescue operations 
a t  the  lunar  surface base: 
. 
125 
126 
127 
128 
o Oxygen masks and portable 
o Pressurized s t re tcher  
o Bnergency pressure garments 
o Bnergency communication gear 
o Portable airlock 
o Portable instrumentation 
o Cutting too l s  
o q g e n  supplies 
* 
o Three-man rover vehicle 
o F i r s t  a id  supplies 
The rescue tugs must be capable 
of completing rendezvous and 
docking with the  orbi t ing lunar 
s t a t ion  regardless of o r b i t a l  
posi t ion and l ight ing conditions. 
A rescue capabili ty f r o m  o r b i t  
I s  rsquired a t  all times t h a t  
a crew i s  on the  lunar surface 
An EVA rover vehicle with a 
3-man capacity must be carr ied 
by t h e  rescue tug from lunar 
orb i t .  The rover vehicle must 
car ry  a t  l e a s t  two men i n  su i t s ,  
plus an  incapacitated man i n  a 
pressurized stretcher.  
The rescue tug must be capable 
of landing within 1/2 n.m. o f  a 
surface base under all l i gh t ing  
and night  conditions. 
19 
20 
28 
HF-1 HF-4 
HF-2 "-8 
HF-3 HO-4 
9 31 H G 1  HL-4 
20 34 HG2 HQ-1 
21 36 HE3 HS-1 
22 37 HL-3 HT-1 
23 
19 22 HF-3 "-1 
20 23 HF-4 HL-4 
21 24 HF-8 HM-2 
HG2 
28 HO-4 
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129 Floodlights are needed on a 26 
rescue rover vehicle t o  pro- 
vide l i g h t  during night  opera- 
€ i o n s  and ingress t o  Yne base. 
HO-1 
HO-2 
130 An advanced type suit and back- 
pack i s  needed with a 6,000 Btu 
and 12 hour power capabili ty.  
23 HL-6 
HL-7 
. 
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Section 3 
HAZARDS ANALYSIS RESULTS 
This section ex t r ac t s  and summarizes the major hazards iden t i f i ed  and the  
recommended safety guidelines from those developed i n  Section 2 of MSC-03977. 
The def in i t ions  of four terms used during the hazards analyses are important 
t o  a c l ea r  understanding of the  data  presented. These are: 
1. Hazard - Presence of a potent ia l  r isk  s i tua t ion  caused by an unsafe 
condition, environment, or act. 
2. Hazard Group - A spec i f ic  c l a s s i f i ca t ion  selected t o  iden t i fy  the 
general  nature of a hazard. 
are: 
taminati  on ; I l l n e  s s/In jury; Personnel I solat ion ; &I ti ons/Acc e l e  ra- 
t ions ;  Human Error; Hostile Environment; Radiolo,@cal Hazards; System 
or  Subsystem Malf’unctions. (The term Hazard Group doss not appear 
elsewhere i n  this volume, but is used i n  the appendix t o  Report MSC- 
03977. 
The Hazard Groups defined f o r  this study 
mlosion/Implosion;  re; Pressure ficursions; Collision; Con- 
3. Hazard Study - A technical analysis  of an operation, events, phenomenon, 
environment, condition, s i tuat ion,  or act ion with the objective of 
ident i fying poten t ia l  hazards, describing hazards e f fec ts ,  develop- 
ing  preventive and remedial correct ive measures and sa fe ty  guidelines, 
and ident i fy ing  s i tua t ions  requiring escape or  rescue. 
ua l  Hazard Studies are presented i n  MSC-03977.) 
(The individ- 
4 .  Hazard Study Group - A grouping of H a z a r d  Studies by equipment element, 
mission operation or  act ivi ty ,  environmental condition, s i tua t ion ,  or 
phenomenon. 
gu i ie l ines  recommended f o r  implementation, a r e  presented i n  this 
volume as a function o f  H a z a r d  Study Group.) 
(Major hazards iden t i f i ed ,  and the associated sa fe ty  
LMSC -A98@62B 
The user  of this section w i l l  f i nd  hazards and guidelines presented by Hazard 
Study Group as shown i n  Table3-1. If in t e re s t ed  i n  a l l  hazards and guidelines 
associated with a par t icu lar  equipment i t e m ,  such as an orb i t ing  lunar s ta t ion ,  
the  user should a l so  consult the groups which in t e r f ace  with t h a t  item; f o r  
example, the  user of Hazard Study Group B of T a b l e s l w i l l  a l so  wish t o  refer t o  
groups A, B, C, E, I, 3, K, M, N, 0, and P through T for i n t e r f ace  e f f e c t s  
and requirements. 
I n  Sections 3.1 and 3.2 t h a t  follow, the  user  w i l l  f i nd  hazards, guidelines, 
and supporting Hazard Studies cross-referenced. Where a similar hazard i s  
iden t i f i ed  f o r  more than one equipment element, and the  recommended sa fe ty  
guideline i s  applicable t o  e i t h e r  element, the guideline i s  s ta ted  only once 
and then specified by reference. 
l i s t  of Major Hazards Ident i f ied  i n  order t h a t  proper d i rec t ions  t o  all perti- 
nent guidelines may be found. 
Thus the user  i s  cautioned t o  examine the  
The probabi l i ty  of occurrence of a hazard may be high o r  extremely low, and 
this must be considered before ce r t a in  r e s t r i c t i v e  or cos t ly  guidelines and 
requirements are implemented. Probabi l i ty  was not a subject f o r  t h e  current  
study. 
For addi t ional  information, Report MSC-03977 presenting the individual  Hazard 
Studies, should be consulted. 
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Table 3-1 
HAZARD STUDY moups 
Group R e f .  Hazard Studs Nos. 
A Prime Transport Vehicles 1, 2, 3 
B Orbiting Lunar Stations 4, 5, 6 
C Orbiting Tugs and Landers 10, 12, 15, 16 
D Landers on the L u n a r  Surface 17, 18 
E Propellant Depots 13 
L u n a r  Surface Bases 
Roving Vehicles 
Flying Vehicles 
Pressure Cabins 
Science Equipment and Unmanned 
Sa te l l i t e s  
19, 20 
21 
24 
33 
8, 20 
K 
L 
M 
N 
0 
P 
T 
Orbital EVA 
Surface EVA 
Cargo and Equipment Handling 
Collision i n  Orbit 
Lighting 
Communi cations Loss 
Natural and man-made radiation 
Meteoroids 
Hazardous Materials 
Human Error 
7, 35, 39 
22, 23, 35, 39 
14, 20 
11, 25 
26, 27, 28 
29, 30 
9, 20, 31, 36 
38 
34 
37 
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3.1 LUNAR MISSION HAZARDS 
The hazards presented here a r e  those which, in the general sense of equip- 
ment and operations interfaces ,  may be present in future  lunar exploration 
missions. They were selected examination of each Hazard Study documented 
ia MSC.-03?77, mrl represent, the ident i f ied  hazards believed ta m e r i t  serious 
a t ten t ion  in preparing fo r  advanced lunar exploration. 
. 
In the following paragraphs the  hazards a r e  grouped, and a r e  assigned an 
ident iming  number within each group. 
the corresponding Hazard Study which presents d e t a i l s  of analysis ( i n  
Section 2 of  MSC-03977) i s  referenced. 
Guidelines and Requirements t o  cope with the hazard a r e  a l s o  referenced, 
and a r e  presented in  Section 3.2 of t h i s  report .  
Alongside each hazard description, 
In addition, the recommended Safety 
. 
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MAJOR HAZARDS IDENTIF'IED 
Recommended 
Hazard H a d  Safety 
No. H a Z a r d  Study No. Guidelines 
GROUP A. HAZARDS WITH PRIME TRANSPORT VEHICLES (Fl'V's) 
HA-1 Personnel on board a disabled FTV 
tha t  i s  on an escape trajectory may 
be stranded or los t .  
1 
HA-2 A PTV which has become disabled i n  luna r  3 
orb i t  presents a coll ision hazard. 
HA-3 Personnel on board a disabled FTV i n  
lunar orbi t  may be stranded, and may 
be l o s t  i f  the PTV has failed with 
excessive angular rates.  
3 
HA-4 A nuclear PTV which has become disabled 3 
i n  lunar orb i t  presents a radiation 
hazard. 
HA-5 A nuclear FTV on a f'ree Earth return 
or  lunar surface impact trajectory 
presents a radiation hazard. 
1 
3 
GROUP B. HAZARDS WITH ORBITING LUiyAR STATIONS (Om's) 
HB-1 Insufficient time t o  don space suits or 4 
escape t o  an adjacent, safe crew compwt- 
men:t following sudden loss of cabin atmos- 
phere results i n  death of crewmen. 
HB-2 Inadequate backup or emergency power and 4 
l i f e  support supply t o  allow time for a 
subsystem repair, transfer t o  a nearby safe 
haven, or t o  await rescue assistance re- 
sults i n  death of crewmen. 
GA-1 GA-11 
GA-2 GB-11 
GA-3 GB-12 
GA-4 GC-i!,. 
GA-5 
GA-6 GA-9 
GA-7 GC-8 
GA-8 
GA-10 GB-12 
GA-11 GC-4 
GB-11 GC-8 
GA-6 GA-10 
GA-7 GB-11 
GA-8 GB-12 
GA-9 GC-8 
GA-12 
Gc-8 
GB-1 
GB-2 
GB-3 
GB-4 
GB-4 
G s 5  
3-5 
a Recommended H a Z d  Hartt3.d Safety No. H a Z d  Study No. Guidelines 
HB-3 
HB-4 
HB-5 
m-6 
HB-7 
HB-8 
HB-9 
HC-1 
Contamination of cabin atmosphere pre- 
sents a th rea t  of i l l n e s s ,  incapacita- 
t ion,  deprivation of oqrgen, or  death 
An explosion o r  f i r e  on b o d  a space 
vehicle presents a th rea t  of injury,  
deprivation of l i f e  support, and death. 
A high angular r a t e  following loss  of 
space vehicle a t t i t ude  s t ab i l i za t ion  
presents a threa t  of i n ju ry  or  death. 
A malfunctioning hatch i so l a t ing  an 
EVA crewman uutside a crew cabin, con- 
s t i t u t e s  a th rea t  of l i f e  support de- 
plet ion and death. 
A malfunctioning hatch o r  other ob- 
s t ruct ion which prevents a crewman from 
making an emergency e x i t  from a crew 
cabin cons t i tu tes  a th rea t  of in jury ,  
l i f e  support deprivation, and death. 
A malfunctioning inner  hatch which pre- 
vents a crew member i n  sh i r t s leeves  
from returning from an a i r lock  t o  the 
cabin presents a th rea t  of i so la t ion .  
Orbital  assembly of modules and deploy- 
ment of appendages by EVA, subjects  crew- 
men t o  r i s k s  of accident and injury.  
GROUP C. HAZARDS WITH QRBITING TUGS AND LANDERS 
A crew stranded i n  lunar o r b i t  i n  a tug 10 
without propulsion and/or a t t i t u d e  con- 
t r o l  i s  faced with the r i s k  of i so l a t ion ,  
l i f e  support deprivation, and possibly 
i l l n e s s  or death from excessive ro ta t ion  
rates o r  duration. 
GB-1 GB-4 
GB-2 GB-6 
QR-3 
GB-1 GB-7 
GB-2 GB-8 
GB-3 GB-9 a 
GB-4 GB-10 
GB-5 
GA-11 GB-13 
GB-11 GC-4 
GB-12 
. 
GB-4 GB-14 
GB-15 
GB-16 
GB-17 
GB-15 
GB-17 
GB-23 
GB-17 
GB-18 
GB-19 
GB-20 
GB-21 
GB-22 
GC-1 Gc-6 
GC-2 GC-8 
GC-3 GB-11 
GC-4 GB-12 
GC-5 GB-14 a 
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Elecommemle d 
H a Z d  H a Z a r d  Safety 
No. HaZaXd Studs No. Guidelines a 
t 
. 
HC-2 
HC-3 
HC-4 
HC-5 
HC-6 
HD-1 
HD-2 
A tug i n  lunar  o r b i t  w i t h  primary 10 GC-7 
propulsion and/or a t t i tude  control or  Gc-8 
other  c r i t i c a l  subsystem f a i l e d  has been 
rendered unavailable f o r  use i n  rescue 
s i tua t ions .  
A d e r e l i c t  tug i n  lunar orb i t  presents 10 
a r i s k  of co l l i s ion  
Maneuvering e r ro r s  or f a i lu re s  with a 12 
manned tug i n  the v i c in i ty  of a nuclear 
propulsion stage exposes the  crew t o  
r i s k  of injury,  i l l n e s s ,  or death from 
nuclear radiation. 
A manned lunar lander tug placed on an 
unplanned impact t ra jec tory  with the  
lunar  surface may lead t o  an unplanned 
landing, t o  a landing at the wrong s i t e ,  
o r  t o  a crash. 
15 
A f a i l u r e  leading t o  loss  of propulsion 
or  a t t i t u d e  control of a lunar lander 
tug while on an ascent or  descent impact 
t r a j ec to ry  will lead t o  a catastrophic 
crash. 
16 
GROUP D. HAZARDS WITH LANDm ON THE LUNAR SURFACE 
A t o t a l  failure of any c r i t i c a l  function, 
such as propulsion, a t t i t ude  control,  o r  
e l e c t r i c a l  power, on a solo lunar  lander 
tug on the lunar surface w i l l  i s o l a t e  the 
crew. Death wi l l  r e s u l t  i f  in su f f i c i en t  
l i f e  support supplies are not avai lable  
t o  amit rescue. 
17 
Insuf f ic ien t  time t o  don space suits o r  
escape t o  an adjacent, safe crew c o m p t -  
ment following sudden l o s s  of cabin atmos- 
phere results i n  death of crewmen. 
18 
GA-7 GA-9 
GA-8 GC-8 
GC-8 GC-11 
GC-9 GC-12 
GC-10 
GC-13 
GC-15 
GC-14 
GC-8 GC-18 
GC-16 GC-19 
GC-17 
GD-1 
GD-2 
GD-3 
GEL1 
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Recommended 
Hazard H a z a r d  Safety 
No. HtiZard  Study No. Guidelines 
m-3 
m-4 
HD-5 
HD-6 
HD-7 
HE-1 
HE-2 
HE-3 
Inadequate power and l i f e  support 
supply t o  allow time f o r  e i t h e r  sub- 
system repair ,  re turn  t o  a safe 
haven, or rescue results i n  death of 
crewmen 
Contamination of  cabin atmosphere pre- 
sents a th rea t  of i l l n e s s ,  incapacita- 
t ion ,  deprivation o f  oxygen, o r  death. 
An explosion o r  f i r e  on board a lunar  
tug presents a threa t  of injury,  de- 
privation of l i f e  support, and death. 
Unscheduled return o f  a lunar lander 
tug t o  lunar orb i t ,  leaving behind crew 
members on t raverse ,  threatens the 
traverse crew with i so la t ion ,  exhaustion 
of l i f e  support, and death. 
Inab i l i t y  fo r  crewmen t o  operate a tug 
while i n  pressure suits presents a 
threat  of i so l a t ion ,  exhaustion of l i f e  
support, and death. 
GROUP E. HAZARDS WITH PROPELLANT DEPOTS 
A detached propellant depot i n  lunar 
orbi t  presents a r i s k  of co l l i s ion  with 
other spacecraft. 
Explosion of a propellant tank o r  depot 
presents a th rea t  of injury,  damage t o  
d j a c e n t  vehicles,  and death. 
An unsecured propellant tank which es- 
capes i n  lunar  o r b i t  presents a c o l l i -  
s ion  hazard. 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
13 
13 
13 
a - 5  
GB-5 
GB-2 
GB-3 
G B - ~  
GB-2 GB-9 
GB-7 GB-10 
GB-8 
GD-6 
GD -8 
GD-7 
GD-4 
GA-7 GN-3 * 
GA-8 GN-4 
GA-9 GN-5 
GN-2 
GN-1 GN-6 
GE-1 GE-3 
GE-2 GE-4 
GA-8 
GE-5 
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Recommended 
H a z a r d  H a z a r d  Safety 
No. H a Z a r d  Study No. Guidelines 
a 
GROUP F. HAZARDS WITH LUNAR SURFACE BASES 
. 
HF-1 Insuff ic ient  time t o  don space suits 
or escape t o  an adjacent, safe crew 
compartment following sudden loss of 
cabin atmosphere results i n  death 
of crewmen, 
HF-2 Inadequate backup or emergency power 
and l i f e  support supply to  allow time 
fo r  a subsystem repair, transfer t o  a 
nearby safe haven, or t o  a w a i t  rescue 
assistance results i n  death of crewmen. 
19 GB-1 
GB-2 
GB-3 
19 
HF-3 Contamination of cabin atmosphere pre- 19 
sents a threat of i l lness ,  incapacita- 
t ion,  deprivation o f  oxygen, or  death. 
m-4 An explosion o r  f i r e  on board a lunar 19 
20 surface base presents a threat of injury, 
deprivation of l i f e  support, and death. 
HF-5 Loss o f  access from a lunar surface base 19 
t o  the lunar surface, or  vice versa, con- 
s t i t u t e s  a hazard. 
HF-6 Ejecta thrown up by the engine plumes 
of a landing tug can injure crew 
members o r  damage crew shelters and 
other equipment. 
20 
HF-7 Ttp-over or  col l is ion accident while hand- 20 
l ing  and set t ing up nodules and large sur- 
face structures can injure crew members. 
GB-5 
GB-1 GB-5 
GB-3 GF-1 
GB-2 GB-6 
GB-1 GB-10 
GB-2 GF-1 
GB-3 GF-6 
GB-7 GF-8 
GB-5 GF-7 
GB-8 GF-9 
GB-9 
GF-2 
GF-3 
GF-4 
GF-5 
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Recommended 
H a Z I a r d  Ht3ZaXd Safety 
No. Ht3Zard  Study No. Guidelines 
HF-8 An accident with a nuclear-electric 
power generator presents a th rea t  of 
excessive radiat ion dose t o  crewman 
of a lunar surface base. 
GROUP G. HAZARDS WITH ROVING VEHICLEX 
H G 1  Stranding of crewmen beyond walk-back 
distance i n  a lunar rover presents a 
threat  of i so l a t ion  and death. 
H G 2  Injury of crewmen on t raverse  i n  a lunar 
rover presents a th rea t  of  i so l a t ion  and 
death. 
H E ?  Life support system f a i l u r e  on a 
lunar roving vehicle  presents a th rea t  
of death. 
(See H G W ~ S  HB-~, HD-2, HD-3, HD-4, HD-5, 
HD-6 and associated guidelines,  which 
a l s o  apply t o  cabin-type rovers.) 
GROUP H. HAZARDS WITH F'LYING V M I C L E S  
"-1 High ve loc i ty  impact of a lunar f ly ing  
vehicle w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  i n ju ry  o r  death 
t o  crewmen. 
"-2 Stranding of crewmen on a lunar flyer 
mission following landing damage o r  
subsystem f a i l u r e  presents a th rea t  of 
dea%h. 
20 GF-10 
GF-11 
m 
21 G G 1  GG-7 
G G 2  G G 8  
GG-3 GG-9 .c 
GG-4 G G 1 1  
GG-5 G G 1 2  
GG-6 
21 GG-4 GG-9 
G G 6  GG-10 
GG-8 GG-11 
21 GB-5 GG-11 
GG-2 GG-12 
GG-9 
24 GH-1 
GH-2 
GH-3 
24 GH-1 GH-7 
GH-2 GH-8 
GH-3 GH-9 b 
GH-4 GH-10 
GH-5 GH-11 
GH-6 
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Recommended 
Hazard Hazard Safety 
No. H a Z d  Study No. Guidelines 
a 
GROUP I. HAZARDS WITH PRESSURE CABINS 
HI-1  Loss of cabin atmosphere results i n  
death of crewman. 
(See H a z a r d s  HB-1, HB-3, HB-4, HD-2, 
associated guidelines, which also apply 
t o  pressure cabins.) 
.. HD-4, HD-5, "-1, HF-3, HF-4, and 
33 GI-1 GI-3 
GI-2 GI -4  
I 
GROUP J. HAZARDS WITH SCIENCE EQUIPMENT AND UNMANNED SATELLITES 
HJ-1  Propellant spillage, ignit ion o r  elec- 8 GJ-1  GJ-5 
t r i c a l  f i re  during servicing, checkout, GJ-2 GJ-6 
o r  launch of an unmanned s a t e l l i t e  at GJ-3 GJ-7 
an orbiting lunar s t a t i o n  can bring GJ-4 
injury, i l lness ,  o r  death t o  crewmen. 
HJ-2 Sa te l l i t e  capture p.resents a r i s k  of 
coll ision. 
8 GJ-8 
HJ-3 Handling of science equipment presents 20 GF-5 
GF-8 a r i s k  of injury from hazardous mater- 
ials o r  operations. 
GROUP K. HAZARDS WITH ORBITAL EVA 
HK-1 Malfunction or  loss of oxygen supply 
o r  pressurization during EVA w i l l  re- 
s u l t  i n  death of an astronaut. 
HK-2 Communications loss  during EVA leads 
t o  lack of informtion exchange which 
may be vital t o  navigation, vital signs 
monitoring, or  rescue assistance. 
7 GK-1 GK-4 
GK-2 GK-5 
GK-3 GK-6 
HK-3 Malfunction of an astronaut maneuvering 7 
unit during EVA may lead t o  uncontrolled 
trajectory,  tumbling , disorient ation, 
nausea, i l lness ,  isolation, and death. 
7 GK-4 
GK-7 
GK-9 
GK-8 
GK-5 GK-12 
G K - ~  ~ ~ - 1 3  
GK-9 GK-14 
GK-10 GK-15 
GK-11 
3-11 
Recommended 
H a Z d  H a Z a r d  Safety 
No. HtUX3J.d Study No. Guidelines 
m-4 
HK-5 
HK-6 
HL-1 
m-2 
HL-3 
m-4 
HL-5 
Loss of e l e c t r i c a l  power during EVA 
results i n  loss of primary commmica- 
t;ions t .eqeraturn c~ntrc1, Etl.nmt.ed 
oxygen flow, and atmosphere cleansing, 
and propulsion capabili ty.  
Nausea and vomiting during EVA opera- 
t ions presents a r i s k  of death t o  the 
astronaut. 
Improper ingress/egress procedures and 
preparations when t rans i t ion ing  from one 
atmosphere composition and pressure t o  
another can r e s u l t  i n  the hazards of 
dysbari sm. 
GROUP L. HAZARDS WITH LUNAR SURFACE EXA 
Malfunction or loss of  oxygen supply 
or pressurization during EVA w i l l  re- 
sult i n  death of an astronaut. 
C o d c a t i o n s  lo s s  during EVA leads t o  
lack of information exchange which may 
be vita t o  navigation, vital signs 
monitoring, o r  rescue assistance.  
Loss of  l i f e  support ftmctions during 
EXA presents a threa t  of i l l n e s s  and 
death. 
E V A  involving heavy o r  hazardous equip- 
ment or rough lu ra in  presents a r i s k  
of injury. 
Corrosive f l u i d s  f'umes, and dust  pre- 
sent a threat of spacesuit  damage and 
of injury t o  an EVA astronaut. 
7 
35 
39 
22 
22 
22 
23 
22 
23 
22 
23 
GK-4 
GK-5 
GI!#-9 
. 
GK-5 GK-18 
GK-6 GK-19 
GK-17 
GK-16 GK-20 
8 
GK-21 GK-24 
GK-22 GK-25 
GK-23 GK-26 
GK-1 GK-4 
GK-2 GL-1 
GK-3 GL-14 
GK-7 
GK-8 
GL-1 GL-5 
GL-2 GL-6  
GL-3 GL-7 
GL-4 GL-19 
GL-8 GL-11 
GL-9 GL-12 
GL-10 GL-20 
GL-8  
GL-10 
GL-13 
3-12 
Recommended 
H€iZard  Hazard Safety 
No. H a z a r d  Study No. Guidelines 
HL-6 
HL-7 
HL-8 
HM-1 
HM-2 
Switching backpacks during EVA pre- 
sen ts  a th rea t  of accident, l o s s  of l i f e  
support , and death. 
23 
Lack of mobili ty and the  presence of 
external  protuberances present a r i s k  of 
accident, injury,  and loss  of l i f e  sup- 
port  f o r  an EVA astronaut. 
23 
Damage o r  loss  of the  glare and heat 23 
r e f l ec t ive  coating on spacesuit face 
masks presents a th rea t  of astronaut 
i n ju ry  or impariment. 
(see H a z a r d s  HK-5, HK-6 and associated 
guidelines, which also apply t o  surface 
EVA. ) 
GROUP M. HAZARDS WITH CARGO AM) EQUIPMEW HANDLING 
An escaped or improperly handled cargo 14 
package i n  lunar o r b i t  may s t r i k e  and 
in ju re  a crew member or damage and dis-  
able a v i t a l  subsystem. 
Accidents while handling equipment or  
cargo on the  lunar surface can r e s u l t  i n  
i n ju ry  t o  crewmen or damage t o  v i t a l  sub- 
systems. 
20 
GROUP N. COLLISION I N  CRBIT 
HN-1 Col l is ion i n  lunar orb i t  presents 
r i s k s  varying from negligible t o  
catastrophic.  
GL-4  
GL-5 
GL-15 
GL-16 
GL-17 
GL-18 
GM-1 GM-4 
GM-2 GM-5 
GM-3 
GF-4 
GF-5 
GF-8 
11 GN-1 GN-7 
25 GN-2 GN-8 
GN-3 GA-7 
GN-4 GA-8 
GN-5 GA-9 
GN-6 
3-13 
Recommended 
Guidelines 
Hazard Hazard Hazard 
No. Study No. Safety 
GEtOUP 0. HAZARD WITH LIGHTING 
un -1 
I&" -a. 
HO -2 
HO-3 
HO -4. 
HP-1 
HQ-1 
nL 
LV F041,.,- + A  --- A = &  u A G  Iru a== E crevasse OT other  
obstruction m y  resid% b damage Y 
entrapment, and in jury  to  a lunar rover 
and crewmen. 
Inab i l i t y  t o  navigate on the  lunar 
surface because o f  poor l igh t ing  
presents a r i s k  of i so la t ion ,  l i f e  
support depletion, and death. 
Docking i n  lunar  o r b i t  under poor 
l igh t ing  conditions may r e s u l t  i n  
col l is ion.  
Poor l igh t ing  o r  obscuration by dust 
during lunar  landing may r e s u l t  i n  
accident and injury.  
26 
27 
28 
GROUP P. COMMUNICATIONS LOSS 
Failure  of communications may lead t o  
and support, and insuf f ic ien t  informa- 
t i on  t o  perform a rescue mission. 
29 
30 i so la t ion ,  lack of v i t a l  information 
GROUP Q. HAZARDS WITH NATURAL AND MAN-MADE RADIATION 
Exposure t o  excessive amounts of 9 
nuclear radiat ion presents a th rea t  20 
of  i l l n e s s ,  injury,  and death. 31 
36 
Go-1 
Go-3 
. 
Go-4 
Go-5 
Go-6 Go-10 
Go-7 Go-11 
Go43 Go-12 
0 - 9  
GP -1 
w -2 
GP -3 
GP -4 
GP-5 
GP -6 
GP -7 
GP-8 
w-9 
GP -10 
GP -11 
w-12 
GP-13 
GK-4 
GK -7 
GK-8 
GA-13 GQ-7 
GF-10 GQ-8 
GQ-1 GQ-9 * 
GQ-2 GQ-10 
CQ-3 GQ-11 
GQ-4 GQ-12 
GQ-5 GQ-13 
GQ-6 
3-14 
Hazard Recommended Hazard 
Study No. Safety 
Guidelines 
GROUP R. HAZARDS FROM METEOROIDS 
HR-1 
HS-1 
HT-1 
Meteoroid penetrations can r e su l t  i n  
mild o r  violent  decompression, damage 
o r  destruction of pressure cabins and 
v i t a l  subsystems, f i r e ,  explosion, 
injury,  and death. 
38 
GROUP S. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
Improper handling, securing, o r  use of 34 
hazardous materials presents a r i s k  of 
injury,  i l l n e s s ,  and death t o  crewmen. 
GROUP T. "MANERROR 
Human er ror  can generate hazards lead- 37 
ing to  i so la t ion ,  injury, i l l n e s s ,  and 
death. 
GR-1 GR-4 
GR-2 GR-5 
GR-3 GR-6 
GS-1 GS-5 
GS-2 GS-6 
GS-3 GS-7 
GS-4 
GT-1 GT-3 
GT-2 GT-4 
3-15 
3.2 SAFETY GUIDELINES 
T h i s  section presents the safe ty  guidelines recommended as preventive o r  
remedial measures for  the hazards described i n  Section 3.1. 
The gAdelLnes are grouped and assip-ed an ident i fying number with511 each 
group. Alongside each guideline the  corresponding Hazard Study which pre- 
sen ts  d e t a i l s  of analysis( in  Section 2 of Report MSC-03977) i s  referenced 
and the identifying group and number of the  hazards which are corrected by 
the guideline are l i s t e d .  
RECOMMENDED SAFETY GUIDELINES 
Reference Guideline H € l Z d  
Guideline Studs No. H a z d  No. No. 
GROUP A. GUIDELINES FOR PRIME T"SP0RT VMICLES 
GA-1 The crew of a prime t ransport  1 HA-1 
vehicle s h a l l  be provided with 
navigation update information, 
and with the capabi l i ty  t o  man- 
ual ly  d i r e c t  the vehicle t o  the 
target  position. 
GA-2 
GA-3 
If the  crew module of a prime trans- 1 
p o r t  vehicle (FTV) i s  mounted on a pro- 
pulsion vehicle, such as a Tug, t h a t  
Tug s h a l l  be i n  a powered-up s t a t e  at 
the time of lunar o r b i t  inser t ion  o r  
departure and s h a l l  be capable of 
rapid separation from the FTV t o  func- 
t ion as a crew escape vehicle. 
HA-1 
During each manned prime t ransport  ve- 
hicle  a r r i v a l  o r  departure a t  t h e  
&on, other operations i n  o r b i t  and 
on the lunar surface s h a l l  be re- 
s t r i c t e d  t o  a c t i v i t i e s  with low 
risk of generating a rescue require- 
ment 
1 HA-1 
3-16 
Guideline HaZrrrd Reference 
No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
GA-4 C r e w  modules, serving e s sen t i a l ly  1 HA-1 
as replacement-crew delivery she l te rs ,  
s h a l l  have the capabi l i ty  ( as a mini- 
mum) t o  quickly separate and move away 
from a disabled (stable o r  tumbling) 
prime t ransport  vehicle, provide a 
d e l t a  ve loc i ty  of approldmately 1000 f t /  
sec t o  achieve an e l l i p t i c a l  lunar 
orb i t ,  and maintain c o a s e  a t t i t u d e  
control,  and communications (beacon 
and voice) and l i f e  support while 
awaiting rescue. 
GA-5 
GA-6 
GA-7 
. 
a GA-8 
During each manned prime t ransport  ve- 
h i c l e  a r r i v a l  and departure at the  
Moon a rescue vehicle,  manned and 
ready, and with aAV capabi l i ty  of 
at least 4,400 f t /sec,  s h a l l  be standing 
by i n  lunar o r b i t  (assumed t o  be 60 nm 
c i r d a r )  . 
1 
Prime t ransport  vehicles, whether 3 
chemical o r  nuclear powered, s h a l l  11 
not be brought i n t o  the same or  in- 
te rsec t ing  o r b i t  with other opera- 
t i o n a l  elements such as an orbi t ing 
lunar s ta t ion ,  and sha l l  always op- 
e r a t e  from a higher o rb i t a l  a l t i t ude .  
Each manned vehicle i n  lunar o r b i t  3 
s h a l l  be constantly mointoring 10 
other  t r a f f i c ,  emergencies, or msl- 11 
functions t h a t  could present a haz- 13 
ard and s h a l l  have the a b i l i t y  t o  25 
maneuver t o  avoid col l is ion.  
Orbi ta l  tug vehicles shall have the  
capabi l i ty  t o  capture and control  or 
dispose of any dere l ic t  vehicle  or 
object i n  an unsafe lunar o r b i t  
3 
10 
11 
13 
25 
HA-1 
HA-2 
HA-4 
HA-2 
HA-4 
HC-3 
HE1 
"-1 
HA-2 HE-1 
HA-4 HE-3 
HC-3 HN-1 
3-17 
Guideline HEiZard Reference 
No. Guideline study No. Hazard No. 
GA-9 Any dere l ic t  vehicle i n  an unsafe 3 HA-2 
lunar orbi t  must be captured and 10 HA-4 
placing it i n  a safe lunar orbi t ,  13 HE1 
ei ther  repaired o r  disposed o f  by 11 HC-3 
returning it to  Eaztkn orbi t ,  or 25 HK-l 
injection t o  heliocentric orbit .  
GA-10 
GA-11 
GA-12 
G E L 1  
GB-2 
Rescue crewmen sha l l  not approach a 3 HA-3 
tumbling nuclear vehicle unless pro- HA-4 
m-5 tected by a specially prepared and 
radiation shielded vehicle. . 
The c r e w  of a space vehicle sha l l  be 1 HA-1 
able t o  assume manual control of ve- 3 HA-3 
hicle a t t i tude  i n  order t o  avoid or 4 HB-5 
stop tumbling. Appropriate means t o  HC-1 
detect and control fa i lures  causing 
att i tude control loss sha l l  be pro- 
vided. 
Nuclear PTV's sha l l  not be placed 1 HA-5 
surface impact trajectory.  31 
36 
on a f ree  Earth return or  lunar 3 HQ-1 
GROUP B. GUIDELINES FOR ORBITING LUNAR STATIONS (OLS's) 
Each crew cabin sha l l  have more than 4 HB-1 HD-4 
one pressurized compartment capable, 18 HB-3 HF-1 
a t  l ea s t  i n  an emergency, of suppmt- 19 HB-4 HF-3 
ing the crew. Hatches t o  intercon- 20 HD-2 HF-4 
necting passageways or airlocks sha l l  
be kept open at  a l l  times, but quickly 
sealable i n  an emergency. 
Each crew cabin sha l l  provide oxygen 4 
masks and emergency pressure garments, 18 
2-gas and independent of spacecraft 19 
ECS, a t  each crew station; pressure 20 
suits and PLSS units f o r  each crew 
member; and immediate use of one or  
mre  o f  these o r  escape t o  a separate 
compartment following explosion, f i r e ,  
loss of pressure, or detection of con- 
taminants i n  the atmosphere. 
HB-1 HD-5 
HB-3 HF-1 
m-4 HF-3 
HD-4 w-4 
LMSC-A98&262B 
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No. Guideline Study No. H a z a r d  No. 
GB-3 Where multiple primary pressure com- 
partments are  provided i n  a system, 
crew members sha l l  not normally a l l  
occupy one compartarent at  one time 
GB-4 
t 
GB-5 
GB-6 
a 
GB-7 
Each orbit ing lunar station sha l l  
have docked t o  it, o r  i n  the imme- 
d ia te  vicinity,  and immediately 
accessible, space tug vehicles with 
crew compartments, propulsion modules, 
and instrument units capable of hous- 
ing and supporting the en t i re  remain- 
ing s ta t ion crew. 
Each space vehicle o r  base mission 
sequence shall be planned such t h a t  
a backup or emergency sourc8 of 
power, l i f e  support, and c o d c a -  
t ions capabili ty is available at 
all times so t ha t  following l o s s  
of a primary source the crew san 
proceed t o  a safe haven unassisted 
or a w a i t  rescue, whichever t i m e  i s  
i s  greater. 
Cabin atmosphere shal l  be monitored 
continuously to  detect contaminants 
such as solid particles,  excessive 
CqZ,  vaporized chemicals, and imme- 
d i a t e  action sha l l  be taken t o  use 
e i ther  oxygen masks, emergency 
pressure garments, pressure suits, 
or separate compartment and ECS as 
appropriate, before illness, in- 
capacitation, o r  oqgen depriva- 
t ion  can occur. 
Ifigh pressure gas storage bot t les ,  
pyrotechnics, and hazardous experi- 
mental devices sha l l  be separated 
from the main cabin of an orbiting 
lunar stat ion and *om c r i t i c a l  sub- 
systems components by enclosing i n  
compartments vented t o  space and i n  
structures design t o  help control 
an explosion o r  fire. 
4 HB-1 m-1 
18 HB-3 HF-3 
19 HB-4 HF-4 
20 HD-4 
4 HB-1 
HB-2 
HB-3 
HB-4 
HB-5 
4 
18 
19 
20 
21 
4 
18 
19 
4 
18 
19 
HB-2 
HB-4 
HD-3 
HF-2 
HF-3 
HF-4 
HE3 
HB-3 
HD-4 
m-3 
HB-4 
HD-5 
HF-4 
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GB-8 High pressure storage vesse ls  4 HB-4 
sha l l  be equipped with r e l i a b l e  18 HD-5 
pressure r e l i e f  valves vented 20 w-4 
t o  space and with th rus t  moaii5ers. 
Pressures s h a l l  be monitored t o  
provide warning of an impending ex- 
plosion, and procedures s h a l l  be 
developed t o  correct  po ten t ia l  hm- 
ards so detected. 
GB-9 Provision s h a l l  be d e  i n  space ve- 4 
h i d e s  or base design f o r  quickly 18 
sealing each pressurized compartment 20 
separately and then remotely exhaust- 
ing the atmosphere t o  extinguish a 
fire. (See note Page 3-29) 
GB-10 Manual f i re  extinguishers of the ap- 4 
each pressurized compartment of 20 
propriate type s h a l l  be provided i n  
manned vehicles. 
18 
GB-11 Attitude control t h rus t e r s  f o r  space 1 
vehicles s h a l l  be designed t o  fail 3 
1loff1I t o  prevent excessive angular 4 
rates f ron  developing. 10 
GB-12 Space vehicles  s h a l l  be provided with 1 
3 
4 
10 
backup or emergency a t t i t u d e  s t ab i l i za -  
allow repa i r  o r  capture by an assist- 
ing vehicle. 
t ion  system t o  a r r e s t  tumbling and 
GB-13 Space tug vehicles  docked t o  an 4 
orb i t ing  lunar s t a t ion  s h a l l  be 
capable of providing emergency 
a t t i t ude  s t ab i l i za t ion  f o r  the en- 
t i re  system. 
GB-14 Development of safe  and ef fec t ive  
means for  a r res t ing  the ro ta t ion  
o f  any tumbling vehicle i n  o r b i t  
by outside means s h a l l  be a prime 
objective. 
4 
10 
HB-4 
HD-5 
HF-4 
HB-4 
HD-5 
HF-4 
HA-1 HB-5 
HA-3 HC-1 
HA-4 
HA-1 HB-5 
HA-3 HC-1 
HA-4 
HB-5 
HB-5 
HC-1 
3-20 
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GB-15 
GB-16 
GB-17 
GB-18 
GB-19 
GB-20 
GB-21 
Each orb i t ing  lunar s ta t ion  s h a l l  6 HB-6 
have a minimum of  two a i r locks  t o  HB-7 
use f o r  EVA purposes. 
a i r lock  need not be an i n t e g r a l  
pa r t  of the OLS. 
The second 
An outer hatch s h a l l  remain open 
on a space vehicle while crewmen 
are  on EVA. 
Design of hatches sha l l  include 
provision fo r  forced opening from 
e i t h e r  side.  
C r e w  members i n  shir ts leeves 
should not  car ry  on airlock ac- 
t i v i t i e s  with the  inner hatch 
closed. If unavoidable, then 
pressure suits and F'LSS's should 
be avai lable  i n  the airlock. 
6 
The ECS operations f o r  a i r locks 
s h a l l  be supported by t h e  space- 
c r a f t ' s  main ECS and have emergency 
separate environmental controls  as 
well. Each air lock should have 
self-contained regulatory controls  
both f o r  E C S  supplied from the  main 
cabin supply and f o r  a i r lock emer- 
gency ECS. 
6 
All a i r locks  s h a l l  be connected t o  
the spacecraft communications loop. 
%reover, it should be possible t o  
contact other members of the lunar 
complex using airlock communications. 
6 
Orbi ta l  assembly, i f  required, s h a l l  5 
be planned t o  avoid EVA. 
HB-6 
HB-6 
HB-7 
HB-8 
HB-8 
HB-8 
HB-8 
HB-9 
3-21 
Guideline s HtXZard Reference 
No. Guideline Study No. Hazard No. 
GB-22 Major appendages for an orb i t ing  5 HB-9 
lunar s t a t ion ,  including solar 
a r r a y s ,  antennae, s c i e n t i f i c  ex- 
periment booms? and other,  s h a l l  
be deployed by means not requiring 
EVA. 
n 
GB-23 Alternate escape routes t h a t  do not 6 
terminate i n  a common module area 
sha l l  be provided. 
HB-7 
GROUP C . GUIDELINES FOR ORBITING TUGS AND LANDERS 
GC-1 
GC -2 
Gs-3 
GC-4 
Two independent reaction control  10 
systems s h a l l  be provided on each 
manned tug. 
A d l  secondary maneuvering 10 
propulsion system, oriented i n  
the same di rec t ion  aa the  primary 
engines and operating o f f  the 
main propellant supply, s h a l l  be 
provided t o  back up the  primary 
propulsion system of any tug i n  
lunar orbi t .  
Where rescue assis tance cannot be 
available, such as during i n i t i a l  
manning 6 an orbi t ing lunar sta- 
t ion,  the crew compartment of a 
manned tug i n  lunar o rb i t  s h a l l  
be carr ied on two complete tug 
propulsion modules and instrument 
units munted i n  tandem 
The crew of a manned space vehicle  
sha l l  be provided the capabi l i ty  
for  manual control of each RCS 
thruster  separately.  
10 
1 
3 
4 
10 
HC-1 
HC-1 
HC-1 
HA-1 
HA-3 
m-5 
HC-1 
LMS C-A9 8062B 
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GC-5 
G C - 6  
GC-7 
GC-8 
GC-9 
GC-1'3 
Each crew compartment and instrumen- 
t a t ion  uni t ,  including RCSz on a t u g  
i n  lunar o rb i t  must be provided t h e  
capabi l i ty  t o  separate from a f a i l e d  
propulsion module and proceed t o  a 
safe haven o r  await rescue. 
Each manned tug  on a solo mission i n  
lunar o rb i t  sha l l  carry expendables 
adequate t o  support t he  crew fo r  a 
period of  seven days beyond the  planned 
mission time. (The t i m e  ant ic ipated f o r  
rescue, with a margin. ) 
When lunar  surface missions are being 
performed, a minimum of three vehicles  
capable of supporting an escape o r  rescue 
mission must be provided; one i s  a 
standby rescue vehicle i n  lunar  o rb i t ;  
one i s  a mission vehicle i n  lunar  o rb i t ;  
one i s  a mission/escape vehicle on the  
lunar surface. 
No single function f a i l m e  of any 
system o r  subsystem on board a 
space vehicle sha l l  r e s u l t  i n  loss of 
capabi l i ty  t o  control a t t i t ude  and 
veloci ty  o f  t ha t  vehicle. 
Normal tug operating procedures sha l l  
require phasing termination, i n  the  
vehicle radiat ion shield cone, at a 
distance of at least 1150 f t .  from a 
nuclear powered prime t ransport  
vehicle. 
Tug operations i n  the v i c i n i t y  of  a 
nuclear prime t r a n s p o r t  vehicle sha l l  
be constrained by adequate procedures, 
such as r ig id  control of approach path- 
velocity-distance parameters, t o  pre- 
vent inadvertent intrusion in to  the  
nuclear vehicle radiation zone during 
normal t r ans fe r  and phasing maneuvers. 
10 HC-1 
10 
10 
1 
3 
10 
1 2  
1b 
12 
12 
HC-1 
HC-2 
HA-1 HC-1 
HA-2 HC-2 
HA-3 HC-3 
HA-4 HC-4 
HA-5 HC-6 
HC-4 
HC-4 
3-23 
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GC -11 No a c t i v i t y  shall be planned around a 
nuclear stage u n t i l  i t  i s  s t ab i l i zed  and 
the nuclear engine has been shut  down 
f o r  a t  l e a s t  24 hours. 
GC -12 
GC-13 
GC -14 
GC-15 
GC -16 
Tug vehicles s h a l l  be equipped with on- 
board radiat ion sensors and instrumenta- 
t ion  with provision f o r  auto-alarm 
whenever the  tug vehicle i s  penetrating 
a region of increasing radiat ion level .  
The crewmen of a lunar  lander tug must be 
provided with manual navigation capabi l i ty  
and m u s t  be t ra ined i n  manually controll ing 
the tug t ra jec tory  a t  a l l  points from o r b i t  
t o  landing and return to  orb i t .  The option 
to assume manual control must be immediately 
available a t  a l l  times. 
All lunar lander tug ascent and descent 
t r a j ec to r i e s  shall be tracked from Earth 
o r  OLS, i f  possible, and s ta tus  confirmed. 
Upon detection o r  no t i f ica t ion  of a 
navigation malfunction o r  t ra jec tory  error, 
standard procedure shall c a l l  f o r  assumption 
o f  manual control by the tug crew and re- 
direct ion of the vehicle t o  a safe  orb i t .  
The c r i t i c a l  nature of lunar lander tug 
descent and ascent maneuvers demands 
special  a t ten t ion  t o  items such as 
redundancy, backup, manual override, 
propellant reserves, control authori ty ,  
and any-time abort  where feas ib le ,  i n  all 
c r i t i c a l  functions and subsystems 
associated with control  of veloci ty  and 
a t t i tude .  
1 2  
12 
15 
15 
15  
HC -4 
HC -4 
HC-5 
a HC-5 
HC-5 
16 HC -6 
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No. Study No. Hazard No. 
GC -17 
GC -18 
GC -19 
0 GD-1 
GD-2 
GD-3 
The main propulsion engines f o r  the tugs 16 HC -6 
i n  the lunar complex shall be designed 
such that f a i l u r e  of a s ingle  engine 
does not deprive the  tug of the  a b i l i t y  
t o  provide veloci ty  and a t t i t u d e  control. 
The p i l o t  of a lunar lander tug must be 16 HC -6 
provided the capabi l i ty  t o  assume manual 
a t t i t u d e  control a t  any time. 
The a t t i t u d e  controls on the tug f o r  lunar 16 HC -6 
operations should be separable so that e i t h e r  
main propulsion (i .e. ,  gimballing engines) 
o r  the RCS o r  both could be used f o r  the 
a t t i t u d e  control function. 
GROUP D. GUIDELINES FOR LANDERS ON THE LUNAR SURFACE 
The crew compartment of a solo lunar  lander 17 HD-1 
tug on the lunar surface must be provisioned 
t o  support the  crew fo r  a period of  time 
following a planned return t o  o r b i t  u n t i l  a 
rescue mission can be accomplished. 
time i s  estimated t o  be l4 Earth days. 
This 
Nach lunar lander tug shall be provided 
with emergency pressure garments which 
can be donned more quickly than f u l l  
pressure suits. 
18 HD-2 
Crewmen i n  a solo lunar lander tug on the  
lunar surface shall remain i n  pressure 
suits a t  a l l  times i f  quickly accessible 
separate pressure compartments and 
emergency pressure garments cannot be 
provided. 
18 HD-2 
3-2 5 
a Guideline Guideline Hazard Reference No. Study No. Hazard No. 
GD-4 The lunar lander tug must be f lyable  by 
crew members i n  pressurized space suits. 
GD-5 
GD-6 
GD-7 
GD-8 
GE-1 
GE-2 
A rescue vehicle f u l l y  fueled and ready, 
should be standing by i n  lunar o r b i t  a t  a l l  
times during a solo lunar lander tug 
mission on the lunar surface. 
Standard operating procedures shall require 
that crew members, on EVA t raverse  from a 
solo lunar  lander tug, re turn  t o  base 
without delay following not i f ica t ion  of  
an emergency a t  the tug. 
Emergency l i f e  support capabi l i ty  on board 
a solo lunar lander tug shall always 
exceed the time required f o r  re turn of 
a l l  crewmen t o  the tug plus re turn t o  a 
safe  haven i n  lunar  orb i t .  
capabi l i ty  must be established uniquely 
fo r  each mission. 
This 
Each EVA crew on t raverse  shall be provided 
with l i f e  support and other necess i t ies  
calculated t o  assure a safe s t ay  time 
exceeding rescue time. 
GROUP E. GUIDELINES FOR PROPELLANT DEPOTS 
Propellant depot tankage shouid be 
designed with maximum meteoroid shield 
protection commensurate with engineer- 
ing f e a s i b i l i t y  and cost  and penetration 
depth probabili ty.  
A propellant depot attached to  an orb i t -  
ing lunar s t a t ion  should be placed between 
the OLS and the lunar surface, i n  order t o  
lessen the area of  depot exposed t o  
meteoroid s t r ikes .  
18 
i8 
18 
18 
18 
HD-7 
m-3 
HD-6 
HD-6 
HD-6 
13 HE-2 
13 HE-2 
3-26 
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Studs No. Hazard No. 
GE-3 
GE-4 
GE-5 
GF-1 
GF-2 
GF -3 
When a propellant depot i s  attached t o  13 HE-2 
an orbitng lunar stat ion,  keep one tug 
docked a t  a transverse por t  on the s ide  
of the  OLS away f romthe  depot t o  prevent 
debris  from s t r ik ing  the  tug i n  the  event 
of explosion of a propellant tank. 
To prevent a col l is ion of la rge  pieces 13 HE-2 
of debris with an orbit ing lunar  s t a t i o n  
following a propellant tank explosion, 
design and emplace a gr id  between the  
propellant depot and the  OLS. 
should shadow the OLS-docked tugs a t  the 
end port .  
The gr id  
Always te ther  propellant tanks to  the 
depot during delivery o r  t o  tug dming 
removal, t o  prevent these tanks from 
becoming a co l l i s ion  hazard i n  orb i t .  
GROUP F. GUIDELINES FOR LUNAR SURFACE BASES 
13 HE-3 
Each lunar surface base shall have parked 19 HF-3 
near the  s i t e  space tug vehicles with crew 20 HF-4 
compartments, propulsion modules, and 
instrument uni t s  capable of housing and 
supporting the  ent i re  beme crew and 
escaping t o  orb i t .  
Each lunar surface base shall be provided 19 HF-5 
with a l t e rna te  access ports ,  a l t e rna te  access/ 
escape routes, and a l te rna te  means f o r  
transporting incapacitated crewmen from 
surface t o  base and base t o  surface. 
Landing pads should be prepared f o r  tugs 20 HF-6 
v i s i t i n g  a L u n a r  Surface Base a t  the  
e a r l i e s t  possible time a f t e r  i n i t i a t i n g  
LSB ac t iv i ty .  
3-27 
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GF -4 
GF-5 
GF -6 
GF -7 
GF -8 
GF -9 
The movement of la rge  pieces of equip- 20 HF-7 
ment o r  of  modules on the  lunar surface HF-2 
should be accomplished with the astronaut 
nearby aiid guiding a d  cmt ro l l i zg  such 
aovement but n e t  aboard the  c a r r y k g  
vehicle. Thus i n  the event of module 
transport  vehicle upset, tipover, e tc . ,  
he w i l l  not be trapped o r  injured. 
The buddy-system should be used i n  
se t t ing  up la rge  equipments on the lunar 
surface so that EVA astronaut entangle- 
ment (e.g. wires) i s  minimized, and so 
that immediate a i d  i s  avai lable  i f  needed. 
20 HF-7 
HJ-3 
HM-2 a 
Careful a t t en t ion  should be given t o  the  19 m-4 
use o f  non-flammable materials i n  the  20 
lunar surface base design, and the 
atmosphere provided should be two-gas. 
Hazardous materials should be handled 
i n  a spec ia l ly  designated area. 
Enough tugs should always be avai lable  
a t  a lunar surface base t o  evacuate the  
en t i r e  crew t o  lunar o r b i t  should the 
LSB have t o  be abandoned. 
The following items a r e  
very close t o  the  LSB: 
a. handling o r  storage 
b. handling o r  storage 
f l u i d s  . 
devices. 
forbidden i n  o r  
of hypergolic 
of pyrotechnic 
19 m-4 
20 
19 HF-4 
20 HJ-3 
HM-2 
4 
c. combustible f l u i d s  i n  the thermal 
control system. 
d. dangerous chemicals. 
e. bacter iological  experiments. 
f .  nuclem materia.ls/systems 
Crew smoking shall be prohibited a t  a l l  
times on lunar missions. 
19 w-4 
20 
3-28 
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GF -10 A nuclear power source used t o  generate 20 HF-8 
e l e c t r i c a l  power shall be stationed a t  31 HQ-1 
l e a s t  2000 f e e t  from the  LSB; prefer- 
ably i n  a c ra t e r  whose walls a r e  higher 
than the  reactor  container and that have 
been thickened by moving s o i l .  
. 
GF-11 Secondary e l e c t r i c a l  power sources should 20 HF-8 
be avai lable  f o r  the  LSB i n  the  event of 
nuclear source malfunction. Such secondary 
sources should be adequate t o  maintain a l l  
l i f e  support and essent ia l  communications 
functions unti l  repairs a r e  made o r  rescue 
o r  re turn t o  o r b i t  i s  effected. 
NOTE : 
Following the  completion of t h e  technical 
study e f f o r t ,  the  advisabi l i ty  and effective- 
ness o f  evacuating a cabin atmosphere t o  
extinguish f i r e  was questioned. Tests  
discussed i n  Ref .  (1) have shown tha t  i n  an 
open-celled polyurethane-foam f u e l  i n  pure 
oxygen ( 5  t o  16.2 psia) , the  c e l l s  trapped 
oxygen and the ignited f u e l  continued t o  
burn until  t he  pressure was dropped t o  0.12 
psia  i n  two minutes. 
It i s  recommended that fur ther  t e s t i n g  be 
carr ied out i n  mixed gas and i n  pure oxygen 
atmospheres with m a t e r i a l s  now considered 
acceptable f o r  use i n  space cabins. 
Reference (1) also describes the  t e s t  of a 
high-expansion breathable, foam extinguishing 
agent compo sed of  approximately 300 pa r t s  
gaseous oxygen ( the  ambient gas i n  t h e  t e s t  
chamber) t o  one part  of water-based solution. 
This agent was found t o  be qui te  e f fec t ive  
and t o  show promise f o r  future applications. 
R e f  (1) "Fire Extinguishment i n  Hyperbaric and Hypobaric 
Environments. It J. Howard Kinzey, NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center, presented t o  NASA Conference 
on Materials for  F i r e  Safety, Houston, Texas, 
May 6-7, 1970. 
a 
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tiG-1 
GG-2 
GG-3 
GG-4 
GG- 5 
GG-6 
GG-7 
GROUP G. GUIDELINES FOR ROVING VEHICLES 
Non-cabin lunar surface rovers s h a l l  21 
not operate beyond walk-back distance 
t o  a safe haven, unless such rovers are 
operated i n  pa i r s  w i t h  each capable o f  
supporting the other  and returning all 
crewmen t o  safe haven. 
The use of two independent vehicles,  21 
each capable of a s s i s t i ng  the other  
should an emergency occur, i s  recommended 
f o r  long traverses with cabin type rovers. 
Each rover must be capable of returning 
a l l  crewmen t o  a safe haven. 
All lunar  surface rovers s h a l l  be cap- 
able o f  operation, driving, l i f e  support, 
communication, etc. ,  with crewmen wearing 
pressurized suits. 
21 
Each roving vehicle s h a l l  be completely 
operable and drivable by a s ingle  crewman. 
21 
It i s  recommended t h a t  a n  emergency 21 
driving s t a t ion  be provided i n  the  
airlock of cabin type rovers. 
Methods and devices f o r  detecting hidden 
cavi t ies  i n  the lunar  surface ahead of 
a moving lunar rover should be developed. 
21 
Nrvigation a ids  t o  lunar surface 21 
crews s h a l l  be capable of continuing 
operation even i n  the event of com- 
plete  communications loss. 
HG-1 
HG-1 
HG-3 
H G 1  
H G 1  
HG2 
HG-1 
c 
H G 1  
HG2 
HG-1 
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GG-8 Lunar surface roving vehicle design 
fea tures  should include l ap  b e l t s  and 
shoulder r e s t r a i n t s ,  r o l l  bars  o r  
similar protection f r o m  in jury  i n  the 
event of vehicle overturn, and surface 
slope warning indicators.  
GG-9 A rescue plan shall be avai lable  i n  de- 
tai l  p r io r  t o  each operational surface 
t raverse  mission. 
GG10 Doors, hatches, and air locks on cabin 
type roving vehicles s h a l l  be capable 
of accommodating a s t re tcher  case plus  
a f u l l y  su i ted  crewman. 
G G 1 1  Lunar surface rovers s h a l l  carry 
redundant communications equipment, 
radio beacons, and visual and audi- 
tory signal l ing devices t o  a i d  i n  
rescue. 
GG12 A s e r i e s  of depots o r  caches where 
c r i t i c a l  supplies a r e  stored along 
a planned lunar  traverse route s h a l l  
be considered i n  mission planning. 
GH-1 
. 
GH-2 
21 
21  
21 
21 
21 
GROUP H. GUIDELINES FOR FLYING 'TMICLES 
Lunar f ly ing  vehicles s h a l l  have 
f u l l y  redundant propulsion and control 
systems, except f o r  propulsion tankage 
and propellant.  Fail-operational, fail- 
operational,  fail-safe philosophy shall 
be observed. 
23 
Each lunar  f l y e r  vehicle s h a l l  car ry  
a communications beacon and voice 
t ransmit ter  capable o f  withstanding 
any crash survivable by a crewman. 
23 
H E 1  
H G 2  
H E 1  
HG2 
HG-3 
HG-2 
H G 1  
HG2 
HG-3 
H G 1  
HG-3 
"-1 
"-2 
"-1 
"-2 
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GH-3 Special protection from low veloci ty  23 "-1 
impacts should be provided f o r  EVA "-2 
backpacks used on lunar flyer missions, 
arld an axidit iond emrge-ilcy oxygex 
supply za?able =f vi ths tmding  the 
impact without impairing i t s  function 
should also be provided. 
GH-4 Lunar f l y e r s  s h a l l  be prohibited 24 
from landing i n  any area which cannot 
accommodate a second f lyer .  
HH- 2 
1 
GH- 5 
GH-6 
GH-7 
GH-8 
GH-9 
A l l  lunar  f l y e r s  s h a l l  be capable 24 
of carrying a t  l e a s t  one p i l o t ,  p lus  
one passenger who may be incapacitated. 
Use of two f ly ing  vehicles on each 24 
f lye r  mission, each capable of re- 
turning the crewmen of both vehicles, 
i s  strongly recommended. 
Continuous communication w i t h  the  
base i s  required f o r  the e n t i r e  
period of all lunar f l y e r  missions. 
24 
In planning flying missions in to  
potent ia l ly  dangerous locat ions a 
rescue plan s h a l l  always be deter- 
mined beforehand. The r ange / the  
capabili ty of the rescue mode s h a l l  
determine the  maximum allowable 
range/time-away-from-base of any 
lunar f l y e r  mission. 
Mission planners must have a pre- 
cise knowledge of the l imi ta t ions  i n  
performance of the flyer/crewman 
combination and de ta i led  information 
on landing s i t e  topography p r io r  t o  
i n i t i a t i n g  a lunar f l y e r  mission. 
24 
"-2 
"-2 
"-2 
"-2 
c 
"-2 
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GH-10 Lunar f l y e r s  sha l l  be operated only 24 "-2 
when solar l i gh t ing  conditions will 
be favorable f o r  both the outbound and 
inbound l egs  of a mission, unless  on 
an emergency mission. 
GH-11 All solo lunar f l y e r  missions s h a l l  
have a crew of a t  l e a s t  2 men with 
the vehicle f lyable  by one man. 
24 
GROUP I. GUIDELINES FOR PRESSURE CABIN LEAKS 
c 
G I - 1  
GI-2 
GI-3 
GI-4 
Instantaneous warning and detection/ 33 
locat ion information for  cabin leaks 
above nominal s h a l l  be provided. 
M u m  feas ib le  access t o  the 
cabin pressure w a l l s ,  ce i l ing ,  and 
f loo r  s h a l l  be provided i n a l l  space 
vehicles  i n  order t o  expedite r epa i r  
of leaks.  Insofar as it does not 
ser iously compromise equipment f+unc- 
t ions,  all equipment should be mounted 
away f r o m  vehicle,  spacecraft and base 
pressure-containing w a l l s  i n  order to 
permit such access as  w i l l  be necessary 
f o r  repairs .  
Provide capabi l i ty  f o r  supplying 
emergency oxygen, within seconds, 
to al l  crew members, i n  the event of 
excessive leaks i n  a space vehicle 
cabin. 
K i t s  and procedures for  repair ing 
damaged cabin w a l l s ,  and sea l s  a t  
cabin w a l l  in te r ior /ex ter ior  in te r -  
faces,  s h a l l  be provided. 
33 
33 
33 
"-2 
H I - 1  
HI-1 
H I - 1  
H I - 1  
3-33 
LMSGA984262B 
Guideline Guideline Hazard Reference 
110. Study No, Hazard No. 
GROUP J. GUIDELINES FOR SCIENCE aUIF 'MENT AND U"ND SATELLITES 
G-1 S a t e l l i t e  deployment and ini t j .a t ion 8 HJ-1 
of operations considered hazardous 
s h a l l  be made ready f r o m  a remote loca- 
t ion before exposing crewmen to poten- 
tial hazards. 
GJ-2 
GJ-3 
GJ-4 
GJ-5 
GJ-6 
Refueling o f  s a t e l l i t e s  sha l l  be ac- 
complished by use o f  prepackaged fuel 
and oxidizer container with bui l t - in  
valves which open only after final 
ins ta l la t ion .  
8 H J - 1  
Servicing o f  s a t e l l i t e  propulsion 
s h a l l  only be accomplished after 
wlorougn system venting and purging. 
8 HJ-1  
Vacuum venting of immediate area 
where system piping o r  tubing i s  
opened s h a l l  be accomplished f o r  
each system breaching operation involv- 
ing dangerous l iqu ids  o r  gases. 
8 H J - 1  
A l l  s o l id  propellant i n s t a l l a t ions  8 
s h a l l  be designed to accept a complete 
prepackaged so l id  propellant module 
designed to  be "no-fire" safe u n t i l  
s a t e l l i t e  i s  armed f o r  deployment. 
HJ-1 
. 
Specific warning instrumentation 8 
and sensors designed f o r  the satel- 
l i t e  propellant f l u i d s  t o  be handled, 
s h a l l  be in s t a l l ed  i n  area where such 
f lu ids  a r e  to be stored o r  handled. 
HJ-1  
- 
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GJ-7 Automatic f a u l t  detection equipment 8 
u t i l i za t ion  sha l l  be employed as the 
first step i n  the test and checkout 
of s a t e l l i t e s .  The sudden r i s e  of 
current above t e s t  limit sha l l  cause 
power cut-off to the test-and-check- 
out setup as a means of preventing 
e l ec t r i ca l  f i res .  
GJ-8  Sa t e l l i t e  capture f o r  data return 
and reuse sha l l  be accomplished v i a  
a tug specifically equipped f o r  the 
task, i n  order to avoid potential  
col l is ion problems for  the OLS. 
8 
GROUP K. GUIDELINES FOR ORBITAL EVA 
GK-1 All EVA astronauts shall  carry a 7 
t h i r t y  minute emergency oxygen supply 
to  be used only i n  the event of fa i lure  
of the main oxygen supply. Switchovers 
m a y  be manual or  automatic, but a signal 
of automatic switchover must be provided 
the astronaut. 
22 
GK-2 
GK-3 
GK-4 
The emergency oxygen supply feed sha l l  
be capable of manual control by an EVA 
astronaut. 
7 
22 
An EVA astronaut using h i s  emergency 7 
22 oxygen supply sha l l  have an immediate 
and mandatory requirement t o  return 
to  h i s  spacecraft o r  base. 
All spacecraft and bases s h a l l  have 
plugs s t ra tegical ly  located on the i r  
7 
22 
surfaces so tha t  an EVA astronaut can 29 
attach umbilicals for oxygen, e l ec t r i ca l  30 
power, and communications. 
HJ-1  
HJ-2 
HK-1 
HL1 
HK-1 
HG1 
HK-1 
HL1 
HK-1 
HK-2 
HK-4 
HL-1 
HP-1 
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7 HK-1 
z - 4  
m- 5 
GK- 5 The buddy system o r  presence of a 
astronauts a r e  assigned tasks i n  which 
spacecraft o r  station. 
safety m a n ,  i s  mandatory when EVA 35 HK-3 
they are operating detached frcjni t he  
GK-6 
GK-7 
GK-8 
GK-9 
The buddy system o r  presence of  a safety 7 HK-1 
man, i s  desirable f o r  an EVA astronaut 35 m-3 
assigned to a task on the surface of a m-5 
spacecraft to which he i s  tethered. 
An EVA astronaut sha l l  have a communi- 7 
cations (May-day) alarm, self-powered, 22 
and activated automatically should h i s  35 
communications subsystem o r  h i s  elec- 
t r i c a l  power subsystem f a i l .  
A communications fa i lure  sha l l  lead 7 
to an immediate and mandatory return 22 
to t h e  EVA astronautls spacecraft o r  29 
base. 30 
In the event o f  loss of primary elec- 7 
t r i c a l  power by an o rb i t a l  EVA astro- 
naut an emergency battery pack sha l l  
supply power to: 
a. run the astronaut propulsion u n i t  
fo r  a minimum of ten minutes, 
0 
b. keep suit temperature below 90 F 
for  t h i r t y  minutes, 
c. run a May-day communications a l a r m  
fo r  one hour, 
d. run a flashing l i g h t  (wattage to  be 
determined) fo r  a t  least one hour. 
GK-10 EVA astronaut propulsion must fail 7 
"Off". 
HI(-2 
HL-2 
HP-1 
HK-2 
HL-2 
HP-1 
HK-2 
HK-3 
a - 4  
HK-3 
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GK-11 
GK-12 
GK-13 
GK-14. 
GK-15 
GK-16 
GK-17 
EVA astronaut a t t i tude  control sub- 7 HK-3 
system s h a l l  be capable o f  being used 
to  keep the astronaut i n  the v i c in i ty  
of h i s  spacecraft  i n  the event of a 
runaway propulsion system. 
A s  astronaut s h a l l  be capable of 
disabling any o r  a l l  AMlT a t t i t u d e  
control th rus te rs  a t  a l l  times. 
7 
A.MU a t t i t u d e  control t h rus t e r s  f o r  7 
an EVA astronaut sha l l  be disabled 
whenever he i s  tethered and not 
t ranslat ing.  Tethers must be im- 
pervious t o  damage from hot  gas o r  
other  AMU exhaust products. 
All spacecraft  s h a l l  have hand-holds 7 
and te ther ing places s t r a t eg ica l ly  
located on t h e i r  surfaces so tha t  an 
EVA astronaut may use these i n  the 
course of  those tasks i n  which he i s  
located on the spacecraft surface. 
Untethered EVA should be prohibited 7 
u n t i l  an astronaut maneuvering u n i t  
(AMU) i s  developed to  the extent of 
being very re l iab le .  
Astronaut candidates must be care- 35 
f u l l y  screened t o  eliminate personnel 
who are  susceptible t o  motion sickness 
o r  nausea. 
Training and simulation programs 35 
should continue to acclimatize astro- 
naut personnel t o  the types of extreme 
motions anticipated w i t h  lunar rover 
t raverses  o r  abnormal EVA motions. 
HK-3 
HK-3 
HK-3 
m-3 
m-5 
m-5 
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GK-18 The d i e t  of astronauts pr ior  t o  EVA 35 
operations sho-Ad coEtlme t o  p reckde  
large food par t ic les .  
GK-19 
GK-20 
GK-21 
GK-22 
Astronauts should continue t o  be in- 35 
doctrinated r e l a t ive  t o  t h e  hazards 
o f  nausea within the  confines of a 
space suit and enjoined t o  r e f r a in  from 
EVA a c t i v i t i e s  when indisposed, regard- 
l e s s  of mission p r i o r i t i e s ,  unless required 
by an emergency condition. 
S u i t  design progress should evolve i n  
the following directions:  
a. Provide increased astronaut mobility. 
b. Incorporate redundant fea tures  t o  
preclude catastrophic f a i l u r e  of any 
suit/back-pack element. 
Include a posi t ive col lect ion method 
including a debris/vomitus t r a p  o r  bag. 
Investigate t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  includ- 
ing a backup system within the  suit o r  
back-pack. 
Provide means t o  open t h e  face mask t o  
render a id  i n  a vacuum environment. 
Provide higher suit pressures t o  
eliminate need f o r  denitrogenixation. 
Provide integrated suit-back pack design. 
35 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f .  
g. 
Adequate provisions f o r  simultaneously 39 
denitrogenating EVA personnel should be 
provided i n  the  OLS, t h e  Space Tug and the  
Lunar Base. 
Crew a c t i v i t y  schedules should allow 
suff ic ient  time f o r  adequate denitro- 
genation when a t r ans i t i on  must be made 
from a higher pressure, 2 gas cabin 
t o  a lower pressure pure oxygen suit 
environment. 
39 
HK-5 
HK-5 
HK-5 
HK-6 
HK-6 
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GK-23 Astronaut select ion c r i t e r i a  should 39 HK-6 
continue t o  s t r e s s  re la t ive  immunity 
from the  symptoms of dysbarism. 
GK-24 Astronaut t ra in ing  programs should 39 
continue t o  indoctrinate candidates on 
the  symptomology of dysbarism. 
GK-25 Drug therapy as a means f o r  prevent- 39 
ing o r  increasing tolerance f o r  bends 
symptoms should be investigated. 
GK-26 Compression therapy techniques and 39 
devices, such as the pressure bag, 
should be developed f o r  space appli- 
cat ions t o  t r e a t  dysbarism symptoms, 
GL-1 
GL-2 
GL-3 
GROUP L. GUIDELINES FOR SURF'ACE EVA 
The buddy system, o r  presence of a safety 22 
man, should be mandatory f o r  EVA astro- 23 
nauts under normal conditions unless they 
are within a few tens of meters of the  
LSB o r  of  t h e  cabin rover o r  of t h e  
landed tug, and standby help i s  immedi- 
at e l y  available,  
Back-pack design shall  permit buddy 22 
23 system attachment and operation f o r  all 
l i f e  support functions and power and 
communications. 
Fai lure  o r  degradation of his l i f e  
support back pack should make re turn  
t o  a safe  haven mandatory and immediate 
f o r  an EVA astronaut. 
22 
23 
HK-6 
HK-6 
HK-6 
HL-1 
HL-3 
HL-3 
HL-3 
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GL-4 Back-pack switching i n  the lunar vacuum 
environment shall not  be required as a 
means f o r  normal extension of mission 
duration. 
GL-5 
GL-6 
GL-7 
GL-8 
GL-9 
GL-10 
GL-11 
Back-pack switching a i d s  shall be pro- 
vided only fo r  emergency-switching of  
backpacks. 
A l l  back-packs and inter-related equip- 
m e n t  should be designed t o  fail-opera- 
t ional,  fail-operational,  fail-safe.  
All hose connections should have auto- 
matic, self-sealing po r t s  f o r  t h e  event- 
uality of' inadvertent hosedisconnection. 
A m e a n s  shall be provided fo r  a s ingle  
astronaut t o  move an unconcious EVA 
astronaut from an accident location to 
a nearby safe haven. 
Erection of large structures/instru- 
ments should be automatic insofar  as i s  
reasonable without serious& compromis- 
22 
23 
22 
23 
22 
23 
22 
23 
22 
23 
22 
23 
ing function o r  costs  fo r  the lunar complex. 
All corrosive f lu ids  should be handled 22 
by EVA astronauts  wearing a protect ive 23 
overgarment and protect ive boots o r  
boot  covers . 
NO EVA astronaut should be outside and 
in the immediate v i c in i ty  of any ve- 
hicle  on the  lunar surface during the  
in i t i a t ion  of motive power. 
22 
23 
HL-3 
HL-6 
HL-3 
HL-6 
HL-3 
HL-3 
HL-4 
m-5 
HL-4 
J3.J-4 
HL-5 
a-4 
. 
. 
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GL-12 Sc ien t i f i c  mission a c t i v i t i e s  shall be 22 HL-4 
organized t o  avoid tripping over em- 
placed s c i e n t i f i c  equipment and i t s  
connecting cables. 
23 
. 
GL-13 
GL-11, 
a GL-15 
GL-16 
GL-17 
EVA astronauts  using the lunar f l y e r  22 HL-5 
should wear a protective garment during 
the  in te rva l  that the f l y e r ' s  engines 
a r e  turned on in order t o  prevent contam- 
ina t ion  from engine exhaust. 
23 
Repair k i t s ,  analogous t o  the t i r e  re- 22 HL-1 
pair k i t ,  should b e  available f o r  a l l  
EVA as t ronauts  ( i n  general, f o r  a l l  
suited astronauts)  i n  order t o  be ab le  
t o  repa i r  minor and medium suit leaks. 
Means should be provided fo r  determina- 
t i on  and detection of leaks. 
Space s u i t  design e f f o r t s  should con- 
t inue t o  s t r e s s  increased astronaut  
mobility performance capabi l i t i es ,  
integrat ion of separate suit elements 
i n to  one garment, increased resis tance 
t o  tear and abrasion, and emergency cor- 
r ec t ive  measures t o  prevent catastro- 
phic suit leaks. 
23 HL-7 
External protuberances such as hoses, 23 HL-7 
e l e c t r i c a l  l i nes ,  etc.,  on a l l  space 
suits should be eliminated by improved 
de sign. 
Lunar  hardware systems must be de- 23 HL-7 
signed t o  preclude accidental  damage 
t o  suits and backpacks. 
include development of safe  vehicle/ 
she l t e r  ingress/egress provisions and 
a ids ,  avoidance of abrasive hardware 
edges and protrusions which can snag 
suits or  hoses. 
such measures 
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GL-18 The gold plated,  heat r e f l ec t ive  layer  
nn Yne spacesuit  face masks stxxiid be 
sealed between two l aye r s  of p l a s t f z  
in order t o  pro tec t  that layer  from 
scratching, abrasion, or  peeling. 
GL-19 It i s  recommended that the  lunar surface 
base have provisions t o  permit sh i r t s leeve  
t ransfer  t o  and from the cabin rover. 
GL-20 The air locks,  doors, hatches, ele- 
vators, e tc . ,  f o r  t he  lunar surface 
base shall be la rge  enough t o  accomo- 
date a t  l e a s t  one s t re tcher  case p lus  one 
crewman wearing a t o t a l  EVA mobility un i t .  
GROUP M. GUIDELINES FOR CARGO AND EQUIPMENT 
GM-1 
GM-2 
GM-3 
It i s  strongly recommended that cargo 
packages whose dimensions exceed 20" x 
30a x 40" o r  whose Earth weight exceeds 
1000 pounds be moved from the cargo module 
t o  the lunar space s ta t ion ,  o r  t o  a tug, 
using a res t ra in t / t ranspor t  method. 
A package whose Earth weight i s  grea te r  
than 500 pounds but l e s s  than 1000 pounds 
and whose dimensions do not  exceed 20" x 
3O1! x 40" should be handled by two crew 
members when in a zero-g, sh i r t s leeve  
environment . 
In order f o r  a package t o  be handled by 
one man in a zero- , sh i r t s leeve  environ- 
ment, it should: 7 a )  have dimensions 
permitting comfortable handling and, 
(b) be less than 500 pounds Esrth weight. 
23 HL-8 
22 
23 
22 
23 
4 
4 
a - 3  
HL-4 
HM-1 
HM-1 
HM-1 
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(34-4 Cargo containers/packages should be de- 111 HM-1 
signed t o  provide generous grasping 
points  or  handholds. 
GM-5 In order t o  minimize hazards associated u HM-1 
with cargo handling in o r b i t ,  the pantry 
technique i s  recommended f o r  receiving car- 
go= 
docked t o  a l o g i s t i c s  port  a t  the s ta t ion ,  
cargo i s  removed on an as-needed basis ,  the 
cargo containers a r e  opened in the module 
and the contents removed in separate pieces 
as needed. This technique requires  entry 
to  the module on a daily (or  more frequent) 
bas i s  bu t  the handling i s  reduced, in 
large pa r t ,  t o  removal of  small packages. 
In such a method the cargo module i s  
GROUP N.  GUIDELINES FOR AVOIDING COLLISION I N  ORBIT 
GN-1 No two space vehicles  o r  s t ruc tures  11 "-1 
shall be based in near-identical o r  13 HE-1 
in te rsec t ing  orb i t s .  25 
GN-2 
4 GN-3 
No two space vehicles  shall be per- 11 "-1 
mitted t o  approach each other on a 13 HE-1 
col l i s ion  course ei ther  with main pro- 
pulsion trontr o r  with a closing veloci ty  
grea te r  than about 2 ft/second. 
25 
A vehicle intending t o  dock in o r b i t  11 "-1 
shall not  be placed on a co l l i s ion  13 HE-1 
course with the primarg propulsion 
burning. 
25 
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GN-4 To accomplish docking following ren- 11 "-1 
dezysl;s =f t.,.a vehicles  Lq orb i t ,  n l t i -  -/ 72 HE-l 
tude ad,Jus+ment shall n c w r  first 35 
followed by establishment of an in te r -  
cept t ra jec tory .  Only docking th rus t e r s  
shall be used for  veloci ty  adjustment, 
and closing veloci ty  shall be l imited 
t o  a maximum of about 2 ft/second u n t i l  
about 200 f t  frm contact. From 200 ft 
t o  contact the  closing veloci ty  shall 
be l imited t o  less than 1 ft/second. 
. 
. 
GN-5 Docking a reas  on space vehicles  shall 11 
be kept f r e e  of vehicle or  subsystem 13 
appendages, such as engines, antennae, 25 
and so lar  ce l l s .  
GN-6 Docking mechanisms shall be designed 11 
t o  absorb twice the normal maximum 13 
expected docking impact energy without 25 
damage. 
"-1 
HE-1 
"-1 
HE-1 
GN-7 Spacecraft departing from a second vehicle  
shall first  make an a l t i t u d e  adjust- 
ment su f f i c i en t  t o  ensure that o r b i t s  
a r e  non-intersecting before i n i t i a t i n g  
main thrust. 
11 
25 
GN-8 The posi t ions of a l l  objects  in lunar 11 
orbi t ,  including space debris ,  shall 2s 
be monitored, Debris shall be re- 
moved a t  the  e a r l i e s t  opportunity 
should any s igni f icant  poss ib i l i t y  of 
co l l i s ion  ex is t .  If debr i s  removal i s  
not prac t ica l ,  the  o r b i t  of vehicles  
threatened with co l l i s ion  shall be 
appropriately a l te red .  
"-1 
"-1 
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GFtDUP 0. GUIDELINES FOR LIGHTING 
GO-1 Navigation and hazard avoidance tech- 26 HO-1 
niques must be developed f o r  use on the HJ-2 
lunar surface with lunar rovers, and with 
lunar f lye r s ,  which are independent of 
any and a l l  l igh t ing  conditions on the 
surface. 
GO-2 
Go-3 
GO-4 
Go-5 
A device, analogous t o  mine detectors ,  26 
should be designed i n  order t o  deter- 
mine hidden crevasses and roofed holes 
on the lunar surface, This device, i f  
needed, should be attached t o  the f ron t  of 
a l l  >mar rovers on a long enough extension 
(truss) so that the  rover may be stopped 
i n  time, a t  i t s  highest speed, i f  such a 
hazard i s  detected. 
A s  a i d s  t o  navigation on the lunar 26 
surface lbuoysl should be developed 
containing coded radio beacons and 
f lashing l i g h t ( s ) ,  and powered 
radioisotope power sources of a t  
l e a s t  5 years  l ifetime. 
should be detectable a t  a dis tance of 
a t  l e a s t  50 miles using omni antennas 
on the lunar rovers. 
Radio beacons 
During dayl ight  docking with a n  orbi t -  
ing vehicle,  the sun l i n e  should be 
maintained within the limits described i n  
Hazard Study 27. 
27 
Problems of sun orientat ion during 
docking may be avoided by completing 
the maneuver on the dark side of the 
o r b i t  while using a r t i f i c i a l  l igh t ing .  
27 
HO-1 
HO- 2 
m-3 
HO-3 
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Go-6 Routine lunar landings shall be planned 
angle s m  light;3ng., Im part.imlar, land- 
ings a t  unexplored s i t e s  during lunar 
night o r  times of high angle sun l igh t ing  
should be avoided except f o r  emergencies. 
- 2 + h  -nnCnn man 
W I W I  8 pLGJ.GJ.&L&b'Z fer t h e s  of In\! 
Go-7 
GO-8 
GO-9 
Go-10 
GO-11 
Go-12 
Z r f a c e  crews shall a id  incoming landers 
by s i t e  preparation and/or selection, 
ident i f icat ion of obstacles, l ight ing,  
and s teer ing information where possible.  
The use of various opt ica l  f i l t e r s  in 
lander viewing po r t s  should be tes ted  
in an e f fo r t  to find means f o r  reducing 
the  e f f ec t s  of g la re  on vision. 
Rescue landers  shall be provided with 
f l a r e s  and f loodl ights  fo r  use during 
night landings. 
Surface crews shall be provided with 
l ighting equipment, signal devices, 
and radio beacons as w e l l  as voice 
communication equipment f o r  a s s i s t i ng  
a manned landing a t  t h e i r  surface s i t e .  
The dynamics of landing should be 
studied t o  determine whether an abor t  
or hovering maneuver can be automatically 
programmed t o  occur a t  any t i m e  the  lander 
tilt a t t i t u d e  exceeds some preselected 
safe angle. 
Means f o r  leveling vehicles following 
landing on the  lunar surface s h a l l  be 
provided. 
28 
28 
28 
28 
28 
28 
28 
m-4 
Ho-4 
m-4 
HO-4 
HO-4 
HO-4 
Ho-4 
. 
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GROUP P. GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNICATIONS LOSS 
GP -1 
GP-2 
GP-3 
GP -4 
GI'-5 
GI' -6 . 
Gp -7 
GI' -8 
Each EVA astronaut shall have independent, 
highly re l iab le  primary, secondary, and 
emergency backup communications systems. 
Loss of the primary system yields  an 
immediate and mandatory requirement f o r  
the astronaut t o  return to  his spacecraft 
o r  base. 
Each rover and f lye r  shall have independent 
primary and secondary communication systems. 
For traverses beyond 1 nm from the base, an 
emergency system shall be added. 
Rover and f l y e r  traverses beyond 1 nm from 
the base shall be aborted immediately 
following any communications failure which 
reduces the t o t a l  capability to  two trans- 
mitters and two receivers. 
Each communication system shall be checked 
a t  frequent, f ixed intervals. 
Communications with an EVA astronaut shall 
be monitored and checked a t  frequent, f ixed 
intervals  by a crewman i n  the nearby tug o r  
space station. 
It i s  strongly recommended that EVA ac t iv i ty  
be carried out using the buddy-system, o r  
with the presence of a safety man. 
Each space tug shall have a minimum of three 
independent, highly re l iab le  communication 
systems. 
A l l  tugs shall have external beacons 
( l i gh t s )  f o r  use as a backup s ignal l ing 
device. 
29 
29 
29 
29 
30 
29 
30 
29 
30 
29 
30 
29 
30 
HP -1 
HP -1 
HP -1 
HP -1 
HP-1 
HP -1 
HP -1 
HFJ -1 
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Each space tug i n  lunar o r b i t  shall be 30 He -1 
able t o  dock t o  the space s t a t ion  i n  
order t o  re-establish communications 
by using the s t a t i o n  f a c i i i t i e s ,  o r  by 
having repairs ~ d t :  to ILs c j w i i  system, 
o r  by a combination of these methods. 
GP-10 The tug shall be returned from an o r b i t a l  30 HP-1 
mission t o  the orbi t ing lunar s t a t ion  f o r  
repair  following any communications f a i l u r e  
that cannot be corrected on board. 
GP-11 The lunar space s t a t ion  shall have some 
capabili ty to  perform scheduled main- 
tenance, and repa i rs  and replacement 
f o r  communications and subsystems. 
GP -12 
GP -13 
GQ-1 
Space tugs should be designed t o  be ab le  
t o  act  a s  the emergency communications 
center fo r  the lunar space s ta t ion .  
Plans f o r  act ion t o  be followed i n  the 
event of p a r t i a l  o r  complete communica- 
t i o n s  f a i l u r e  shall be prepared p r io r  t o  
any mission. 
necessary during the mission. 
Plans w i l l  be revised as 
30 HP -1 
30 
29 
30 
GROUP Q. GUIDELINES FOR NATURAL AND MAN-MADE RADIATION 
The radiat ion shielding incorporated i n  a 9 
nuclear power system module shall be 
capable of attenuating the  rad ia t ive  energy 
and pa r t i c l e  release,  f o r  the postulated 
maximum credible nuclear source accident,  
t o  levels  which do not exceed the allowable 
crew dose, per duty tour, i n  the orb i t ing  
lunar s ta t ion.  
Hp -1 
He -1 
HQ-1 
6 
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GQ-2 
. 
GQ-3 
3 
GQ-4 
GQ- 5 
GQ-6 
c 
GQ-7 
The nuclear source shielding i n t e g r i t y  9 HQ-1 
shall be such t h a t  it w i l l  survive, i n  
an in t eg ra l  condition, all assaults 
resu l t ing  from source system mechanical 
malfunctions, thermal shock, and vehicle 
col l is ion.  Further, the shielding area 
facing the s t a t ion  sha l l  survive i n t a c t  
the postulated maximum credible nuclear 
source accident. 
It s h a l l  not be possible f o r  a f a i l e d  o r  9 
f a i l i n g  power module t o  i n h i b i t  access to ,  
o r  escape o r  rescue from, the orbi t ing lunar 
s t a t ion  by reason o f  d i rec t  exposure from 
gamma o r  neutron radiation. 
A nuclear energy source (reactor)  s h a l l  be 9 
capable of posi t ive shut-down i n  any 
or ientat ion and under a l l  conditions of 
mechanical malfunction. The source re- 
ac tor  shall fa i l - sa fe  to  a shut-down 
condition f o r  a l l  credible nuclear t rans ien t  
conditions. 
A nuclear power system module shall in- 
corporate design features which permit 
remote detachment o f  the module by a 
tug vehicle f o r  disposal purposes. 
F l igh t  operations i n  and around an 
o r b i t a l  s t a t ion  s h a l l  be constrained 
to  avoid the res t r ic ted  volume around 
a nuclear power module f o r  a distance 
determined t o  be safe. 
The s t a t ion  telemetry l i nk  t o  Earth s h a l l  
sample, and report  the ambient radiat ion 
l eve l  i n  the s t a t ion  a t  any time when the 
radiat ion values exceed an  established 
background nominal. TM shall regularly 
report  dose and dose ra te  a t  selected 
s t a t ion  areas  
9 
9 
9 
HQ-1 
HQ-1 
HQ-1 
HQ-1 
HQ-1 
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GQ-8 Replacement of nuclear f u e l  f o r  the  9 HQ-1 
reactor o r  replacement of the  reac tor  
niques t F s t  ecs;;rnc that the  crew mwbsrs 
involved do not receive an injur ious 
radiation dose. Actual permissible dose, 
i n  the l i g h t  of the  importance of this 
operation, should be determined. 
itself w i l l  be gccoq l i shed  -*li-ig tech- 
GQ-9 
GQ-10 
GQ-11 
GQ-12 
Each crew member shall always wear a 
dosimeter, changed a t  regular i n t e rva l s  
so as t o  keep accurate records of radi- 
a t ion  exposure. Dosimeter readings w i l l  
be reported regularly,  o r  on demand, t o  
Earth s t a t ions  t o  the LSB o r  t o  other  
appropriate spacecraft. 
Consideration of !!crew radiation- 
exposure accountabili ty” must be in- 
cluded i n  the administrative procedures 
devised f o r  lunar exploration mission 
planning. It must be possible t o  up- 
date each crewman’s exposure record a t  
least once each 24 hours. 
9 HQ-1 . 
31 HQ-1 
36 
Serious consideration shall be given t o  31 HQ-1 
the implementation of  a mission planning 
function, which w i l l  thoroughly evaluate 
the “crew radiat ion exposure potent ia l”  
for  each phase and a c t i v i t y  of the  planned 
missions. 
36 
Specific crew safety studies shall be 31 HQ-1 
required f o r  each i t e m  of  mission equip- 
ment capable of emitting ionizing radiat ion.  
The s tudies  s h a l l  be conducted i n  the  context 
of  the  mission(s) f o r  which the  equipment use 
is intended. Where several  such equipments 
are  t o  be employed, the  study shall account f o r  
the sequential  and/or simultaneous use of the 
involved equipments. 
36 
t 
8 
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GQ-13 All nuclear and isotope source units 31 HQ-1 
shall have been demonstrated t o  be safe ly  
contained against  impact, weldment leakages, 
o r  containment melt-through, p r io r  t o  f l i g h t  
qual i f icat ion.  Where the m i t i s  t o  be 
employed continuously i n  close proximity t o  
crew quarters  and shel ters ,  the unit shall 
be double contained t o  avoid a l l  poss ib i l i t y  
of leakage and l o c a l  environment contamination. 
GR-1 
GR-2 
GR-3 
GR-4 
GR-5 
GR-6 
GROUP R. GUIDELINES FOR METEOROIDS 
Every e f fo r t  shall be made t o  provide a 
two-gas atmosphere i n  spacecraft cabins, 
using a di luent  such as nitrogen i n  order 
t o  suppress vaporif ic  f lash  during meteoroid 
penetrations. 
38 
All c r i t i c a l  hardware d i r ec t ly  exposed t o  the 
space environment shall have protection 
against  meteoroids as required t o  meet 
acceptable r i s k  probabili ty c r i t e r i a .  
38 
K i t s  shall be devised fo r  t he  quick repa i r  
of small holes i n  manned cabins caused by 
meteoroid punctures. 
38 
Lunar  bases and spacecraft shall be designed, 
where feas ib le ,  t o  have two o r  more com- 
partments, each capable of maintaining the 
cabin atmosphere which supports the  crew 
l i f e  functions. 
38 
All  op t ics  i n  hardware c r i t i c a l  t o  support, 
protection, and survival of crew members shall 
have protect ive shields, such as i r is- type 
closures, when not i n  use. 
38 
All spacecraft, lunar surface bases, and 
other  vehicles i n  the lunar complex shall 
carry medical equipment f o r  the treatment of 
burns. 
treatment of  burns. 
38 
Crewmen shall be t ra ined i n  the  
HR-1 
HR-1 
HR-1 
HR-1 
HR-1 
HR-1 
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GROUP S .  GUIDIGINES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
GS-2 
GS-3 
GS-4 
GS-5 
Primary containers f o r  hazardous mater ia l  
shall be designed t o  permit safe  storage 
and t r ans fe r  of the contained material under 
a l l  conditions of use and storage i n  lunar 
orb i t  and on the  lunar  surface. Ascertain 
the conditions of safe  stowage, handling and 
use of a l l  mater ia ls  considered t o  be hazard- 
ous both i n  lunar o r b i t  and on the  lunar 
surface. 
Secondary bulk cargo storage containers shall 
be designed to  permit safe t r ans fe r  and handling 
of primary hazardous material containers under 
a l l  conditions of t ransport  t o  lunar o r b i t  and 
the lunar  surface. 
The tug vehicle, L u n a r  Orbiting S ta t ion  and 
Lunar  Surface Base design reviews shall 
spec i f ica l ly  examine the s to re s  stowage safety 
features  and assess  the hazards e f f ec t s  
countermeasures incorporated (i.e.,  f i r e ,  
explosion, vapor control,  contamination 
control, e tc . ) .  
Considering mission a c t i v i t y  sequences, the  
optimum manner of stowage f o r  hazardous 
s tores  shall be ascertained, consis tent  
with safe ty  and a v a i l a b i l i t y  f o r  use. 
The actual need f o r  hazardous materials i n  
achieving mission and program object ives  
shall be established. For each hazardous 
material  needed, a l t e rna te  materials shall 
be reviewed t o  ascer ta in  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
reducing the hazard po ten t i a l  by a l t e r n a t e  
selection. Alternate techniques f o r  achieving 
desired program objective and eliminating the  
more hazardous mater ia ls  a r e  extremely desirable.  
34 
34 
34 
34 
34 
HS-1 
HS-1 
HS-1 
HS-1 
A 
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GS-6 For hazardous materials required, 
insure and c e r t i f y  (pr ior  t o  f l i g h t  
approval) : 
GS -7 
GT-1 
GT-2 
a. 
b. That a l l  hazards involved i n  materials 
Necessity f o r  hazardous inaterial use. 
use are known. 
That safeguards provided f o r  material  
use are adequate fo r  personnel safety. 
T h a t  procedures f o r  material  use a r e  
accurately documented and thoroughly 
understandable. 
T h a t  disposal of hazardous material 
i n  lunar o r b i t  o r  on lunar surface 
can be safe ly  accomplished i f  necessary. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
Personnel shall be experienced and trained 
i n  the  handling of hazardous materials both 
i n  zero-g and on the lunar surface. 
GROUP T. GUIDELINES FOR "MAN ERROR 
Lunar  f l i g h t  operations shall require two 
crewmen a t  the f l i g h t  s ta t ion  during a l l  
c r i t i c a l  f l i g h t  maneuvers such as docking, 
landing, ascent,  and o r b i t  change burns. 
The second crewman shall function as a 
judgement e r ro r  monitor and shall assist 
the  p i l o t  i n  the  execution of the maneuvers 
as necessary. 
A "buddy-system" mode of operation, o r  
presence of a safety man, shall be 
implemented f o r  a l l  hazardous a c t i v i t i e s  
where a crewman may be jeopardized by an 
equipment o r  environment induced o r  self- 
induced malfunction o r  mishap. 
34 HS-1 
34 
37 
37 
HS-1 
HT -1 
HT-1 
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GT-3 The probable sources of human e r ro r  l i k e l y  
t o  be encountered in the  expanded lunar 
exploratisn prcgre;? should be ident i f ied.  
These sources snould be considered i n  progrm 
element design refinement f o r  sa fe ty  enhance- 
ment. 
work-rest r a t io s ,  fa t igue  buildup, react ion 
error  s tudies  and such other human fac to r s  
and engineering aspects as may be required t o  
suppress the poten t ia l  f o r  human e r ro r  t o  
minimum levels .  
The e f f o r t  should include as necessary, 
GT-4 Specific e f f o r t s  a r e  recommended t o  enlarge 
upon the  use of simulators and fu l l - sca le  
mockup equipments f o r  the configuration 
evolution of  program element control and 
work s ta t ions  . 
37 HT-1 
37 HT-1 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
. 
The study generated the following basic data: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
Hazard s tudies  were performed i n  39 individual areas  i n  which 
hazards were ident i f ied  and analyzed, and corrective measures 
proposed. 
Over 200 safety guidelines were proposed and recommended f o r  
implementation, based on the s ign i f icant  hazards ident i f ied .  
Escape and rescue s i tuat ions and requirements were ident i f ied  
and analyzed. 
Escape/survival./rescue concepts were proposed and defined t o  cope 
with each escape/rescue situation. 
A lunar mission escape/rescue 
Highlights from the two study tasks  are a 
* 
c 
4.1 ESCAPE/RESCUE ANALYSIS 
plan w a s  prepared. 
presented below. 
The Integrated Program Plan ( P P )  elements under consideration appear feas ib le  
f o r  escape and rescue use i n  all si tuat ions examined, provided crew survival can 
be assured and the elements are equipped f o r  such missions. The surface mobility 
vehicles and the tug can function as the primary escape/rescue vehicles simply by 
the  addition of si tuation-peculiar k i t s .  
plan i s  predicated on the deployment o f  the IPP elements i n  a manner t h a t  makes them 
avai lable  f o r  escape/rescue missions during the Advanced Lunar Program and on the 
assumption of a minimum 4 V capabili ty of 15,000 f t / sec  f o r  the dedicated tugs 
based i n  lunar  o r b i t  o r  on the lunar surface. 
The f e a s i b i l i t y  of  the proposed escape/rescue 
It i s  strongly concluded tha t  the primary emphasis should be on survival and 
escape provisions, with rescue required only where self-help cannot bring 
the endangered crewmen t o  a permanent safe  haven. The react ion times f o r  
escape are usually much shorter  than f o r  rescue - i n  many cases, minutes o r  hours 
vs days. 
The required elements, t he i r  deployment, and escape/rescue missions, are shown 
i n  Table 2-2. 
capabili ty are: 
The key program impact items involving deployment and basic 
- -  
o lr a r9scxn capabili ty is denmdad for  the i n i t i a l  manning anQ 
activation of an orbit ing lunar station, the rescue must originate 
from the v ic in i ty  o f  Earth. 
tugs with the i n i t i a l  manning mission with the capabili ty t o  escape 
t o  Earth o rb i t  i n  the event of a Prime Transport Vehicle or orbit-  
ing lunar s ta t ion fai lure .  
The preferred solution i s  t o  provide 
o A minimum o f  three tugs are required i n  the lunar area when surface 
missions are underway: 
operational tug i n  o rb i t  with capabili ty to  perform surface rescue 
i f  required; and one operational/escape tug on the surface, 
one dedicated rescue tug i n  orbi t ;  one 
o An orbi ta l  lunar s ta t ion capable of serving as a rescue base and 
safe haven i s  a n e c e s s q  part of the proposed escape/rescue plan. 
o “he crew compartment of the Prime Transport Vehicle must be provided 
with the capabili ty fo r  autonomous escape t o  a safe lunar orbi t .  
This requires a minimum AV capabili ty of 1,000 ft/sec. 
o The tug must have the capabili ty t o  return t o  E;a;rth o rb i t  from lunar 
orbit .  
To ensure crew survival and the a b i l i t y  t o  complete effect ively a rescue operation 
f o r  the various emergency situations tha t  may occur, the study results recommend 
many additions, modifications, and res t r ic t ions  i n  both design and operation of 
the IPP elements. These recommendations are i n  the areas of Commrdcations, 
Crew Survival i’rovisions, Rescue Response Time,  AV Requirements, and Rescue 
Equipment. 
Communications a 
A r e l ay  satell i te f o r  communications is necessary f o r  safe lunar  surface 
operations on t h e  fars ide.  
o r  a s a t e l l i t e  system operating i n  lunar o rb i t .  In addition, improved and 
dedicated emergency communication capabi l i t i es  are recommended, such as rescue 
a l e r t i ng ,  locating, and landing aids. 
This system can be e i the r  a l i b ra t ion  point re lay  
. 
C r e w  Survival Provisions 
In  any rescue s i tua t ion ,  a fundamental tradeoff exists between providing crew 
survival t i m e  versus rescue t i m e .  
reasonable bounds, provision must be made f o r  crew survival within the  basic 
program elements and operations. 
I n  order t o  keep rescue requirements within 
Major considerations are: 
o Vehicles accomodating astronauts i n  shir ts leeves should have 
two pressure compartments - separate but interconnected, with 
each capable of supporting the  e n t i r e  crew i n  an emergency f o r  a 
period o f  t i m e  commensurate with the  rescue time. 
o A simple, lightweight emergency pressure garment t ha t  can be donned 
i n  f ive  seconds or less should be developed. 
t h i s  emergency garment into a s t re tcher ,  while being worn, by t h e  
addition o f  handles o r  rods, should be considered a goal. 
The a b i l i t y t o  convert 
o An uprated backpack i s  needed with a minimum metabolic capacity of  
6,000 BTU and a ba t te ry  lifetime of at l e a s t  1 2  hours. 
4- 3 
o A crew compartment o r  module w i l l  probably be used f o r  ferrying 
crews to and f r o m  the moon. This compartment may o r  may not be 
mated to a tug propulsion module. 
o r  departing primary transport vehicle (PTV) i n j ec t s  into an undesirable 
trajectory, including lunar surface impact o r  lunar escape, place 
excessive response and To 
avoid these excessive requirements, the crew compartment should have 
the capability to  detect  the existence of a dangerous trajectory,  
separate from the Prime Transport Vehicle, and in j ec t  i t s e l f  into a 
lunar orb i t  t o  a w a i t  rescue. In addition to autonomous guidance, 
a t t i tude control, communications, and power, a propulsion system 
with a minimum A V capabili ty o f  1,000 ft /sec i s  required to a t t a i n  
a safe lunar orbi t .  
Situations i n  which the arriving 
A V requirements on any rescue vehicle. 
o Each vehicle or  base should provide suff ic ient  space s u i t s ,  backpacks, 
emergency pressure garments, and emergency oxygen masks f o r  all crewmen. 
Rescue Response Time 
The time f o r  a rescue team to arr ive a t  the s i t e  of an emergency can vary from a 
few hours, say from lunar orb i t  down to  the lunar surface base, t o  several days f o r  
an Earth-based rescue. 
conditions are necessary: 
In order to minimize response times, the following i n i t i a l  
o If a rescue capability from Earth v ic in i ty  i s  required, it should be 
based on the surface. 
o Rescue tugs i n  lunar o rb i t  should have the capabili ty to make a 90- 
degree plane change pr ior  t o  landing on the lunar surface. 
rescue tug should be fu l ly  loaded with propellant and i n  standby 
condition i n  orbi t .  
The 
o Rescue tugs must be able to  land on the lunar surface under d.1 
conditions of l ight ing and sun elevation, and landing aids such as 
m 
8 
L 
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tracking beacons, boundary markers, and area l ight ing should be 
available on the surface t o  mark the landing area. 
A V Requirements 
The Escape/Rescue plan i s  predicated on a lander tug with a nominal AV cap- 
a b i l i t y  of 15,000 ft/sec. 
rescue operations when s ta r t ing  with fill propellant tanks: 
Such a tug can accomplish the following escape/ 
o Return to  the Earth vicini ty  f r o m  lunar o rb i t  
o Descend t o  the lunar surface and return to an o rb i t a l  lunar s ta t ion 
(with no plane changes) 
o Ekecute a 90-degree plane change and descend f r o m  o rb i t  to  the lunar 
surface. 
rescue mission 
Provide a temporary safe haven while awaiting a further 
o Ascend from the lunar surface, execute a 90-degree plane change, 
rendezvous, and dock with an orbi t ing lunar s ta t ion  
o Rescue a crew compartment from lunar o rb i t  o r  from a lunar escape 
trajectory and return to an orbiting lunar s ta t ion  
These operations are a l l  tha t  are required to  rescue a crew from any lunar 
s i tua t ion  and return them to a temporary o r  permanent safe haven. 
f t /sec capability i s  suff ic ient  t o  complete all escape/rescue missions and 
arr ive a t  a permanent safe haven for  a l l  except two of the si tuations examined; 
the two exceptions are: 
The 15,000 
1. Rescue of the crew i n  the orbit ing lunar s ta t ion by a tug from the 
lunar surface 
2. Rescue of a crew on the lunar surface, by a tug from the orbit ing 
lunar s ta t ion,  i n  a si tuation requiring a large plane change. 
4.- 5 
For the  first case, once a temporary safe haven is  provided i n  the  rescue 
tug, f r o m  the lunar surface, the tug must remain i n  lunar  o r b i t  to await a i d  from 
the Earth vicini ty .  
u n t i l  a second o r b i t a l  tug can make a descent without a plane change, which 
may be as long as 14 days, and can e i t h e r  bring addi t ional  propellant o r  
re turn  the rescued crew to the o r b i t a l  s ta t ion.  
For the second case, the tug must w a i t  on the  lunar surface 
EscaDe/Rescue/survival fiuipment 
In addition t o  the requirements and operational r e s t r i c t i o n s  given i n  the 
preceding sections, the need f o r  spec i f ic  devices and procedures t o  a id  rescue 
i s  pointed out i n  the study. 
One of the major items o f  new equipment i s  a portable a i r lock t o  allow crewmen 
i n  an EVA mode to  en ter  a shir ts leeve compartment without destroying the ambient 
atmosphere. The portable a i r lock should be s m a l l  and l i g h t  enough t o  be handled 
by no more than two crewmen, but should be expandable to a large enough s i ze  to 
accommodate an incapacitated m a n  i n  a pressurized s t re tcher  and a second man i n  
a pressure suit with backpack. 
Other recommendations include portable instrumentation, loca tor  aids, attachment 
and docking aids, handcarts, and emergency access doors. 
EVA during refueling of the tug, it i s  recommended t h a t  interchangeable 
propellant modules, t ha t  would not require EVA f o r  coupling and connecting of 
supply l i nes ,  be considered. 
In order to eliminate 
8 
4.2 HAZARDS ANALYSIS 
rc 
The results of the Hazards Analysis task are i n  the nature of hazards ident i f ied ,  
corrective rceasures and safety guidelines proposed to counter those hazards, 
and recommexdations f o r  additional study and safety technology development. 
Hazards Analysis results having major program impact a r e  summarized i n  the 
following seven areas. 
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Extravehicular Act ivi ty  
. 
The Hazards Analysis l ed  to a c l e a r  conclusion t h a t  disproportionate r i s k s  a re  
present i n  extravehicular a c t i v i t y  (EVA). 
l imi t a t ions  of any current o r  projected space s u i t  and l i f e  support backpack 
design, and include: 
a iding an ill, injured, o r  vomiting astronaut; c r i t i c a l  consequences of suit  
rupture o r  backpack f a i l u r e ;  and short s o r t i e  l i fe t ime f o r  EVA backpacks. 
r i s k s  should be minimized by: 
These r i s k s  r e s u l t  from the inherent 
lack of astronaut mobility; lack of access to permit 
These 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 .  
8. 
9. 
Limiting EVA to those functions which cannot be e f f i c i e n t l y  
performed by means not requiring EVA 
Requiring use of the buddy system o r  presence of a safety 
man f o r  a l l  EVA a c t i v i t i e s  
Developing new pressurized suits and backpacks with integrated 
design, increased mobility, increased s o r t i e  l i fe t ime,  access 
through the face mask t o  render aid, and easy repa i r  of minor suit 
3 --- -_ 
uaua5c 
Developing means f o r  switching backpacks safely,  bu t  not using t h i s  
as a normal means f o r  extending EVA 
Devising means f o r  a single astronaut to move an unconscious EVA 
astronaut from an accident locat ion to a nearby safe  haven 
Developing means fo r  an EVA astronaut to share all backpack f’unctions 
with a buddy astronaut 
Developing means fo r  supplying all power, communication and metabolic 
needs f o r  an EVA astronaut through external  plug-ins on the ex te r io r  
of a s t a t i o n  o r  base ( t h i s  must be accomplished without undue r i s k  
of losing s t a t ion  o r  base atmosphere through introducing addi t ional  
Leak paths. 
Designing doors, hatches, and a i r locks  on all pressure cabins to  
accommodate a s t re tcher  case plus  a f d l y  
Designing all vehicles t o  permit operation by a s ingle  crewman 
i n  a pressurized suit. 
sui ted crewman 
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While the r i s k s  accompanying EVA are recognized, it i s  a l s o  evident t h a t  EVA 
w i l l  be useful  and necessary i n  advanced lunar exploration. 
pressurized suit i s  desirable  as a backup during occupancy of a pressurized 
cabin. 
operation by a single crewman i n  a pressurized su i t .  
s ta t ion ,  o r  base should provide space su i t s ,  backpacks, emergency pressure 
garments, and emergency oxygen masks f o r  all crewmen. 
In addition, the 
This leads to the reqcirement t h a t  all vehicles be desigmd tc p e r a t  
Also, each vehicle,  
Crew Training 
Recent NASA planning information suggests t h a t  a mix o f  highly t ra ined astronauts 
and l e s s e r  trained technical spec ia l i s t s  may be considered f o r  lunar  exploration 
i n  the 1980's. 
varying from four to eight  o r  twelve men. 
so r t i e s  from orb i t  to o rb i t ,  o r b i t  t o  surface, o r  surface t o  surface, o r  when 
emergencies requiring rescue missions a r i s e ,  few men w i l l  be avai lable  a t  each 
s ta t ion ,  lander, base, and surface transportation vehicle. 
t h a t  each crewman must continue t o  be highly t ra ined i n  all aspects of the  
mission and hardware u n t i l  such time as the lunar exploration personnel complement 
i s  much l a rge r  than four-to-twelve men. 
The same information shows lunar  s t a t ion  and base complements 
This means t h a t  when men are  sent  on 
The analysis showed 
Failure Modes 
Certain functions were determined to be so c r i t i c a l  t o  safety t h a t  they should 
be designed to  fail-operational,  fail-operational,  fa i l - sa fe  philosophy. 
functions include propulsion, a t t i t u d e  coctrol ,  and power f o r  lunar landers 
and lunar flyers;  a l l  functions f o r  l i f e  support backpacks; and power 
navigation, and l i f e  support f o r  lunar  rovers. 
These 
Cabin and Sui t  AtmosDheric Pressures 
Compatibility o f  pressures i n  cabins and space suits i s  a potent ia l  major problem, 
An increase i n  the  pressure of pueoxygen i n  present suits from 3.5 psia ,  and a 
c 
a 
corresponding decrease i n  t o t a l  pressure of oxygen and nitrogen i n  cab-ims t o  
l e s s  than 14.7 psia,  a re  necessary i n  order t h a t  the t r ans i t i on  from cabin t o  
s u i t  can be made without a delay fo r  denitrogenixation. This w i l l  require  
detai led study t o  es tab l i sh  the  most desirable compromise pressure, taking 
in to  consideration the  design problems, disadvantages, and hazards of a s u i t  
with increased pressure. 
4 
Pressurized Compartments 
Each space vehicle or  cabin accommodating astronauts i n  sh i r t s leeves  must have 
a t  l e a s t  two pressure compartments, separate but interconnected, with each 
capable of supporting the e n t i r e  crew i n  an emergency f o r  a period of time 
commensurate with rescue time. 
event o f  f i r e ,  explosion, meteoroid puncture, o r  other damage which renders 
a compartment uninhabitable - a safe haven i s  immediately a t  hand. 
This is necessary i n  order t h a t  - i n  the  
Surface Transportation 
portat ion vehicle must be able t o  carry a t  l e a s t  one p i l o t  o r  driver,  plus one 
passenger who may be incapacitated. It i s  a l s o  recommended t h a t  surface trans- 
portat ion vehicles bcayond walk-back distance should be used i n  pairs ,  with each 
vehicle capable of carrying and supporting a l l  crewmen of bcth vehicles i n  an 
emergency. A l l  rover vehicles should be capable of carrying a nominal crew 
of three, including the  dr iver .  Each rover should have a minimum emergency 
capabi l i ty  t o  support and t ransport  four  crewmen, including the  dr iver ,  and 
should provide fo r  care of two men i n  pressurized s t re tchers .  
a t ing  mode would then be t o  send two rovers on s o r t i e  with two crewmen plus 
disposable payloal on each ( o r  three crewmen on one, one crewman on the other, 
and disposable payload on each). 
The normal oper- 
In the event t ha t  a 4-man emergency capabi l i ty  i s  found t o  impose an un- 
reasonable burden on the  lunar equipment del ivery systems, an acceptable al- 
t e rna te  i s  a 2-man nominal capacity rover with + m a n  emergency capabi l i ty .  
This rover could be operated i n  a biddy mode, with two men on one vehicle and 
one man plus disposable payload on the other.  a 
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4.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR FESEARCH 
Research o r  technology development e f f o r t s  t h a t  could lead t o  improved safety 
ir, ad-mczd >mar f i s s i o m  m r z  idznt i f ied  in several  aress. 
a r e  recommended f o r  consideration. 
The fnllnwing 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6. 
7.  
8. 
9. 
An integrated suit and backpack should be developed t o  eliminate 
external protuberances and hoses, t o  eliminate concern f o r  sequence 
of act ivat ion o r  deactivation, and t o  provide increased astronaut  
mobility performance capabi l i t ies .  
t o  share a l l  functions with a buddy astronaut in an emergency. 
Pressure suits should be developed/designed t o  operate a t  pres- 
sures which would eliminate the  need for  denitrogenization. 
Backpack switching a ids  and procedures should be developed, in 
conjunction with integrated suit and backpack development, t o  
permit safe switching by an unassisted EVA astronaut.  
Means should be developed f o r  sa fe ly  opening 821 EVA astronaut 's  
face mask t o  render a id .  
Means should be developed fo r  detect ing strains and poten t ia l  
failure of face masks during use. 
Emergency pressure garments, designed t o  be donned i n  f i v e  seconds 
o r  l e s s ,  should be developed. 
use of  this garment as a pressurized s t re tcher .  
A pressurized s t re tcher  should be developed - together with means 
f o r  handling and hois t ing of an unconscious crewman. 
gency pressure garment suggested in 6 above, should be considered 
as a poten t ia l  s t re tcher .  
A repair  k i t  analogous t o  the t i r e ' r e p a i r  k i t  should be developed 
fo r  on-the-spot remedy of a small- and medium-size suit  leaks 
during EVA. 
A "clockt1 should be developed to  inform a backpack wearer how much 
EVA time remains as a function o f  remaining oxygen supply and 
current use r a t e .  
The backpack should be designed 
Consideration should be given t o  
The emer- 
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10. 
ll. 
12. 
13 
14. 
15 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Hatch designs should be developed t o  provide f o r  normal and forced 
opening from e i the r  side. 
Design and developent  o f  a dust  co l lec tor  applicable t o  cleaning 
dust  from space suits, equipnent surfaces, etc. ,  in external lunar  
environment should be in i t i a t ed .  
The dynamics of lunar landing should be studied t o  determine whether 
an abor t  o r  hovering maneuver can be automatically programmed t o  
occur a t  any time the lander tilt a t t i t u d e  exceeds some pre-selected 
safe angle. 
Techniques f o r  navigation and obstacle  avoidance on the lunar surface 
during poor sun elevation or azimuth conditions should be improved. 
T h i s  might include study of polarizing f i l t e r s  f o r  a t tenuat ion o f  
l i g h t  re f lec ted  from the lunar surface. 
Means f o r  detect ing hidden cavi t ies  or  surface s t ructure  wealmesses 
cm the  Pxar s ~ z f s e e  fi.~;;; a z~- ;bg  vzhicls shauld be b-wst lga ted .  
Additional data a r e  required to  define the incidence, s ize ,  veloci ty ,  
and direct ion of large meteroids in the v i c i n i t y  of the moon. 
For use with large,  permanent o r b i t a l  s ta t ions ,  a cherry-picker-like 
device should be developed for ex ter ior  repa i r ,  maintenance, and 
service functions. T h i s  device would obviate the  need for  use of 
backpacks and long umbilicals. 
Tests should be i n i t i a t e d  t o  es tab l i sh  the meri ts  of (a )  evacuating 
cabin atmosphere t o  extinguish a f i r e ,  and (b) introducing an i n e r t  
gas while reducing cabin pressure t o  extinguish a f i r e .  
It i s  recommended that f’urther flammability t e s t ing  be carr ied out 
in mixed gas and in pure oxygen atmospheres w i t h  mater ia ls  now 
considered acceptable f o r  use in space cabins. 
Drug therapy as a means f o r  preventing o r  increasing tolerance f o r  
bends symptoms should be investigated. 
It i s  recommended that compression therapy techniques, such a s  the 
preasure bag, be developed for space appl icat ions to t r e a t  dysbarism 
symptoms. 
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4.4 SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT 
The Lunar  Mission Safety and Rescue Study was l imited in scope and depth 
thrc-qh t he  changing ,mture nf +&-e proposed Tntegrated Program Plan, lack  of 
hardware designs, and budget constraints.  
safety analyses continue in p a r a l l e l  w i t h  program and hardware def ini t ion,  
design, and developnent. 
It i s  therefore important that 
Some spec i f ic  suggestions are: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
A detai led study of the  safety aspects  of the  Apollo lunar landings 
and surface exploration would be most helpful  i n  preparing f o r  the 
hazards of landing, navigation, dust  e f fec ts ,  sun angle e f f ec t s ,  
surface physical conditions, including hidden crevasses and roofed 
holes, e tc .  
An extensive study of m e a n s  for  a r r e s t ing  angular motion of a space 
vehicle w i t h  a t t i t u d e  control f a i l ed  should be i n i t i a t e d .  T h i s  
study should include the  f’ull range of ve’nicle s i zes  ant ic ipated 
in advanced lunar exploration; disabled vehicles that are manned 
and unmanned; rescue vehicles that a r e  manned and unmanned; 
rotat ion rates from low t o  high; vehicles  that a r e  chemical and 
nuclear powered. 
Means f o r  safely capturing and disposing o f  d e r e l i c t  vehicles o r  
debris in lunar o r b i t  should be studied and developed. 
Additional study of the  safety t radeoffs  o f  propellant depots i s  
recommended. This should include depot designs, basing schemes, 
l iquid t ransfer ,  depot v s  no depot, and other per t inent  parameters. 
Specific s tudies  t o  ident i fy  the probable sources of human er ror  
l ike ly  t o  be encountered in advanced lunar exploration a r e  
recommended. The e r ro r  source information should then be used 
in program element design refinement for  safety enhancement. 
e f fo r t  should include as necessary, work-rest r a t i o s ,  fa t igue 
buildup reaction e r ro r  studies,  and such other human fac to r s  and 
mgineerjng aspects as may be required t o  suppress the poten t i s l  
f o r  human er ror  t o  minimum levels .  
The 
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